Ao minuto: Moção de rejeição do PCP chumbada. Programa do Governo passa

[Branc0]

Essa teoria da balança negativa ser boa é de uma escola económica que enfim. Claro que é bom para quem está a conseguir consumir o que não tem na altura mas essa teoria implica que as coisas se manterão sempre assim o que eu pergunto se é minimamente expectável?

Friedman parece discordar de si próprio quando diz que não "há almoços grátis". Em que é que ficamos?

Como podes imaginar o meu pensamento é mais influenciado por outras escolas económicas como a Austríaca.

Entre outras razões (estabilidade politica, instituições democráticas, poder militar para as defender) isso explica porque alguém lhes empresta o dinheiro que eles não precisam de poupar.

Os EUA pedem dinheiro emprestado para pagar as dividas que têm. Isto indica incapacidade (ou falta de vontade) de gerar cash suficiente para pagar o capital + juros. A sustentatibilidade de isto acontecer ad-eternum é nula e os inimigos dos EUA não se sentirão obviamente na obrigação de os levar ao colo quando não se sentirem seguros com os seus bens.

[atomez]

Quando se fala do deficit americano convém ter em conta o superavit do valor acrescentado: a última vez que fiz as contas os EEUU com 35% do PIB mundial tinham 55% dos lucros mundiais consolidados.

Quer dizer, são a economia mais rentável do mundo.

E, não menos importante, 80% das patentes activas.

Entre outras razões (estabilidade politica, instituições democráticas, poder militar para as defender) isso explica porque alguém lhes empresta o dinheiro que eles não precisam de poupar.

Isso, e também terem as melhores universidades do mundo.

Essa é segundo muitos analistas a principal razão da sua supremacia mundial. Sendo ao mesmo tempo uma consequência.

E a esse nível não estão a perder a supremacia. Antes pelo contrário.

E mais outras coisitas como uma sociedade que estimula e premeia a competitividade, o espírito de empreendedorismo, o sucesso individual e colectivo.

E investidores com espírito de risco e enorme capital.

Como dizia John Doerr - o Silicon Valley é o lugar do mundo onde se faz a maior criação legal de riqueza de todos os tempos.

[Fogueiro]

Quando se fala do deficit americano convém ter em conta o superavit do valor acrescentado: a última vez que fiz as contas os EEUU com 35% do PIB mundial tinham 55% dos lucros mundiais consolidados.

E, não menos importante, 80% das patentes activas.

Entre outras razões (estabilidade politica, instituições democráticas, poder militar para as defender) isso explica porque alguém lhes empresta o dinheiro que eles não precisam de poupar.

[salvadorveiga]

Ja' agora aproveito pa deixar um artigo deste Chris Martenson...

Prepare to be shocked.

The US is insolvent. There is simply no way for our national bills to be paid under current levels of taxation and promised benefits. Our combined federal deficits now total more than 400% of GDP.

That is the conclusion of a recent Treasury/OMB report entitled Financial Report of the United States Government that was quietly slipped out on a Friday (12/15/06), deep in the holiday season, with little fanfare.

Sometimes I wonder why the Treasury Department doesn't just pay somebody to come in at 4:30 am on Christmas morning to release the report. Additionally, I've yet to read a single account of this report in any of the major news media outlets, but that is another matter.

But, hey, I understand. A report this bad requires all the muffling it can get.

In his accompanying statement to the report, David Walker, Comptroller of the US, warmed up his audience by stating that the GAO had found so many significant material deficiencies in the government's accounting systems that the GAO was "unable to express an opinion" on the financial statements. Ha ha! He really knows how to play an audience!

In accounting parlance, that's the same as telling your spouse, "Our checkbook is such an out of control mess, I can't tell if we're broke or rich!" The next time you have an unexplained rash of checking withdrawals from that fishing trip with your buddies, just tell her that you are "unable to express an opinion" and see how that flies. Let us know how it goes!

Then Walker went on to deliver the really bad news:

Despite improvement in both the fiscal year 2006 reported net operating cost and the cash-based budget deficit, the U.S. government's total reported liabilities, net social insurance commitments, and other fiscal exposures continue to grow and now total approximately $50 trillion, representing approximately four times the Nation's total output (GDP) in fiscal year 2006, up from about $20 trillion, or two times GDP in fiscal year 2000.

As this long-term fiscal imbalance continues to grow, the retirement of the "baby boom" generation is closer to becoming a reality with the first wave of boomers eligible for early retirement under Social Security in 2008.

Given these and other factors, it seems clear that the nation's current fiscal path is unsustainable and that tough choices by the President and the Congress are necessary in order to address the nation's large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance.


