Banca surpreendida com negócio do Novo Banco

[EuroSexy]

F. Ramada, comprei numa altura em que o preço era absurdamente barato, depois dizem que o mercado é eficiente... A gestão é a mesma que a Altri, são empresas do mesmo grupo, basicamente, só que como a Altri tem muita visibilidade, nunca poderia ficar com um desconto tão grande como ficou a F. Ramada, o pessoal está sempre de olho na Altri.
E depois a F. Ramada tem investimentos na área da saúde, é sempre uma cena sexy.

[/quote]

E o que está a acontecer agora à Cofina? está absolutamente barata dada pelo mercado. Uma empresa com ROE de 25% Com PER de 7 com crescimento do capital próprio exponencial. Quando o lucro for maior e o PER também maior também estará disponivel para comprar.

[LTCM]

An important choice for many proprietary traders is whether to
focus on shorter or longer horizon strategies. Typically, shorter
horizon strategies get their edge from providing temporal liquidity
to a market place or predicting short-term trends that arise from inefficient trading.
Longer-term models focus on asset pricing inefficiencies.

How does implementation of these strategies compare?
Shorter-horizon investment strategies are desirable because
they tend to create higher Sharpe ratios. If your average holding
period is a day or a month, you have the opportunity of placing
many more bets than if you hold positions for three months to a
year or longer. On the flip side, shorter horizon strategies tend to
have capacity issues (it’s easy to make a small amount of money
with them, harder to make a lot of money). Shorter horizon strategies
also require serious investments in trading infrastructure,
since quick and inexpensive execution is much more important
than for longer horizon strategies.

Risk management for shorter horizon strategies tends to occur
through position trading rather than portfolio construction. Assets
are not held for long periods of time and portfolio characteristics
change quickly. The biggest risk for shorter horizon strategies is
model risk, or the risk that the trading strategy deployed has
stopped working. Since even the best trading strategies experience
periodic drawdowns, the hardest challenge for the short-term
model-based trader is to figure out whether his model is going
through a regular drawdown or has stopped working altogether.
Longer-horizon model-driven investment strategies have different
issues. Since assets are held for longer periods of time, execution
costs (although still important) are not the primary focus.

Statistical inference becomes more difficult and the danger of
overfitting or mining data becomes larger. Risk management for
longer-term strategies happens in portfolio construction: since
rebalancing occurs less frequently, more care needs to be taken to
ensure the portfolio is not exposed to unintended sources of risk.
Because they tend to have lower Sharpe ratios, longer horizon
strategies have a different kind of capacity issue—the manager’s
capacity for pain.

However, there is one advantage: because trading occurs less frequently it’s possible to lead a much occurs less frequently it’s possible to lead a much better lifestyle than if you’re running shorter horizon strategies!

[LTCM]

Two Sigma was co-founded in 2001 by ex-D.E. Shaw Group hedge fund quants John A. Overdeck, a statistician, and David M. Siegel, a computer scientist and artificial intelligence specialist. Both wanted to apply big-data analysis to money management.

From the outset, Mr. Siegel said, he and Mr. Overdeck were intent on creating a state-of-the-art, scientifically driven investment firm armed with the world's best computer systems.

“We had a very narrow focus in building this firm. We put every last ounce of our energy into building a big-data company,” Mr. Siegel said, noting somewhat wryly that he and Mr. Overdeck didn't imagine their big-data firm would become a big company.

Mr. Gulati described the firm's co-founders and co-chairmen as “big-data guys who looked at the world of finance … and realized that this industry was ripe for innovation. Every other industry in the world has been completely reinvented through technology, so why should investment management be an exception?”

“What you can do with supercomputers and the vast amount of data that's available, often unstructured data, is really changing the way people can — and should — invest,” Mr. Gulati said.

Using a single technology and research platform that strives to provide a 360-degree view of what drives the price of securities, Two Sigma's systems analyze massive amounts of data to produce hundreds of forecasts. Those forecasts are integrated with risk management, portfolio optimization, efficient trading and swift execution to guide investment in thousands of securities, including equities, fixed income, commodities, currencies and liquid derivatives.

