Gasóleo sobe 7 cêntimos, gasolina aumenta 2,5 após corte no ISP

[GAB]

alguem sabe explicar-me porque não consigo negociar algumas acções no BIG? como por exemplo a da empresa Zions Bancorp

Talvez por não ter esse activo disponivel para trade.

[Lboy]

alguem sabe explicar-me porque não consigo negociar algumas acções no BIG? como por exemplo a da empresa Zions Bancorp

[andren]

Fui ver a Zion por curiosidade, na 6 feira fechou a 82.70 e fez maximos de 83.45, tinha sido um bom negocio...

[GAB]

Laureate Educatin, Inc (LAUR)
provides educational services through campuses and online.

Sector: Services
Industry: Educational and Training Services

Market Capitalization: $2.51 billion

Average daily volume (3-month): 411 thousand shares

Closing Stock Price: $48.83

52-week high / 52-week low: 1.36

Beta (3-month): 0.41

Debt/Equity: 0

Profitable: Yes

Price/Sales: 2.69

Price/Book: 2.50

Price/Earnings: 34.78

Price/2006 Analyst Earnings Estimates: 20.09

Fundamental Analysis
Overview

Several catalysts for short-term price appreciation exist: A favorable earnings announcement, accelerating revenue and earnings growth, and a high short ratio.

Long-Term Growth

Revenues and earnings growth has been relatively strong during the past five years; revenues have grown at an average annual rate of 15.5%, and earnings have moved from negative territory to plus $85 million.

The strong long-term growth is a positive.

Recent Growth

Revenues for Q2 2006 came in 28.9% above revenues for Q1 2006, and 39.1% above revenues for Q2 2005. EPS for Q2 2006 was $0.72, up from -$0.01 in Q1 2006, and $0.38 in Q2 2005.

Shares Sold Short

Roughly 2.63 million shares were sold short as of the 12th of June; this is roughly 8 days of average volume. Many of shorts likely covered on Friday’s bullish earnings results, and sharp stock-price advance. However, the remaining short positions should add fuel to any positive momentum that materializes.

Analyst Forecasts

Analysts forecast 2006 EPS of $2.00, and 2007 EPS of $2.43. The spread of these estimates are $0.03 and $0.12, respectively. Analyst forecasts are for 20% annual EPS growth over the next five years.

Laureate’s managers are much more bullish than analysts; Laureate reiterated guidance for 2006 EPS of 2.05 to 2.15, and 2007 EPS of 2.59 to 2.67. Laureate’s chairman and CEO forecasts 25% annual EPS growth over the next five years.

During the MRQ, EPS came in at $0.77, well above the consensus estimate of $0.68.

Three analysts rate the stock as a Strong Buy, five rate it as a Buy, and four rate it as a Hold.

We view the tight analyst estimate spread, strong long-term growth estimates, positive ratings, and relatively bullish management forecasts as positive indicators for the stock.

TARGET: $54,50

[GAB]

ZION
chart(2)

[GAB]

Zions Bancorp. (ZION)
is a holding company of several banking and related companies in the US.
http://www.zionsbancorporation.com

Sector: Financial
Industry: Regional – Pacific Banks

Liquidity:
Market Capitalization: $8.21 billion
Average daily volume (3-month): 569 thousand shares
Closing Stock Price: $77.34

Risk Proxies:
52-week high / 52-week low: 1.28
Beta (3-month): 0.40
Debt/Equity: 1.23
Profitable: Yes

Valuation:
Price/Sales: 4.35
Price/Book: 1.89
Price/Earnings: 14.79
Price/2007 Analyst Earnings Estimates: 12.62

Forecast Duration: Up to one month

Technical Analysis
ZION’s chart has several bullish features:

The stock rose strongly on high volume Monday
The fast stochastic rose above the slow stochastic in oversold territory on Monday
The stock is near support

[GAB]

Leucadia National, Corp.
Ticker Symbol: LUK
Website: http://www.leucadia.com/

Sector: Conglomerates
Industry: Conglomerates

Market Capitalization: $6.27 billion
Enterprise Value: $5.41 billion
Average daily trading: 960 thousand shares // $29.3 million
Shares outstanding: 216.19 million
Float: 143.40 million
52-week stock price range: $18.90 - $32.62

Current price: 28.74
Fair valuation estimate: 35.89

Profile
Leucadia operates in a variety of businesses including primarily manufacturing, healthcare, telecommunications, real estate, winery operations.