Wow! I know David Walker's been vocal lately about his concern over our economic future, but it seems almost impossible to ignore the implications of his statements above. From $20 trillion in fiscal exposures in 2000 to over $50 trillion in only six years? What shall we do for an encore, shoot for $100 trillion?

And how about the fact that boomers begin retiring in 2008...that always seemed to be waaaay out in the future. However, beginning January 1st we can start referring to 2008 as 'next year' instead of 'some point in the future too distant to get concerned about now.' Our economic problems need to be classified as growing, imminent, and unsustainable.

And let me clarify something. The $53 trillion shortfall is expressed as a 'net present value.' That means that in order to make the shortfall disappear, we'd have to have that amount of cash in the bank - today - earning interest (the GAO uses 5.7% & 5.8% as the assumed long-term rate of return). I'll say it again - $53 trillion, in the bank, today. Heck, I don't even know how much a trillion is- let alone fifty-three of 'em.

And next year we'd have to put even more into this mythical interest bearing account, simply because we didn't collect any interest on money we didn't put in the bank account this year. For the record, 5.7% on $53 trillion is a bit more than $3 trillion dollars, so you can see how the math is working against us here. This means the deficit will swell by at least another $3 trillion, plus whatever other shortfalls the government can rack up in the meantime. So call it another $4 trillion as an early guess for next year.

Given how studiously our nation is avoiding this topic, both in the major media outlets and during our last election cycle, I sometimes feel as if I live in a small mountain town that has decided to ignore an avalanche that has already let loose above, in favor of holding the annual kindergarten ski sale.

The Treasury Department soft-pedaled the whole unsustainable gigantic deficit thingy in last year's report, but they have taken a quite different approach this year. From page 10 of the report:

The net social insurance responsibilities scheduled benefits in excess of estimated revenues) indicate that those programs are on an unsustainable fiscal path and difficult choices will be necessary in order to address their large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance.

Delay is costly and choices will be more difficult as the retirement of the 'baby boom' gets closer to becoming a reality with the first wave of boomers eligible for retirement under Social Security in 2008.


I don't know how that could be any clearer. The US Treasury Department has issued a public report warning that we are on an unsustainable path and that we face difficult choices that will only become more costly the longer we delay.

Perhaps the reason US bonds and the dollar have held up so well is that we are far from alone in our predicament. In a recent article detailing why the UK Pound Sterling may fall, we read this horrifying evidence:

Officially, [UK] public sector net debt stands at £486.7bn. That's equal to US$953.9bn and represents a little under 38% of annual GDP. Add the state's "off balance sheet" debt, however - including its pension promises to state-paid employees - and the total shoots nearly three times higher. Research by the Centre for Policy Studies in London says it would put UK government deficits at a staggering 103% of GDP.


If we perform the same calculations for the US, however, we find that the official debt stands at $8.507 trillion or 65% of (nominal) GDP, but when we add in our "off balance sheet" items the national debt stands at $53 trillion or 403% of GDP.

Now that's horrifying. Staggering. Whatever you wish to call it. More than four hundred percent of GDP(!). And that's just at the federal level. We could easily make this story a bit more ominous by including state, municipal and corporate shortfalls. But let's not do that.

Here's what the federal shortfall means in the simplest terms.

· There is no way to 'grow out of this problem.'

What really jumps out is that the US financial position has deteriorated by over $22 trillion in only 4 years and $4.5 trillion in the last 12 months (see table below, from page 10 of the report).

The problem did not 'get better' as a result of the excellent economic growth over the past 3 years, but, rather, got worse, and is apparently accelerating to the downside. Any economic weakness will only exacerbate the problem. You should be aware that the budgetary assumptions of the US government are for greater than 5% nominal GDP growth through at least 2011. In other words, because no economic weakness is included in the deficit projections below, $53 trillion could be on the low side. Further, none of the long-term costs associated with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are factored in any of the numbers presented (thought to be upwards of $2 trillion more).





· The future will be defined by lowered standards of living.

As Lawrence Kotlikoff pointed out in his paper titled "Is the US Bankrupt?" posted to the St. Louis Federal Reserve website, the insolvency of the US will minimally require some combination of lowered entitlement payouts and higher taxes. Both of those represent less money in the taxpayer's pockets, and, last time I checked, less money meant a lower standard of living.

· Every government facing this position has opted to "print its way out of trouble."

That's an historical fact and our country shows no indications, unfortunately, of possessing the unique brand of political courage required to take a different route. In the simplest terms this means you and I will face a future of uncomfortably high inflation, possibly hyperinflation, if the US dollar loses its reserve currency status somewhere along the way.

Of course, it is impossible to print our way out of this particular pickle because printing money is inflationary and therefore a 'hidden tax' on everyone. What is the difference between having half of your money directly taken (taxed) by the government and having half of its value disappear due to inflation?