The strategy works because it invests in such a diverse universe of securities to produce consistent, risk-adjusted uncorrelated returns, Mr. Gulati said. He would not provide returns of Two Sigma's investment funds.

Even as the firm's hedge funds were closing to new investors, Mr. Gulati said Two Sigma was working on customized solutions for institutional investors, including asset allocation, portfolio construction and improvements to internal trading execution.

Two Sigma's Beta One strategy, composed of long-only and 130/30 approaches, also has gained traction with about $3.5 billion under management to date.

[LTCM]

Eurekahedge: Winton Capital Management has an illustrious track record in the industry and has seen strong asset allocations to its global CTA/managed futures fund over the years. What had you originally envisioned for the company when setting it up 16 years ago and how, in your opinion, has it evolved since then? Could you also shed some light on the secret behind the firm’s longevity and how, in particular, has it managed to retain its appeal over the years.

When I set up Winton my dream was to become a billion dollar CTA. That took quite a few years to achieve but now we have surpassed that target substantially. The business has grown more than I could ever have anticipated. Our success has been achieved due to a mixture of luck, application, rigorous intellectual integrity (not fooling oneself!) and a patient dedication to research.

EH: The investment process at Winton Capital Management places a high degree of emphasis upon rigorous scientific analysis, discipline in approach and diversification of strategies. Given a market increasingly driven by news flows, do you think this systematic approach will continue to generate superior returns?

You are right, there is a balance to be struck by successful systematic managers between innovation and discipline, or between flexibility and dogmatism, depending on how you view it. Winton’s Board and governance processes are as well prepared as possible to take responsibility for the funds clients entrust to our care under all circumstances (And you can be sure that we think about and plan for some pretty extreme ones).

EH: Managers following systematic trading strategies are often torn between discipline and persistence in sticking to tested and proven systems, and evolution and innovation in adapting to changing market conditions and new market insights. How does your fund strike a balance between the two especially given its long track record? How would your strategy react to a new and unexpected extreme event that could have unforeseen effects on the fund’s performance?

As the events of the past few years have shown extreme events, whether financial or natural, are far from uncommon. Surprises have always happened in history and we have tried to design a trading system that can withstand such surprises. We do regular back tests to see how our current positions would have fared during past crises and how we would cope. History as Mark Twain said does not repeat itself but it rhymes.

EH: Over the last couple of years, CTA/managed futures funds have underperformed rival strategies in the hedge fund industry, with the Eurekahedge CTA/Managed Futures Hedge Fund Index returning 3.46% over the last three years. A number of trend following CTAs blamed active central bank intervention in the markets as the main culprit for this lacklustre performance. What is your take on this? And more importantly, how did Winton manage to defy these headwinds and outperform its rivals?

I am not a big fan of the QE explanation for poor performance by CTAs. It is true that QE has made risk free rates close to zero and that CTA track records, which are usually supplemented by interest, are having to make do without. But as for “normal market dynamics being interfered with” which is what some try to imply, I think it is a convenient excuse. There has always been government intervention in markets. Winton has taken moderate risk, we have targeted a lower volatility than most of our competitors since 2008 (the Winton Futures Fund targets a 10% volatility much lower than most of our peers which means we may do relatively better in periods of mediocre performance), avoided the most crowded trades and continued to innovate.

Whilst people may use QE as a convenient reason for their poor performance recently, Winton’s trend following systems made money last year, as did our cash equity portfolio (25% of the risk in the WFF is now on trading cash equities) and some of our non-trend following strategies. We do not see QE as an excuse but rather as a spur to innovate further. We believe we are different. We hope our focus on research makes us more likely to outperform our peers over the long term, but do not believe this means we will outperform them every year.

EH: Winton Capital Management runs multiple strategies concurrently in a wide variety of markets. How do your proprietary models generate their investment signals? Is manager discretion an important component of your asset allocation strategy?

The first part of the question is rather general. The same as everyone else’s, I guess! Our computers are fed lots of data and they produce orders which are directed into the markets almost 24 hours a day. In terms of ‘manager discretion’ the Winton Investment System is obviously designed by humans and is in a state of continual evolution. The main process driving this is our monthly investment management committee, chaired by our CIO, Matthew Beddall, which I always attend and play an active role in.

