Montenegro anuncia redução de IRS nas rendas, isenção de mais-valias e maior dedução à coleta

[FRM]

Boas,

Normalmente nem costumo acompanhar o Cramer mas também achei a intervenção dele na CNBC hoje interessante.

Até me pareceu estranho terem deixado ir assim para o ar, e penso que até possa haver consequências para ele.

Fica o registo:

http://www.cnbc.com/id/22706231/site/14081545

Cumprimentos

[Silverwolf]

Exactamente! Agora o problema é eu tenho um banco e tenho os meus próprios créditos que sei quais poderão ser default, outros créditos vendi a outros bancos para não ficar com todo o risco, e esses bancos por sua vez também venderam alguns créditos a outros bancos...

no final de contas ninguem percebe bem a imensidão do problema e se um destes bancos ou seguradoras fica aflito e não paga estas obrigações, começa uma bola de neve de bancos que não vão receber $...

Parece-me até que no meio disto tudo o maior problema é mesmo a incerteza...

[Ulisses Pereira]

Pelo que me parece, o Cramer defende que os bancos que fazem a "securitização" das obrigações de algumas empresas estão ainda em grandes dificuldades. Basta pensar no que está a sofrer o Banco que fazia a "securitização" das obrigações da Countrywide...

Um abraço,
Ulisses

[MNFV]

Ulisses,

Não sei se serei o único, mas entre conceitos finaneceiros e o ingês fiquei com dúvidas.

Podes esclarecer-mas (nos); Qual a diferença entre os bancos para uns já terem atingido o fundo da crise subprime e outros não?

Obrigado

[Ulisses Pereira]

"MER Shows Why We're Not Near Bottom"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist
1/17/2008 8:39 AM EST


"Oh boy, worse than even I thought. Go through the Merrill (MER - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) release. They have bonds that they thought were insured that aren't anymore because of counter-party risk. That's the linchpin again.


Remember, there are two reasons we haven't even gotten near the bottom of the subprime mess. One is that the firms that are stuck with this junk are sticking by the fiction that the problem is only subprime mortgages and not mortgages in general because a) they are insured anyway and b) there's never been a history of defaults on non-subprime paper.

And two, the firms that insured Merrill are sticking by the fiction that they can pay, buttressed by meager capital raisings and ratings agencies that stick by them because they don't know what they are doing.

Here's what you need to know: there is no subprime. There are just mortgages. Mortgages from around the country are defaulting if they were bought in 2005-2006 regardless of whether they're prime, subprime, AAA or B-. They are defaulting because so many of them have home equity loans away from the mortgages. If you have a AAA mortgage and a home equity loan and you bought between 2004 and 2008 -- and that's probably as many as 10 million borrowers -- the paper has a fairly likely chance of default.

So what do you do if you are Merrill or Citi (C - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating)? You decide that as long as it is AAA and insured, there is no need to take the hit.

You are out of the woods only if you have no residential mortgages that you did not originate (Wells (WFC - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) is better because it originated most of what it owns, but much of what it didn't originate is going bad).

Why is it fictional? Look at the amounts that an Ambac (ABK - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) or an MBIA (MBI - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) are raising to pay off the claims that are obviously amounting to tens of billions of dollars of guarantees: a billion here and a billion there.

The SEC doesn't care. The banks don't care. The buyers of the junk don't care. But New York's Superintendent of Insurance Eric Dinallo cares, because these insurers must pay off the muni owners, not just the Merrill and Citi CDO holders.

That's when the AAA -- rated that in part because of the insurance and in part because of the business models that have worked for years but aren't now -- paper crumbles.

That's when the real bottom will happen for these institutions, as it has already been reached for many other banks and brokers after this quarter.

I have said over and over again that without the failure of a monoline -- a member of Gang of Four, MBIA, Ambac, PMI (PMI - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) or MGIC (MTG - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) -- there will be no real bottom for the financials that need money. The ones that don't -- US Bancorp (USB - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating), Wells Fargo and JPMorgan (JPM - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) -- have bottomed already.

At the time of publication, Cramer was long Citigroup. "

(in www.realmoney.com)