Nothing.

Except that raising taxes is political suicide, while the overprinting of money as the cause of inflation is conveniently never discussed by the US financial mainstream press (for some reason), and therefore goes undetected by a majority of people as a deliberate matter of policy. Ergo, we will get all manner of government monetary and fiscal excess, however carefully disguised as bailouts and deficit spending.

Unfortunately, all that printing can ever realistically accomplish is the preservation of a few DC jobs and the decimation of the middle and lower classes.

In summary, I am wondering how long we can pretend this problem does not exist? How long can we continue to buy stocks, flip houses, forget to save, pile up debt, import Chinese made goods, and export debt? Are these useful activities to perform while there's an economic avalanche bearing down upon us?

Unfortunately, I only know that hoping a significant and mounting problem will go away is not a winning strategy.

I know that we, as a nation, owe it to ourselves to have the hard conversation about our financial future sooner rather than later. And I suspect that conversation will have to begin right here, between you and me, because I cannot detect even the faintest glimmer that our current crop of leaders can distinguish between urgent and expedient.

What we need is a good, old-fashioned grassroots campaign.

In the meantime, I simply do not know of any way to fully protect oneself against the economic ravages resulting from poorly managed monetary and fiscal institutions. For what it's worth, I am heavily invested in gold and silver and will remain that way until the aforementioned institutions choose to confront "what is" rather than "what's expedient." This could be a very long-term investment.

Are you shocked?

Your Faithful information scout, Chris.

[atomez]

E sou eu que não percebo o quê exactamente?

Há sempre teorias para tudo.

Esse PDF é sobre a Balança de Pagamentos, em português balança comercial, a diferença entre o que é importado e exportado. Não entram aí os dividendos de investimentos no estrangeiro, turismo, investimento vindo estrangeiro, os chamados "invisíveis correntes".

Por isso é que Portugal tem uma balança comercial altamente deficitária (importa mais do que exporta) mas apesar de tudo vai-se aguentando com o turismo e as remessas dos emigrantes que equilibram a balança de pagamentos.

Também há quem ache que ter uma balança comercial negativa é bom:

Friedman and other economists have also pointed out that a large trade deficit (importation of goods) signals that the country's currency is strong and desirable. To Friedman, a trade deficit simply meant that consumers had opportunity to purchase and enjoy more goods at lower prices; conversely, a trade surplus implied that a country was exporting goods its own citizens did not get to consume or enjoy, while paying high prices for the goods they actually received.

Trocando por miudos -- a Alemanha (país exportador e com superavit) exporta Mercedes e Porsches para os EUA (país importador e deficitário) e os americanos acabam por comprar os ditos mais baratos (em termos de tempo de trabalho que têm de dispender para os comprar) que os alemães. O que é verdade!

Também, um défice de balança comercial de 5% do PIB como têm os EUA (700B em 13T) não é nada por aí além.

Dados de 2003:

The 2003 U.S. Balance of Payments

In 2003, the United States exported $714 billion of merchandise and imported $1,263 billion, for a merchandise trade deficit of $549 billion (see Table I). However, service exports were $305 billion and service imports were $246 billion, for a surplus of approximately $59 billion. The trade deficit on goods and services, therefore, was $490 billion. U.S. interest payments to other countries and U.S. interest income from abroad were $250 and $272, respectively, and there was a net outflow of $68 billion in unilateral transfers. Therefore, the current account showed an overall deficit of $536.

Capital account transactions yielded a net outflow of $3.1 billion. For the financial account, U.S. investors acquired $277 billion of assets abroad and foreign investors acquired $857 billion of assets in the United States, yielding a net financial and capital account surplus of $580 billion. That surplus, minus a statistical discrepancy of $34 billion, balanced the $536-billion current account deficit.

[Branc0]

Eu mostrei-te os dados (não sei se seguiste o link) do governo dos EUA a dizer que o défice comercial de produtos e serviços é prejudicial aos EUA nos ultimos 35 anos e está a crescer exponencialmente.

E sou eu que não percebo o quê exactamente?

Sim, eu percebo que eles desenham e vendem iPhones. E tu? Percebes que apesar de terem vendido 120 mil milhões a mais do que compraram em serviços tiveram um défice a nível de produtos de 820 mil milhões?

O PDF não é assim tão longo e um buraco de 700 mil milhões mesmo na ultima linha nota-se bem.

EDIT: Para quem tiver muito trabalho a abrir o link ficam aqui os dados de 2007 (em milhões de USD):

Serviços Exportados: 497,245
Serviços Importados: 378,130
Excedente: 119,115

Bens Exportados: 1,148,481
Bens Importados: 1,967,853
Defice: - 819,373

Total da balança comercial: 119,115 - 819,373 = - 700,258

A não ser que se conte exportar dívida como um serviço... isso é porreiro. Alguém quer importar a minha?