EH: CTA/managed futures funds are managing asset pools that are larger than ever before. Do you feel there is a crowding out effect given a number CTAs are running similar statistical strategies? How has this herding impacted your trading style and to what extent do your models utilise game theory concepts when sifting through investment opportunities? Do you feel the CTA/managed futures hedge fund strategy has more room for growth?

For example some of our scientists recently wrote a research paper looking at the efficacy of fast, medium and slow trend following from the mid 1980’s to-date. That paper, “The Historical Performance of Trend Following” can be found on our website. In general we found trend following systems to be effective in forecasting future price movements, but we observed a significant and persistent decline in the forecasting ability of those with the fastest turnover. While we have not yet speculated about the causes of the decline in performance, many might note that it coincides with a rise in assets under management in the CTA industry.

Only firms that are able to innovate through research and successfully commercialise their innovations will succeed in the long term. I founded Winton with that belief and 15 years and one financial crisis later nothing has changed that belief.

EH: Could you share with our readers a rough breakdown of your asset allocation across geographies? How do you distribute your portfolio to achieve maximum diversification benefits?

Well I cannot give you any very detailed breakdown but your readers would not be surprised to learn that the US is the region with the greatest risk weight in our portfolio, followed by Europe, then Asia. This is purely a function of liquidity. Portfolio construction is a complex field but obviously we direct our system towards areas where we perceive the highest opportunity and the lowest risk.

EH: We understand that your fund originally operated with a higher leverage, with volatility targeted at double that of what it currently is now. What is the rationale behind lowering the volatility target?

We have lowered our risk target as the years have passed because we have become increasingly sensitive to the dangers of leverage. LTCM, Amaranth, Goldman Global Alpha, not to mention the entire banking system have been destroyed, or nearly so, by excess leverage. If you are not highly leveraged you cannot be wiped out by a nasty surprise. We plan on staying in this business for the long term.

EH: A key part of your risk management involves abandoning traditional risk metrics that use a normal distribution and favouring your own sophisticated proprietary risk measurement techniques that are more sensitive to tail risk. Could you share with our readers more about your risk measures and how they contribute to better risk management?

Risk measures based on normal, parametric, distribution of returns have played a big part in financial mathematics in recent years. Perhaps that is why so many financial institutions have got into trouble! Risk is absolutely not a one dimensional concept; there is no unique quantitative definition of risk. Many naive market participants think they know what ‘the risk’ is. We have developed lots of different ways you assess risk quantitatively and we balance them all in a complex fashion.

EH: There has been a trend of more hedge funds adopting the 40 Act fund structure in the US to attract retail and conservative institutional investors, who were previously unable access their strategies. Do you see any opportunities for Winton Capital Management in this domain?

We have participated in 40 Acts as one among several advisors but not as a sole advisor to our own or anyone else’s fund. We continue to keep the space under review to see if there is anything of value we can offer there.

EH: Hedge funds have witnessed strong asset allocations in 2013. How has your fund fared in this regards and what investor classes (e.g. family offices, pension funds, HNWI, etc.) have been the most active in terms of capital allocations?

We have generally been flat to experiencing mild outflows as we are caught up in the CTA disappointment trend. This conceals the fact that we are seeing decent inflows from institutions (pensions and endowments) offset by outflows from retail funds.

EH: Lastly, thank you for your valuable insights and on a final note, please share with our readers your expectations on the global economy’s transition to a post-QE world. With interest rates expected to rise above their artificially depressed levels, what kind of adjustments do you foresee taking place in the currency, bonds and commodities markets and what opportunities or challenges will they unleash for trend following funds?

All my career I have been battling against the prevailing economic orthodoxy that markets are efficient. Winton is not about building economic theories to predict where economies and hence markets are going under different scenarios – we have always been about looking at the data, developing trading strategies based on what we learn from that data and letting the results speak for themselves. Our aim is to create a small edge in predicting how markets might behave, based on how they have behaved in the past.

I certainly have not got a crystal ball but governments around the world have had to ‘print’ a lot of money to prevent a debt deflation induced depression. That will probably lead lots of assets to be redenominated at higher nominal prices in the years to come and that might create good conditions for trend followers and CTAs. It is going to be tough staying in the game in the meantime whether you are a CTA or a client! But that is what we are paid for.