Strategy
Business Plans

Leucadia National intends to continue what it has been doing: Operate its current assets, seek to acquire undervalued or troubled assets, improve the value of owned assets, and create favorable cash flow realizations.

Economic Moats
None of Leucadia’s segments enjoy significant economic moats. The company relies on superior management skill in generating returns.

Management Structure:

Ian M. Cumming
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Chief Executive Officer

Joseph Steinberg
Director, Member of the Executive Committee, Chief Operating Officer, President

Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg are the two key figures at Leucadia. They are supported by a relatively large number of exemplary senior managers. The continuing success of the company depends on these managers as well as the CEO and the President. In their 2005 letter to shareholders, Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg wrote:

[We] get most of the credit for what goes on in Leucadia but we should not–just some of it. We have a large group of dedicated hard working people who do most of the work and it is they who should get most of the credit. We are the orchestra conductors–we don’t play a note but we stand in front of everybody and wave a stick.

Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg oversee a broad team of mangers whom they make responsible for specific projects. So far they have done an exemplary job:

Return on equity has averaged greater than 20% per year since 1979
Return on the common stock has averaged greater than 25% per year since 1979
Both Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg have nine years remaining on their contracts with Leucadia.

We view management as being exceptionally straightforward, forthcoming, and honest in their letters to shareholders and in the company’s SEC filings; we view this as a substantial positive. As we wrote recently, management’s ethics and sense of fairness to shareholders may play a large role in value creation. A couple examples from their 2004 letter demonstrate these management qualities:

One of us is skeptical that WilTel will ever be a successful investment; the other continues to believe that there will be future riches on the wings of broadband!

We plan to continue to search for undervalued or out-of-favor assets that we can buy and improve. The pickings are slim, but our enthusiasm is unabated. If we run out of ideas or steam we will let you know and develop a plan to return money to our shareholders.

(Leucadia divested of most of the WilTel assets in 2005 for a profit.)


Corporate Governance

Institutional Shareholder Services rates Leucadia’s corporate governance as better than 43.9% of companies in the S&P 400, and as better than 79.6% of diversified financial companies.

Key positives of the current corporate governance structure:

The entire board of directors is elected annually
This makes takeovers possible in a timely manner, and forces managers to act responsibly
There is not a dual class shareholder structure
Company manager’s do not hold a disproportionate share of the voting rights – it is based on ownership
Simple majority votes are sufficient for the approval of a merger or change in the charter or bylaws
There is no poison pill in place
Poison pills are often used by managers who want to protect their jobs (and not for shareholder benefits)
75% of the members of the board of directors are independent
Board member independence helps ensure that shareholders are fairly represented
The entire audit committee is independent
The entire compensating committee is independent
The entire nominating committee is independent
Key negatives of the current corporate governance structure:

The CEO is also the Chairman of the board of directors
This is often a negative as it suggests that one officer has too much power to influence the company – this may result in unfair practices or overconfidence-induced mistakes.
We believe that Leucadia’s corporate governance structure is quite good for shareholders. Given the company’s history of tremendous success, Ian M. Cumming’s apparent honesty, and the existence of a President, we are comfortable with the combination of CEO and Chairman; the substantial institutional ownership of the stock (57.5%) and the reasonable size of the top ten institutional holdings (33.8%) also act to ensure Ian M. Cumming is acting in the best interests of shareholders.



Risks

Market Risk

We used data from July 6th, 1999 until July 3rd, 2006 to calculate the âeta against the S&P 500; we find it to equal 0.598. This value is robust to the elimination of outliers.



Industry Risks

Since Leucadia operates in a variety of industries, it is less subject to industry-specific risks than most other companies. However, Leucadia’s profitability is still subject to industry changes, especially in areas where it has relatively large operations – manufacturing, healthcare, telecommunications, real estate, and winery operations.

Firm Specific Risks

Leucadia benefits greatly from its strong management team. The loss of a senior manager would likely reduce our long-term earnings outlook. Although Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg report that they are in good health, they are both in their 60s.


The interest coverage ratio is high in comparison to historic averages. In consideration of the company’s relatively stable pretax earnings, this suggests good financial health. The total debt to equity and long-term debt to equity ratios are also low in comparison to their historic values; this is also suggestive of relatively good financial health. At the year end of FY 2005, the company had $387 million in cash and cash equivalents ($419 million at the end of Q1 2006).