[atomez]

Se achas que não há problemas porque os americanos hão-de sempre conseguir trocar iPhones e titulos de tesouro por petróleo, aço e comida então realmente o céu será o limite para a prosperidade americana.

Eu simplesmente tenho as minhas duvidas...

Eu também não quero alongar a conversa, mas desculpa lá... you just don't get it! Tal como grande parte do pessoal que por aí aparece.

As economias mais desenvolvidas são economias de serviços.

Nos EUA, Canadá, Europa, Japão, Austrália, Nova Zelândia (basicamente a OCDE):

- menos de 5% da economia é agricultura (nos States é 3% e são autosuficientes, até são os maiores exportadores de produtos agrícolas do mundo; a Europa, felizmente, também é autosuficiente)

- a indústria (manufacturing) representa uns 15% ou menos

- 80% da economia ou mais são serviços

Até mesmo em Portugal mais de 70% da economia são serviços. O turismo é o mais rentável de todos.

Sabes qual é o maior sector económico americano e europeu? Serviços de saúde (healthcare). Só por si são 20% da economia. E nessa área os EUA e Europa são dominantes. Nem Japão nem China nem nada são importantes nisso. E aí não há outsourcing que lhe valha.

A seguir a healthcare vêm sectores de serviços como o financeiro, legal, entretenimento e tempos livres (Hollywood, TV, música, parques temáticos, desporto), ciência e tecnologia.

A realidade é esta. Petróleo, energia, matérias primas, indústria, não são o mais importante nas nossas economias.

Dr. House não é mera coincidência.

[Rabbi]

Olá Amigos,
todos todos todos os dólares
outrora perdidos.

Ou seja,
Com a crise do imobiliário e de subprime
Os EUA de futuro dólares retornarão
Porque quem hoje abarrota de
liquidez vai "tapar" esta crise.
Com o tempo, no entanto, tenho mais ou menos
uma e só uma percepção de que,
toda esta crise está a meio caminho.
Portanto os indices poderão descontar
-40% desde o último máximo do Verão
passado.

[Branc0]

Acho que já estamos aqui a ameaçar estragar o tópico ao Fogueiro quando eu só queria um pequeno comentário mas ele que nos perdoe

Os States exportam tecnologia, royalties, know how, direitos de autor, bonds (obrigações do tesouro) e até coisas como MBS (mortgage-backed securities) e CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) de modo que o resto do mundo, e em especial nós europeus, é que estamos a pagar pela crise sub-prime deles...

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/sta ... /gands.pdf

Isso é o balanço comercial de produtos e serviços (que incluem o tal "designed in California"). O ultimo ano positivo foi em 1973. Nos ultimos 10 anos o balanço negativo multiplicou 7 vezes.

Parece-me que os EUA estão "insolventes". Se fosse uma empresa qualquer já tinha sido fechada e liquidado os seus bens para pagar aos credores, mas como os credores somos todos (entenda-se os bancos centrais de todo o globo) assobiamos todos para o ar a ver se ninguém nota.

Quando digo que a China pode "ameaçar largar o USD" é dizer que um dos credores decidiu cortar as perdas e correr para a porta com o que ainda tem (trocando USD por mercadorias que necessite). Isto obviamente tem implicações graves pelo mundo fora e não acredito que seja feito de ânimo leve por quem quer que seja (inclusivé os chineses que obviamente preferem que as dividas sejam pagas normalmente).

A minha pergunta original refletia os factos das duas noticias:
1) A China decidiu dar uma mão e "segurar" o USD
2) A China avisa (pede/ameaça?) que não deve ficar a ver navios com a Freddie/Fannie
E da minha visão:
3) Os EUA têm o seu futuro dependente dos seus grandes credores entre os quais a China que não é propriamente uma aliada.

Se achas que não há problemas porque os americanos hão-de sempre conseguir trocar iPhones e titulos de tesouro por petróleo, aço e comida então realmente o céu será o limite para a prosperidade americana.

Eu simplesmente tenho as minhas duvidas...

[atomez]

:?: Como é que o câmbio é problema de outros numa economia que é importadora?

Economia importadora? Sim, de produtos de consumo. Que são fabricados onde for mais barato - China, Mexico, etc.

Como diz na caixa do iPhone -- "Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China." Está lá escarrapachado para todo o mundo ver. E onde é que fica a maior parte do valor? Na China ou na Apple???

A balança comercial deles é altamente deficitária, mas a balança de transacções não. Pelo contrário.

Os States exportam tecnologia, royalties, know how, direitos de autor, bonds (obrigações do tesouro) e até coisas como MBS (mortgage-backed securities) e CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) de modo que o resto do mundo, e em especial nós europeus, é que estamos a pagar pela crise sub-prime deles...