[fj201]

http://awealthofcommonsense.com/somethi ... ot-accept/

Something Most Investors Simply Cannot Accept
Posted on September 13, 2015

“There’s only one absolute truth about investing…it isn’t easy.” – Howard Marks

Investing is hard.

Markets are extremely challenging.

Beating the market is not easy.

Coming to these realizations is maybe the hardest part about investing because we all like to assume that we’re above average. Case in point — a few years ago MarketWatch columnist Chuck Jaffe shared some anecdotal evidence on the irrational overconfidence many investors have in their own abilities. Active investors at a Fidelity Traders Summit conference were surveyed to see how many of them expected to meet or beat the market’s return over the following 12 months. Over 90% of these investors said they would outperform.

I’ll take the under on that one every time.

Overconfidence surely affects novices, but professional investors are probably the ones who are the biggest culprits of overestimating their own investment skill. Some combination of ego, career risk and an ultra-competitive gene suggest that this trait won’t be going away any time soon. Jim O’Shaughnessy provided a perfect example of this on his blog recently in a re-print from his book, What Works on Wall Street:

Professor Nick Bostrom, the Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University points out, in his paper Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction and Related Hazards that “Bias seems to be present even among highly educated people. According to one survey, almost half of all sociologists believed that they would become one of the top ten in their field, and 94% of sociologists thought they were better at their jobs than their average colleagues.”

The great thing about the sheer amount of overconfidence in the markets is the fact that certain groups of investors will always be able to take advantage. The downside is that there will also always be investors who are being taken advantage of, whether they’re willing to accept this fact or not. Someone always has to take the other side of a winning bet.

In his latest quarterly letter, legendary investor Howard Marks does a deep dive into how difficult it is to outperform:

Why should superior profits be available to the novice, the untutored or the lazy? Why should people be able to make above average returns without hard work and above average skill, and without knowing something most others don’t know? And yet many individuals invest based on the belief that they can. (If they didn’t believe that, wouldn’t they index or, at a minimum, turn over the task to others?)

Marks go on to say that only a small percentage of investors possess enough superior skill to outperform over the long-term. Carl Richards penned the term ‘the behavior gap’ to describe the difference between the returns reported on an investment and the returns actually earned by investors. I think there’s also a ‘Lake Wobegon gap’ that can explain the underperformance in most actively managed strategies, as certain individuals or groups of investors are unwilling or unable to admit that they don’t have what it takes.

The paradox of “average” returns is that they will almost certainly always be above average in the long run because of compounding costs, poor market timing and overactivity by this group of overconfident investors. The latest SPIVA scorecard provides a good illustration of this:

[LTCM]

[fj201]

LTCM: Tens razão, aliás quando defini a alocação stocks/bonds/cash, fiz mais ou menos 50% stocks /50% bonds+cash. Na parte das bonds recorri a um etf de obrigações de qualidade corporativas AA/A (75%) diversificadas por empresas globais - na altura as obrigações longo prazo soberanos disponíveis na europa tinham pouca liquidez, e o XBAG ainda não existia. Mas com a recente queda, e como bem apontado pelo ruicarlov, as bonds long/intermediate quality não se comportaram de forma tão acentuada como estava à espera. (ver figura em anexo). O US10 (versão mais próxima europeia do TLT) foi mesmo assim o que teve o comportamento mais de acordo com a "teoria".

Por isso de certo modo, fiquei a pensar se devo repensar a estratégia da parte das bonds. Stocks e cash estou satisfeito com a alocação que fiz e não vou mexer nada. O que me deixou a pensar foi a necessidade de alterar a parte de bonds para o US10 ou o MTF + uns putzinhos do SPY. Se bem que o teu argumento pode fazer mais sentido, ou seja, para pessoal com projectos de mais longo prazo o que interessa é aproveitar estas quedas para reforçar. Não sei tenho que pensar bem..

ruicarlov: Sim é por aí que estou a pensar...

ps. LTCM quanto à "estratégia mais interessante" eu já não tenho idade para comprar banha de cobra. Prefiro como estou.