Financial Statement Analysis

When first beginning to investigate Leucadia, we were confused why this liquid multibillion dollar company did not have any analyst coverage. We quickly figured it out. It is lots of work! Leucadia carries many items on its balance sheet at prices that may differ substantially from market rates, and the fair values of which are difficult to determine. It is also difficult and time-consuming to perform comprehensive analyses of all the components of Leucadia’s business. We have only done a partial, (although we believe relatively robust) analysis of Leucadia’s operations and financials.



Mark to Market Adjustments

Balance sheet

We mark to market the pension plan, make adjustments for off-balance-sheet financing (operating leases), eliminate goodwill, reduce the deferred tax asset to represent present rather than cash value, and mark-to-market shares held at cost for which there is a reliable price. We do not have reliable data for the values of other assets, so we do not mark them to market. However, based on the company’s historic realizations (and positive historic inflation and increasing real-estate prices), we would estimate that we are understating shareholder’s equity.




Asset adjustments (millions):

Deferred Tax Asset
$ (136.70)

Off-Balance Sheet Assets
$ 38.51

Off-Balance Sheet Guarantee
$ 85.10

Mark-to-Market of Investment
$ 64.10






Liability adjustments (millions):

Off-Balance Sheet Financing
$ 38.51

Off-Balance Sheet Guarantee
$ 85.10

Unrecognized Pension Expense
$ 40.74






The net results of our adjustments (millions):


Reported
Adjusted

Assets
$5,260.90
$5,311.91

Liabilities
$1,599.00
$1,763.35

Shareholder's Equity
$3,661.90
$3,548.56


Our balance sheet adjustments reduce the book value of the company by 3.1%.

Income

Adjusting earnings for stock option expense reduces earnings by an average of 0.54% during the past three years.


Earnings Quality

FY2005 earnings should not be interpreted as being representative, since they include nonrecurring events. However, earnings appear to be of high quality in that they do not exaggerate the profitability of the firm; we found no earnings quality warning signs. Earnings may be somewhat understated due to the use of exaggerated depreciation expense; free cash flows have been consistently higher than pretax income less normal corporate taxes (by a factor of three over the past five years, on average).



Free Cash Flow and Income (millions):

Free Cash Flow
$298.50
$85.10
$191.30
$111.90
$20.70

Pretax Income * (1 - Tax Rate)
$60.45
$85.67
$27.82
$8.58
$34.91




Recent Growth

After adjusting for divestitures, revenues and earnings have risen drastically over the past year. Revenues for Q1 2006 were $386.5 million; revenues for Q1 2005 were $121.3 million. Income from continuing operations (before income taxes and equity income from associated companies) for Q1 2006 was $109.9 million; income for Q1 2005 was -$17.2 million.



The strong recent revenue and earnings growth is a positive sign that the managers at LUK are continuing to create value.



Profitability

A large portion of Leucadia’s profits arise as a result of value-enhancement activities, rather than profits from continuing operations. The company’s operations also changed substantially in 2005, due to the sale of WilTel assets. Hence, we believe that traditional profitability metrics do not provide much value in our analysis. However, we have nevertheless included the basic profitability measures.



Using unadjusted income statement and balance sheet data:

Fiscal Year
2005
2004
2003

Gross Margin
46.99%
59.03%
68.03%

Operating Margin
19.84%
27.37%
9.46%

Return on Assets
31.10%
3.03%
2.21%

Return on Common Equity
44.68%
6.44%
4.55%





If you are looking at the above and thinking that it looks strange, you’re right. The ROA and ROE values include the effects of taxes (negative every year for the past five years) and the effects of discontinued operations.



The high gross and operating margins are a good sign of financial health.



Transaction Analysis

Acquisitions and Divestitures

Leucadia continues to provide value to shareholders through the acquisition of undervalued assets, value-enhancement activities, and the divestitures. Although the availability of appropriate and undervalued assets changes over time, Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg currently believe that there are several opportunities; in their 2005 shareholder letter they wrote:



We have many things in the hopper that look interesting and hopefully by next year at this time we will have a measurable reduction in cash and an increase in higher yielding investments.