Tomáramos nós estar na "crise" deles.

[Branc0]

Para os américas 1 dolar vale 1 dolar, isso de taxas de câmbio é problema dos outros. (vantagens de ser a moeda de referência mundial)

Como é que o câmbio é problema de outros numa economia que é importadora?

Para os américas um dolar vale um dolar... um dolar é que já não vale nada

[atomez]

E eu estou é exactamente a falar não dos bonds mas das reservas em USD que estão a ser aumentadas. Estas serão cash puro e transacionáveis por qualquer tipo de mercadoria.

Precisamente. Mas a que valor? Se os chineses de repente quiserem comprar $2T de petróleo ou de ouro ou de outra coisa qualquer isso faz disparar o preço dessa coisa por aí a cima e eles só têm a perder.

Para os américas 1 dolar vale 1 dolar, isso de taxas de câmbio é problema dos outros. (vantagens de ser a moeda de referência mundial)

Tenho um amigo que vive em S. Jose, California, e que este ano veio cá passar férias, à Europa. E perguntei-lhe: "então vieste cá agora que o dollar está tão baixo?" Ao que ele retorquiu - "ora, desde que haja muitos..."

[Branc0]

Um aviso, um pedido ou ameaça? Achas possível que os Chineses retaliem o "entalanço" na Fannie & Freddie largando o USD?

Mas eles "largam" os USDs para quem??? Quem é que os vai comprar?

Sendo que todo o tipo de mercadorias é transacionado em USD, "largar" o USD deve ser das coisas mais fáceis de fazer não? Basta encomendar "meia duzia" de barris de petroleo.

E eu estou é exactamente a falar não dos bonds mas das reservas em USD que estão a ser aumentadas. Estas serão cash puro e transacionáveis por qualquer tipo de mercadoria.

[atomez]

Um aviso, um pedido ou ameaça? Achas possível que os Chineses retaliem o "entalanço" na Fannie & Freddie largando o USD?

Mas eles "largam" os USDs para quem??? Quem é que os vai comprar?

Os chineses (ou melhor, o politburo) devem é estar a ficar preocupados é que daqui a pouco os $2T que têm nos cofres não valem nem um par de Nikes...

Isto foi escrito há 12 anos numa altura em que o Japão era o grande comprador de dívida pública americana. É só substituir "Japanese" por "Chinese":

The Future of Money

Were we ever in danger of a financial meltdown?

It can't happen. If the Japanese own US government bonds, and they decide to "pull out" their money, they have to find somebody who will buy those bonds and pay them cash. Now they have US dollars, which they can't spend in their own country, so they have to find somebody who will buy those dollars for Japanese yen. "The money is always there, but the pockets change," said Gertrude Stein, and she was dead right. Speculators and other destabilizing influences can churn a market, but the dollars in America never change.

[Branc0]

Já agora, o que achas destas duas noticias:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= ... lo2E01QVFI
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.j ... ina126.xml

Um aviso, um pedido ou ameaça? Achas possível que os Chineses retaliem o "entalanço" na Fannie & Freddie largando o USD?

Vês esta aquisição forçada pelos bancos comerciais de USD como a China a ganhar armas para poder pressionar os EUA ?

[Branc0]

Há um pormenor que não referi: creio que o Barclays, através do seu iShares Silver Trust ETF (SLV) tem em cofres prata que cobririam o short-selling verificado. Também poderiam ter negociado o lending a terceiros.

Neste caso não seria "naked"

Só para confirmar que o SLV tem +/- 1 tonelada a mais em cofres do que aquilo que foi shortado no ultimo mês pelos dois bancos norte-americanos desconhecidos.

Achas que faz sentido esta operação? A ultima vez que vi a lease rate da prata não chegava a 0.25% já para não falar na desonestidade intelectual por detrás de um fundo que serve para os investidores acumularem prata, usar essa mesma prata para deprimir o mercado onde os investidores estão. Mas presumo que a desonestidade não seja algo que faça Wall Street perder o sono

[Fogueiro]

Há um pormenor que não referi: creio que o Barclays, através do seu iShares Silver Trust ETF (SLV) tem em cofres prata que cobririam o short-selling verificado. Também poderiam ter negociado o lending a terceiros.

Neste caso não seria "naked"

[nunofaustino]

Nuno, já respondi, está na pg anterior, meu post de 23/8/2008 4:02.

Obrigado... não tinha reparado .

Um abr
Nuno

[Fogueiro]

A TT Gustav já é Furacão com ventos de 90 mph, está a atingir a Rep Dominicana e deverá passar entre a Jamaica e Cuba, dirigindo-se para o GOM, onde chegará no Domingo se a rota e velocidade de deslocação do "olho" se mantiver.