[ruicarlov]

Eu uso duas formas. Long-term quality bonds e puts sobre o SP500.
Visto que as yields das obrigações de longo-prazo estão bastante espremidas e que os EUA estão num bull-market há tantos anos seguidos, há uns meses decidi ir juntar os puts à equação. Não é algo que pense manter anos e anos a fio. É apenas até haver alguma correção a valer. Não tenhamos ilusões que haverá alguma mais cedo ou mais tarde. Este segurozinho custa-me 1.5% mas estou disposto a pagá-lo uns anitos. No pé em que as coisas estão, está difícil as obrigações longo prazo atenuarem os crashes acionistas. Esta correção recente mostrou isso.

[LTCM]

Caros foristas,

como costumam proteger as vossas carteiras?

- cash/short-term quality bonds;
- long term quality bonds;
- nenhuma das anteriores - qual então?

Deparei-me com este artigo noutro fórum
http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2015/09/invest/

Acham razoável fazer a protecção da nossa carteira recorrendo a puts do S&P500? Ou seja temos a nossa posição em stocks, tipo o IWDA - barato e diversificado globalmente, e depois compramos uma espécie de seguro (1% ou 1,5% do valor da carteira) em puts do SPY.

Se o SPY subir, azar. Perdi o dinheiro do seguro (exactamente igual aos seguros das casas e automóveis);
Se o SPY descer, vendo e com o lucro minimizo a perda que tive na minha carteira.

Opiniões, aceitam-se. Obrigadinho pela atenção.

Qualquer das opções é exequível.

A opção de puts sobre o S&P500 é algo que reduzindo o DD reduz igualmente a rentabilidade. Depende da capacidade de cada um mas num projecto a 25-30 anos não sei se um DD nos anos iniciais, que é uma oportunidade de reforçar a carteira, terá assim tanta importância.

Estás a esquecer a hipótese mais interessante, e cientificamente comprovada, fazer market timing . Só tens de fechar as posições quando prevês que vai descer, o ouro sobre azul é shortar essa mesma posição – de preferência alavancado, e quando achas que vai começar a subir inverter as posições assumidas. Existem vários experts no CdB sobre essa temática e com certeza podes aprender imenso com eles.

[fj201]

Caros foristas,

como costumam proteger as vossas carteiras?

- cash/short-term quality bonds;
- long term quality bonds;
- nenhuma das anteriores - qual então?

Deparei-me com este artigo noutro fórum
http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2015/09/invest/

Acham razoável fazer a protecção da nossa carteira recorrendo a puts do S&P500? Ou seja temos a nossa posição em stocks, tipo o IWDA - barato e diversificado globalmente, e depois compramos uma espécie de seguro (1% ou 1,5% do valor da carteira) em puts do SPY.

Se o SPY subir, azar. Perdi o dinheiro do seguro (exactamente igual aos seguros das casas e automóveis);
Se o SPY descer, vendo e com o lucro minimizo a perda que tive na minha carteira.

Opiniões, aceitam-se. Obrigadinho pela atenção.

[LTCM]

F. Ramada, comprei numa altura em que o preço era absurdamente barato, depois dizem que o mercado é eficiente... A gestão é a mesma que a Altri, são empresas do mesmo grupo, basicamente, só que como a Altri tem muita visibilidade, nunca poderia ficar com um desconto tão grande como ficou a F. Ramada, o pessoal está sempre de olho na Altri.
E depois a F. Ramada tem investimentos na área da saúde, é sempre uma cena sexy.