This was in stark contrast to 2004’s letter, where they expressed concern over a lack of investment opportunities (Leucadia’s cash holdings increased by $110 million in 2005):



We plan to continue to search for undervalued or out-of-favor assets that we can buy and improve. The pickings are slim, but our enthusiasm is unabated. If we run out of ideas or steam we will let you know and develop a plan to return money to our shareholders.



We view the positive outlook for investment opportunities as a favorable signal of future return on equity.



The recent profitable divestiture of some WilTel assets is also a reassuring sign that the managers at Leucadia are continuing to produce value, especially since WilTel was from the troubled telecom industry.



Insider Transactions

Insider selling has been modest; net, 9,808 shares were sold over the past twelve months; 21,650 shares were bought, and 31,458 shares were sold.



Officer Hubert Eugene Scruggs Jr. sold 21,108 shares; his remaining stake is 25,392 shares.
Officer and Treasurer Thomas E. Mara sold 4,350 shares; he has 33,150 shares remaining in his portfolio.
Chairman and CEO Ian M. Cumming bought 200 shares; he now owns more than 12 million shares.
Director Jesse Clyde Nichols III sold 6,000 shares and then bought 6,450 shares; he now owns 103,520 shares.
Director Jeffrey C. Keil bought 5,000 shares; he now owns 5,000 shares.
The average purchase price for the insider transactions was $25.28/share (split adjusted); the average sale price was $23.24/share.



Although insider transactions were net sales, we view the transactions in a neutral light from a signaling perspective; insider transactions are usually sales.



Institutional Transactions

Institutional transactions have been essentially flat; institutions bought 10.3 million shares and sold 10.8 million shares.



From a signaling perspective, we view the institutional transactions as neutral.



Valuation

Relative Valuation

Leucadia’s price-to-book ratio of 1.65 is low in comparison to the industry average of 3.02, and also to the S&P 500 average of 2.75. In consideration of management’s proven ability to generate high long-term return on equity, we believe that this discount is unjustified.

LUK appears attractively priced from a relative value perspective.

Fair Value

We use the conservative mark-to-market adjustments outlined above and the effects of stock option dilution to adjust the reported book value. Our adjusted estimate of the fair value of net assets is $15.86/share.

The geometric average growth in book value per share has been roughly 14.5% over the past twenty years; this value has been relatively consistent across different time horizons.

Historic ROE has been high and relatively consistent over long periods of time:


Average ROE
Geometric Average Growth in Equity

5-year
15.68%
14.28%

10-year
15.46%
13.75%

15-year
17.47%
14.45%

20-year
17.61%
14.48%

25-year
22.97%
19.98%

We forecast that ROE will be a constant 14.3% for the next nine years (the duration of the contracts for Ian M. Cumming and Joseph Steinberg). Subsequently, we assume that ROE will decline by 1/3 of the difference between the current ROE and the steady-state ROE. We have set the steady-state ROE equal to the required return on equity.

For the fair return (and discount rate), we use an equity risk premium of 3% over bonds, our calculated beta1 of 0.598, and the current bond rate of 5.1%; the discount rate we use is 6.89%.



We apply the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (residual income) model to our adjusted book value of $15.86/share and our ROE projections.

We estimate the fair value of LUK to be $35.89. The fair value estimate’s position above the current stock price of $28.74 is relatively robust to changes in our assumptions.


All else held constant, V0 (fair value) > S0 (current stock price) if:

Beta
<
1.32

Equity Risk Premium
<
6.60%

9-year ROE
>
12.74%

Growth Reduction Fraction
<
100.00%

From an absolute valuation basis, the stock appears attractively priced at current levels.

Revaluation Catalysts

Although some catalysts may act to create minor short-term gains, no revaluation catalysts are likely to drive LUK to its fair value in the near-term. We believe the most likely catalyst for a revaluation is an improved corporate profile; this may be caused by:

Increased analyst coverage
Leucadia participating in high profile transactions
Increased media attention related to Warren Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway
Conclusion

We believe LUK is undervalued. Our estimate of fair value is $35.89.

Stock price revaluation to our fair value target is likely to take a long time; there are no substantial catalysts for revaluation.


Short-term upside is likely to be driven by increased corporate exposure to investors. Long-term upside will be driven by deal flow and value improvements to existing assets.

TECHNICALLY = NEUTRAL

[GAB]

JetBlue Airways, Corp. (JBLU) provides passenger air transportation services.