[Fogueiro]

Nuno, já respondi, está na pg anterior, meu post de 23/8/2008 4:02.

[nunofaustino]

Oi Fogueiro...

O que dizes sobre esta questão que o Branc0 levantou neste post sobre a prata (http://caldeiraodebolsa.jornaldenegocio ... hp?t=64171)?

Um abr
Nuno

[Fogueiro]

Sim, vale a pena ver e ouvir atentamente. Obrigado por colocar aqui o link.

Aproveito para deixar informação recente sobre consumo, através do último Inquérito da ChangeWave Alliance sobre o comportamento dos consumidores americanos:

The Consumer Squeeze

http://tinyurl.com/5e7xum
...

[salvadorveiga]

Fogueiro esse artigo e' muito interessante e esta' em linha de conta do que e' falado por este rapaz aqui:

http://www.chrismartenson.com/crashcourse

Existem 2 ou 3 capitulos de que ele fala do "failure of banking system as we know it", uma vez que ele afirma que e' insustentavel no medio longo prazo...

Ja' vi este video completo por 2 x's e alguns capitulos mais que 2 para inteirar bem os conceitos...

[acintra]

Nestas férias, que infelizmente acabaram hoje, estive em Istambul na mesma altura que o presidente do Irão, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Os media mencionavam que a ida á Turquia era para aumentar a exportação de gás e com preços mais acessiveis, mas era principalmente para ganhar um voto muito importante na continuação do programa nuclear.
A Turquia, para alem de pertencer á NATO, quer entrar na EU e é o pais árabe mais ocidental de todos.
Os taxistas e comerciantes que questionei sobre a presença de Mahmud Ahmadinejad na Turquia, foram unanimes em considerar, que o homem é um doido e que os Turcos nunca o vão apoiar.

Gostei imenso da cidade e do povo, apesar de ter tido um problemazito na Mesquita Azul.

[Fogueiro]

Muito se tem falado sobre a possível nacionalização das GSEs Fannie e Freddie como indispensável para minorar a crise do crédito hipotecário nos EEUU.

Será improvável que o Paulson se arrisque a tirar as acções FNM e FRE aos seus proprietários sem que a crise chegue a limites de insolvência, como no caso Bear Sterms. Teria que enfrentar montes de acções judicias.

Embora longo, vale a pena ler este artigo do John Mauldin, que analisa a situação nas suas diferentes implicações:

It's more than Fannie and Freddie

Yet another crisis confronts us, as we will have to deal with the aftermath of a rather large number of bank failures over the next year, which is likely to overwhelm the ability of the FDIC to insure your bank deposits. Today we look at the banking system, the FDIC, and Freddie and Fannie. It's not pretty, but as realists we must know what we are facing.

The US Banking System Is in Trouble

A few weeks ago when I was in Maine, I met Chris Whalen. Chris is the managing director of a service called Institutional Risk Analytics, whose primary business is analyzing the health of banks and financial institutions. If you are one of their clients, you can go to their web site and drill quite deep into all aspects of every bank in America. And what they have done is come up with various metrics which compare how well-capitalized a bank is, how much risk it is taking, and what kind of losses (or profits) it can expect. It is a one of a kind firm, and the data gives Chris a very special perspective on the US banking system.

And what he sees is not pretty. There is a crisis brewing. He expects 100 banks to fail between now and July of 2009. Most of them will be small, but there will be a few large banks. The total assets of those banks he estimates to be $850 billion (not a typo!). Those are the assets the FDIC is going to have to cover when they take over the banks.

Take Washington Mutual as an example. There are problems there. Their debt now trades at 20%, which is worse than junk. There is no way they could issue preferred stock to recapitalize their business. And they are going to need more capital, as they have writedowns in their future due to the slowing of the economy. Any common issue would have to seriously dilute existing shareholders almost to the point of nothing. There are circumstances in which they can survive, but it would take a remarkable recovery for the US economy, which is not likely. Maybe management can pull a rabbit out of the hat, but it will need some strong magic to get the capital they need at a cost they can live with.

The FDIC has about $50 billion. These reserves have been built up over the years from deposit insurance paid by banks that are part of the program. They are going to need an estimated $20 billion just to cover the failure of Indy Mac. The FDIC will have to cover only a small percentage of the $850 billion, as some of those assets will surely be good. But if they have to cover 10%, then the FDIC would need another $50 billion. Does that sound like a lot? Chris thinks a more conservative number for planning purposes would be 20-25% potential losses, and you hope it does not get there.