Most investors can’t outperform the stock market by individually picking stocks because stock returns aren’t evenly distributed. A randomly picked stock has only a 35% to 45% chance (depending on the investment horizon) to outperform the market. There are a few exceptions, one of which is when it comes to purchases made by corporate insiders... This effect is more pronounced in small-cap stocks. Another exception is the small-cap stock picks of hedge funds...The trick is focusing only on the best small-cap stock picks of funds, not their large-cap stock picks which are extensively covered by analysts and followed by almost everybody

[fj201]

Speaking of industries as a whole that might subtract value, S&P Dow Jones Indices came out with its mid-year "SPIVA U.S. Scorecard," which measures whether actively managed mutual funds beat their indexes. They don't especially:

Based on the June 30, 2015, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard data, 65.34% of large-cap managers underperformed the benchmark (S&P 500®, 7.42%) during the past one-year period. The figure is equally unfavorable when viewed over longer-term investment horizons. Over the five- and 10-year investment horizons, 80.8% and 79.59% of large-cap managers, respectively, failed to deliver incremental returns over the benchmark.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2 ... d-unicorns

[LTCM]

Buy expensive, concentrated mutual funds: These funds are expensive because they are worth it! The guys who run these funds are the best — they are pros, stock-picking experts who didn’t get to where they are today by accident. Besides, how could an entire industry exist if all it did was overcharge and under-deliver for services? Accepted economic theory about the efficiency of markets teaches us that’s practically impossible.

Market timing is where all the real money is made: Imagine how much more money your investments would make if you avoided the big sell-offs? Think about missing the almost 80 percent drop in tech stocks in 2000. Or better yet, imagine selling those stocks short and making money on the way down. How sweet would that have been? Same thing in 2006 for the homebuilders, 2007 for the banks, 2008 for the investment firms – there was a killing to be made.

You might also imagine what it would do for your returns if you added some leverage to ride the bull market up. You would become a millionaire in no time at all!

There is no reason to think you cannot pick stocks with the best of them! Picking stocks is not all that hard. You do some research, pay attention to the latest gadgets, keep your ears open for the occasional good stock tip, and you are golden. Besides, you have a good network of people who often share great investing tips with you — I bet you can buy shares in companies before blowout quarters or takeovers are announced. Worst-case scenario, all you need to do is watch that crazy guy on TV each night and buy whatever he suggests.

Why worry about fees? That’s penny-ante stuff! Seriously, dude, you are after the big fish, not the minnows. You cannot waste time and effort focusing on these piddling details. Look, you already figured out that market timing and stock selection are where the big money is made. Let’s not worry ourselves about all that small stuff. Besides, what does compounding have to do with investing anyway?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/busine ... story.html

[fj201]

ahahahha

so·ci·o·pa·ti·a
(socio- + -patia)
substantivo feminino
Desequilíbrio patológico que se manifesta num comportamento anti-social e impulsivo ou agressivo.
"sociopatia", in Dicionário Priberam da Língua Portuguesa [em linha], 2008-2013, http://www.priberam.pt/dlpo/sociopatia [consultado em 05-09-2015].


Deve ser o utilizador com mais registos da história de Portugal de um fórum.

[fj201]

Outra empresa parecida a essa é a https://www.futureadvisor.com/ - que seguia de perto com esperança que abrissem uma divisão na europa... mas agora aparentemente foram comprados pela blackrock, o que é estranho, pois até que ponto irão aconselhar/apresentar alternativas por exemplos em etfs de outras casas? Não é que eu não goste da iShares, mas a Vanguard, Lyxor, Amundi, SPRD também têm alguns produtos muito interessantes.

É uma lástima, pois achava o conceito muito interessante.

[LTCM]

Wealthfront, which CNNMoney named as one of the 15 best financial apps and sites last year, is the fastest-growing online financial advisor. Assets have ballooned from less than $100 million at the start of 2013 to more than $650 million today.

Nearly 60% of the site's customers are under the age of 35, and many are based in Silicon Valley. The top employers of their clients are a Who's Who of influential tech companies: Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, eBay, Amazon and Apple.

On average, these younger Wealthfront customers have just under $100,000 in their accounts.

"These are people who grew up on computers, they're comfortable with software, and they have a lot of wealth because their companies share it with them," said Wealthfront CEO Adam Nash. "They really like the idea of an investment system that's automated, so they can spend more time on what they care most about."

Nash, who has an engineering background, is frequently invited to tech companies to talk about how their employees should manage their personal finances.

He first did the talk at LinkedIn (LNKD) about a month before it went public. Last October, he delivered the presentation to workers at Twitter (TWTR) just before its IPO. Nash covers topics from behavioral finance theories to the benefits of compound growth. He stresses what it takes to achieve long-term investing success.