Sector: Services

Industry: Regional Airlines

Market Capitalization: $2.13 billion

Average daily volume (3-month): 5.4 million shares

Closing Stock Price: $12.24

52-week high / 52-week low: 1.89
Beta: N/A
Debt/Equity: 2.7

Price/Sales: 1.17

Price/Book: 2.39

Price/Earnings: Negative

Price/2007 Analyst Earnings Estimates: 48.96

Technical Analysis
JBLU rose more than 30% from late April until late June; since then, it has been consolidating in a bull flag formation.
A breakout would be bullish.

[GAB]

Nautilus, Inc (NLS)(develops, produces, and markets fitness products).

Sector: Consumer Goods
Industry: Sporting Goods

Market Capitalization: $487 Million

Average daily volume (3-month): 573 Thousand Shares

Closing Stock Price: $14.85



Risk Proxies:

52-week high / 52-week low: 2.19

Beta (3-month): 1.42

Debt/Equity: 0.05

Profitable: Yes



Valuation:

Price/Sales: 0.74

Price/Book: 1.91

Price/Earnings: 26.57

Price/2007 Analyst Earnings Estimates: 12.69

Overview

Based on our analysis of corporate governance, recent growth, long-term growth, growth projections, stock ownership, and valuations, we believe Nautilus, Inc. to be undervalued.



Corporate Governance

Institutional Shareholder Services rates NLS’s corporate governance as better than 90% of S&P 600 companies.



Recent Growth

Revenues for Q1 2006 came in 1.2% above revenues for Q4 2005, and 18.3% above revenues for Q1 of 2005. EPS for Q1 2006 was $0.16, up from $0.06 in Q4 2005, and down from $0.28 for Q1 2005.

Revenue and earnings growth has been moderate. We view it as neither a positive or a negative.

Long-Term Growth

Sales have grown at an average rate of 15.5% during the past five years. Unfortunately, growth has been nearly nonexistent during the past three years.

The weak growth rates of the past several years is bearish.

Insider Transactions

Insider trading in the stock has been mixed. Net, over 300,000 shares have been sold; however, the majority of transactions have been buys.

Net, we do not feel that the insider transactions are either a bullish or bearish sign.

Institutional Transactions

Recent institutional transactions have been positive. Net, 2.2 million shares have been bought. Gross, 14.9 million shares were bought, and 12.7 million shares were sold. Favorably, buying was concentrated within a few large institutions. Specifically:

Snyder Capital Management bought 2.6 million shares. The position was last reported to be a reasonably large 1.4% of their total portfolio size.
UBS Global Asset Management increased their position size by 1.9 million shares to 2.6 million shares.
Wells Capital Management bought 1.2 million shares.
ICM Asset Management bought 750 thousand shares, increasing their position to a total of 1.7 million shares. The position is now 2.2% of their total portfolio size.

The institutional buying = positive for the stock.

Shares Sold Short

Roughly 11 million shares were sold short as of the 12th of June; this represents approximately 20 days of average volume, and 37% of the outstanding float. If the stock rises substantially, it may cause short-sellers to cover their positions. If this happens, it could prompt an acceleration of the positive trend.

Analyst Forecasts

Analysts forecast 2006 EPS of $0.90, and 2007 EPS of $1.17. The spread of these estimates are $0.23 and $0.45, respectively. Forecasts are for 17.5% annual EPS growth over the next five years.

During the past two months, analysts have increased their estimates for this FY and the next FY.

This fiscal year: From $0.89 to $0.90
Next fiscal year: From $1.15 to $1.17
During the MRQ, EPS came in at $0.16, $0.01 above consensus estimates.

Six analysts rate the stock as a Strong Buy, three rate it as a buy, five rate it as a hold, and one rates it as a sell.

Strong long-term growth estimates, increasing estimates, and generally positive ratings as bullish indicators for the stock. The wide spread of analyst estimates is a bearish indicator.



Catalysts

Although the company has been troubled by manufacturing difficulties, several analysts believe that these issues will be largely resolved over the coming year. Meaningful development on this front would likely cause NLS shares to rise.



Valuations

After reviewing the recent analyst reports, we believe that the bullish analysts have stronger arguments than the bearish analyst. Given improving the improved earnings that analysts expect as a result of improved operations, we believe that NLS is undervalued. The stock is trading at a forward P/E ratio of 12.7, and a forward P/EG ratio of 0.725; these ratios are both low.