Sometime in the next few quarters, Congress and the President, either the current group or early in the term of the next President, are going to have to address that potential shortfall, before we see bank runs as people fear that FDIC insurance reserves may not be enough. The very sad fact is that taxpayers are going to be on the hook for some time. What is likely to happen is that a loan facility will be made to the FDIC so they can borrow as much as they need, and pay it back from future bank insurance payments.

You can't make up the shortfall just by raising fees. Chris points out that raising fees right now is not really a winning option, as that just makes the financial books of marginal banks even worse. You can raise rates as the banking system returns to health.

If Congress and the President wait too long, there could be a very serious problem, as depositors could start moving their funds under $100,000 (the insured amount) to what they perceive may be a safer bank than their current bank. Rumors could run rampant. This is something that needs to be addressed now. Frankly, this should be addressed right after the elections AT THE LATEST, in consultation with Congress and the new President.

If you are worried about your bank, you can go to Chris's web site and pay $50 for a brief analysis of your bank and an update for the next four quarters. If you have less than $100,000 in your accounts, you should not worry. But for businesses with large deposits and cash flows, it might be worth checking on the health of your bank. The link is http://us1.institutionalriskanalytics.c ... ate=bmg123.

You can click on the link that says "Click here for the free samples" in the lower right corner of the page to see if the format of what they offer is something you would find useful.

$500 Billion and Counting

We have seen some $505 billion in bank write-offs so far in this credit crisis. It is serious naiveté to assume that this will be the extent of it. Most of the write-offs have been mortgage-related. We have not yet seen the write-offs that will come as consumers start defaulting on credit cards, auto loans, and other consumer debt. Neither have we seen the losses that will come from commercial real estate or corporate loan as the recession progresses. You can't write off something until it goes bad, although you can increase your loan loss provisions. This of course hits earnings and your stock price and thus your ability to raise new equity. It presents a very difficult dilemma for bank managers and investors deciding whether to invest or go away.

Sober-minded analysis from the IMF suggests that the total write-offs by all banks may be $1 trillion. Dr. Nouriel Roubini is much more alarmed and puts the potential losses at closer to $2 trillion. That means that banks over time are going to have to increase their loan loss provisions, hitting both earnings and capital. And that means they will have to raise more investment capital and equity at a time when their stock prices are low.

It is a vicious spiral. Banks have less capital, so they are able to lend less to the very businesses that need the money; and without said money the businesses will be less capable of paying their current loans, which means that banks have less capital. Rinse and repeat.

That only prolongs the recession and Muddle Through Economy, which hurts consumers and corporate profits, which in turn puts more pressure on banks. Ultimately it means that banks are going to have to raise a lot more capital than anyone who is buying financial stocks today imagines. And it is largely going to be expensive capital. Look at this note from Bennet Sedacca of Atlantic Advisors:

"Financial entities like banks, broker/dealers, regional banks, finance companies, and insurance companies need credit at reasonable rates in order to finance themselves. I have been concerned for many years that the door would finally shut on banks, brokers and others to raise new capital in the debt markets.

"For many regional banks like KeyCorp, Zions, Regions, and National City, the door has already shut on them--if they wanted to raise capital in the debt market at levels where their outstanding issues regularly trade, they would have to pay 12-15%, hardly economic levels. GM bonds trade near 27% yields. Washington Mutual trades north of 15%.

"Then there are the 'good banks', like J.P. Morgan and Wells Fargo. J.P. Morgan recently sold $600 million of preferred stock at 8 3/4 % and Wells Fargo sold $1.3 billion at 8 5/8%, plus underwriting fees.

"Below I offer up a few guesses of what other issuers would have to pay to issue preferred stock.

Lehman Brothers--11-13%.
Merrill Lynch--11-12%.
Morgan Stanley--9-10%.
Citigroup--9 1/2-10 1/2%.
CIT Group--12-15%.
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac---15%
Keycorp--11-13%.
National City--13-15%.
Wachovia--10-12%.
Zions Bancorp--13-15%.
GM/GMAC--not possible.
Washington Mutual--not possible.
Ford--not possible."

Bennet does note a good point. Banks that conserved capital and managed their risks well will be in good shape to take over weaker brethren. They will have access to the capital markets for the money they need for expansion. My own bank was acquired recently by another small regional bank. Deals are getting done.

In another note, and to illustrate this point, Sedacca points out that it is not just Freddie and Fannie. Besides Washington Mutual, mentioned above, "RF (Regions Financial) needs to raise $2 billion says Sanford Bernstein. Let's see, what are their options? They can sell debt. The problem here is that you couldn't sell debt if you wanted. The last reported trade in RF paper was 2 weeks ago nearly +700 to the 30 year or close to 12%. Their preferreds trade at 10% and the stock is now a 'single digit midget' near $8 a share. So if you could even get a deal done, shareholders would get a 50% haircut."