"It's not that millennials don't trust the stock market, but ... they don't think there's a way to beat the market," Nash said. "They're actually pretty realistic in their expectations. They know that the market goes up over time, but they've been through two crashes. That's why they like the idea of passive, diversified investments."

Zhang agreed. He said he's not trying to live off the money he made by selling his company.

He hopes his investments will grow conservatively -- and that he'd rather spend more time working on his latest start-up than worrying about the daily ups and downs of the stock market.

[Ulisses Pereira]

Como o utilizador, continua a multiplicar nicks para insultar utilizadores e os administradores, tivemos que recorrer a outras formas de forma a perceber que o Caldeirão é um local de debate saudável, não de descarregar de frustrações. Podemos fazer sempre de maus da fita, mas mais de 10 anos depois continuamos a defender o debate são no Caldeirão. Custe o que custar.

Abraço,
Ulisses

[Ulisses Pereira]

SMA, começamos a estar cansados de seres banido e apareceres com outros nicks. O problema é voltarmos sempre a dar-te mais oportunidades, quando já percebemos que não consegues discutir no Caldeirão sem insultos. Banido pela enésima vez.

[O Alquimista]

Bem, o que estou a assistir é claramente a passagem para o insulto directo, algo que não é interessante nem acrescenta nenhum argumento a nenhuma discussão. Preferia não ter que apagar parte nenhuma da discussão.

Também sou da mesma opinião (quanto à parte sublinhada). Ao suposto insulto responde-se com factos. Foi o que fiz.

[Pata-Hari]

Bem, o que estou a assistir é claramente a passagem para o insulto directo, algo que não é interessante nem acrescenta nenhum argumento a nenhuma discussão. Preferia não ter que apagar parte nenhuma da discussão.

[O Alquimista]

Não queria acreditar mas os níveis de iliteracia neste país são mesmo deprimentes.

estar no mercado só nos dias em que existem subidas

Na frase realçada a verde qual é a palavra, ou palavras, que tens dificuldade em interpretar?

Como fizeste a pergunta sobre como saber quais os dias bons e os dias maus, só te queria ajudar. Agora vejo que que já sabias resposta. És um brincalhão. Só podes ser um profissional da área. Bravo!

Eu, iletrado, me confesso. Mas um iletrado com resultados. Ora vê: "No âmbito do FI Alquimia 2015 foram concluídos até ao momento 4 negócios com o seguintes resultados (números redondos) +18%, -2%, + 20% (estes 3 já referidos), + 15% (tesla). O objectivo permanece inalterado"
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=83549&start=300#p1183342
Queres que te faça um gráfico colorido ou basta o que anexo?
Enfim, "esta coisa dos números é uma chatice", LTCM dixit.

DO FI Alquimia faz parte o EEM, sobre o qual disse: "Do FI Alquimia 2015 faz parte o etf EEM. Tendo o investimento sido aberto à linha, à linha será fechado, para uma potencial subida perto dos 12%. Está pois colocada ordem de venda na median line. Logo que o preço vença o swing imediatamente anterior a stoploss será colocada em b/e: jamais um investimento que nesse momento registará cerca 8% poderá incorrer numa perda. A carteira é minha e é assim que faço a gestão activa de um activo passivo. Acredito na continuação do movimento ascendente mas como sou um swing trader esperarei por uma correcção para ponderar uma nova entrada. Aí sim, o objectivo será mais ambicioso. Ora bem: (supondo) 10 aqui%, 15% ali e 20% acolá ao longo do ano permitirá ficar muito perto de alcançar o desiderato. Sem doping."
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=83549&start=150#p1169260
Abre um gráfico, aponta a entrada e a saída, pega na calculadora e faz a conta ao ganho registado no EEM.