Technical Analysis

NEUTRAL

Chart 1 year;

[GAB]

Deerfield Triarc Capital Corporation (DFR) invests in real-estate related financial instruments.

Fundamental:

Sector: Financial

Industry: Diversified Investments



Liquidity:

Market Capitalization: $676 Million

Average daily volume (3-month): 179 Thousand Shares

Closing Stock Price: $13.10



Risk Proxies:

52-week high / 52-week low: 1.27

Beta (3-month): 0.99

Debt/Equity: 10.93

Profitable: Yes



Valuation:

Price/Sales: 9.21

Price/Book: 0.95

Price/Earnings: 10.08

Price/2007 Analyst Earnings Estimates: 7.36

Overview

Based on our analysis of recent growth, growth projections, stock ownership, and valuations, we believe Deerfield Triarc Capital to be substantially undervalued.



Recent Growth

Deerfield Triarc Capital has grown revenues rapidly over the past year, especially after its IPO in 2005. Revenues for Q1 2006 came in only 1.9% above revenues for Q4 2005, but were up over 314% from Q1 2005 revenues. EPS for Q1 2006 was $0.37, down from $0.41 in Q4 2005, and up from $0.22 for Q1 2005.



The strong revenue and EPS growth is a positive signal for the stock.



Insider Transactions

Insider trading in the stock has been generally positive. The vast majority of insider transactions have been purchases. It is important to note that the majority of insiders in this case are institutions with substantial beneficial ownership (not managers); however, we nevertheless view the buying as a substantial positive valuation signal.



Net, $8.5 million in stock were bought; Ross Financial Corporation was the only seller of the stock; the company sold $115.5 million in DFR. In order of size, purchases were made by:

Rushmore Investments (beneficial owner)
Ross Financial Corporation (beneficial owner; purchases were made before the sale, at slightly lower prices)
Howard Rubin (Director)
Gregory Sachs (Director)
Jonathan Trutter (Chief Executive Officer)
Richard Smith (Chief Financial Officer)
Robert Grien (President)

Institutional Transactions

Recent institutional transactions have been positive. Net, 2.5 million shares were bought by non-insider institutions; 6.3 million shares were bought, and 3.8 million shares were sold. The institutional buying is a positive signal for the stock. It is also a positive (according to empirical studies) that buying has been relatively concentrated:

Deutsche Bank bought 1.4 million shares
Gartmore Global Investments bought 1 million shares
Citadel Investment Management bought 499 thousand shares
Schneider Capital Management bought 440 thousand shares
Shares Sold Short

Although only 3% of the float is sold short, this represents 7.5 times the average daily volume of the stock. If a stock price rise prompts short-sellers to cover their positions, then the stock may be propelled upwards by a substantial amount in a short period of time.



Analyst Forecasts

Analysts forecast 2006 EPS of $1.58, and 2007 EPS of $1.78. The spread of these estimates are $0.25 and $0.34, respectively. Forecasts are for 10% annual EPS growth over the next five years.



During the past three months, analysts have increased their estimates for this quarter, this FY, and the next FY.

This quarter: From $0.37 to $0.39
This fiscal year: From $1.50 to $1.58
Next fiscal year: From $1.72 to $1.78
During the MRQ, EPS came in at $0.37, $0.03 above consensus estimates.

All four analysts covering the stock rate it as a Strong Buy.

Although the wide analyst estimate spreads are a negative, the, increasing estimates, and positive ratings are bullish indicators for the stock.

Comparative Valuations

DFR trades with a much lower P/EG ratio than the industry average; it’s P/EG ratio is 1.08; the industry average P/EG ratio is 1.58. The current P/E ratio is also lower than the industry average; it is 10.08 for DFR, and 15.75 for the industry.



Differences in P/E-related valuations are often reconciled by differences in P/B valuations. However, this is not the case with DFR; the stock’s P/B ratio (0.95) is substantially lower than the industry average (3.45).

Despite the lower valuations, operating margins are substantially higher for DFR than the industry; DFR has operating margins of 70.51%, whereas the industry’s operating margins are 46.45%.

The only stock in the diversified investments sector (97 stocks) that has a lower P/B ratio and positive earnings from continuing operations was delinquent in its regulatory filings, and is predicting losses for 2006.

Based on comparative valuations, DFR is very attractively priced.