Fannie, Freddie, and the Credit Crisis

Let's turn to Freddie and Fannie. There must be some people who think there is some way that the shareholders of Fannie and Freddie will not lose everything, as their shares actually trade. This just simply goes to show that you can fool some of the people some of the time. And as we will see, some of those people are very serious institutions.

It is almost a forgone conclusion that the US Treasury will have to step in and for all intents and purposes nationalize the two government-sponsored enterprises. The estimated losses in these two firms are far beyond what they could raise in a traditional market. And the longer the government waits, the worse the situation is likely to get.

Moody's downgraded the preferred stock in these firms to almost junk level because of the increased likelihood of "direct support" from the US Treasury, which, depending on the nature of the support, could wipe out both the holders of the common and the preferred. The preferred shares have already lost half their value since June 30 on speculation that an intervention would mean a stop in dividend payments (highly likely) and issuance of new preferred that would take preference over current preferred.

Interestingly, this would put more pressure on the banking system, as many banks hold the GSE preferred shares as assets, choosing to get a little extra return over traditional and more conservative assets. But then of course, Fannie and Freddie preferred were considered safe just a few months ago, with the best ratings from Moody's.

"Regional banks including Midwest Bank Holdings Inc., Sovereign Bancorp and Frontier Financial Corp., may have the most to lose. Melrose Park, Illinois-based Midwest has $67.5 million, or as much as 23 percent of its risk-weighted assets, in the preferred stock, while Philadelphia-based Sovereign owns about $623 million and Everett, Washington-based Frontier about $5 million." (Bloomberg)

It is doubtful that banks which hold these assets have written them down yet, but with a downgrade they will almost certainly be forced to do so in the near future. For the record, Fannie Mae has 17 classes of preferred stock, with more than 600 million shares outstanding. Freddie Mac has 24 classes of preferred stock, with about 460 million shares outstanding. The existing shares are trading worse than junk bonds, paying 17-19%.

And it may be a total write-off. It is hard to imagine how Treasury Secretary Paulson, or a new Treasury Secretary next year, could put US taxpayer money into the companies at risk without wiping out the current common and preferred shareholders. The justified outrage would be huge.

The basic problem is that without Freddie and Fannie the US mortgage market would go from crippled to moribund, if not dead. We have created a system that could not function in the short term without them, and the pain of allowing them to collapse would be another 1930s-style Depression, the era in which these firms were first created. They were never designed to take on the huge leverage they did, or to use hundreds of millions in lobbyist money and campaign contributions to create a massive payment scheme for management and shareholders. Congressional estimates are that this could cost US taxpayers $25 billion, a significant multiple of their current market caps.

Fannie and Freddie will not be able to raise capital on their own. At this point, why would any rational investor put that much money into a company with such a convoluted preferred share scheme, without government guarantees? That estimated loss assumes that the housing market does not get worse from this point. Losses could be much worse, or things could get better. Who knows? Why invest in something with so much uncertainty?

But there are more problems. You can't just take someone else's property, and that is what stock is, without some serious reasons. You almost are forced to wait for a crisis, otherwise shareholders would sue, saying that they suffered unnecessary losses. You can certainly expect the preferred shareholders to sue. That is why Paulson hired JP Morgan to figure out how to recapitalize the banks. I don't envy the people who are working on that one. Maybe there is some magic somewhere, but as we saw with Bear Stearns, at the end of the day it is all about adequate capital.

The GSE companies should be adequately capitalized and broken up into much smaller firms that would not be too big too fail in the future, and put under a regulator that would enforce reasonable leverage limits, with the profits going to pay back the US taxpayer before any profits or dividends are paid to any other future owners.

That is, if the government takes the two GSEs and puts capital (probably in the form of loans and guarantees) into them, which puts taxpayers at risk, then allows a public offering of the smaller entities to raise capital to repay the loans, any shortfall should be made up by the issuance of preferred shares, and the common shareowners would wait until the government loan was repaid before they would be eligible for a dividend.

And the people responsible for creating the leveraged systems, the board, et al., should be forced to resign. New top management all around.

The ultimate goal should be for taxpayers to get their money back and any guarantee, implicit or explicit, to be removed. No mortgage bank should ever again be allowed to be too big too fail.

Now, taken as a part of the total credit crisis, which will run to over $1 trillion (at least), $25 billion may not seem like a lot. But I hope this is a wake-up call for better regulations and safeguards.

And before I go, let me reiterate my call for regulators to force banks to move their credit default swaps to an exchange. The potential for a blow-up is serious, and it could dwarf the current credit crisis. I am not saying it will happen, just that it could. Even a low-risk event should be protected against. Credit default swaps are legitimate business transactions. They are very useful. They should just be put on an exchange, like futures or options, where there is 100% transparency as to counterparty risk.

John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com