Mais tarde acrescentei: "Acabo de tomar uma importante decisão quanto ao FI Alquimia 2015: ele passa a ter duas faces, como Janus. Uma para se manter fiel ao propósito inicial, caso em que as posições serão encerradas, para o bem e para o mal, de acordo com o plano de trading que se faça para cada activo. A outra será um teste ao modo como a carteira se portará durante este ano de 2015 (um ano, portanto), sem realizar quaisquer mais ou menos valias, por forma a compará-la um um benchmark (pode ser o sp500). Assim, e a título de mero exemplo, a posição na has será apenas aproveitada para o FI Alquimia 2015 - Face A e não para o FI Alquimia 2015 - Face B. Relativamente a esta última face, sempre que oportuno será colocada aqui a carteira que criei no FT. No que diz respeito àquela, farei uns cálculos grosseiros sobre os resultados dos negócios (ex. supondo que a has me dá um lucro de 10%, esta valorização conta para a tentativa de duplicar o capital, mas não contará para carteira que está no FT (FI Alquimia 2015 - Face B). Em suma:
- o FI Alquimia 2015 - Face A tem posições abertas na jcp, na gild e na has (objectivo: o inicial).
- o FI Alquimia 2015 - Face B tem posições abertas na jcp, no eew e no jnk (dois etf e uma acção; objectivo: compará-lo com um benchmark)"
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=83549&start=225#p1175862
Fica assim explicada a razão pela qual a carteira do FT regista a posição aberta no EEM, que de momento cai 17%.
A tal razão acresce uma outra: sentir o que sente um defensor da passividade, do b, h § p, do "deixa andar que o dinheiro não é nosso", quando vê uma queda desta magnitude. O que me safa é que sei fazer o hedging. Como? Comprando um bom activo: jcp.

Fazer market timing? Efectivamente, só para quem sabe. Ora vê:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=83549#p1154310
Faz as contas usando o valor do ponto por cada contrato de futuros do petróleo.

Eu, iletrado, vim aqui à procura de informação. O que é que encontrei? Um aletrado.
Aletrado= aquele que apaga as suas letras. Possível causa: amuo. Tratamento: , zurzir n´O Alquimista.

Normal em países de socialistas. Pessoas que acham que basta a 'força de acreditar' para dar certo. Os aumentos de capital de alguns bancos em Portugal são paradigmáticos dessa profunda ignorância.

Um apport só ao alcance de um Gervasio...

"CALVIN: The more you know, the harder it is to take decisive action. Once you become informed, you start seeing complexities and shades of gray. You realize that nothing is as clear and simple as it first appears. Ultimately, knowledge is paralyzing. Being a man of action, I can’t afford to take that risk. HOBBES: You’re ignorant, but at least you act on it." -Bill Watterson, Calvin & Hobbes

[SMA50]

Tanta referência ao paper + consulta de outras fontes = expansão do conhecimento e ainda não aprendeste?

Alguém que me indique, por gentileza, como é que se evitam os futuros 5,10,15,… piores dias de forma a se estar no mercado só nos dias em que existem subidas.
Muito agradecido desde já.

Há pelo menos um forista que sabe:

(...) A verdade é que apanhar os melhores dias é fácil. Basta estar sempre no mercado.(...)

Não queria acreditar mas os níveis de iliteracia neste país são mesmo deprimentes.

estar no mercado só nos dias em que existem subidas

Na frase realçada a verde qual é a palavra, ou palavras, que tens dificuldade em interpretar?

Não é pelo facto de chamares implicitamente ao Alquimista um suposto ileterado financeiro que te vai tornar mais literado financeiramente. Tu ainda tens que nascer outra vez para chegares ao nivel da capacidade interpretativa e do humor refinado do Alquimista (se ele não tivesse uma boa capacidade interpretativa de textos não estava no patamar profissional que ocupa, e não passava de um médio licenciado), que só está ao alcance de alguém que seja superior à média dos analistas e esses não se limitam a fazer o simples track do "mercado da literaçia financeira".
O que o Alquimista quis dizer, e para isso utilizou uma frase do teu pajem (daí o humor refinado dele), é que captar os melhores dias (maiores ganhos) é fácil, basta estar sempre investido (all time) no mercado, mas o difícil, mas o mais proveitoso, é não captar os piores dias (maiores perdas), e este último caso não se consegue com a estratégia de buy&hold, e dado que matematicamente o controlo de minimização das perdas, através de stops, é mais vantajoso do que a não tomada do mesmo valor numérico dos ganhos, como já demonstrei num post atrás, então qual é a tua dificuldade de interpretação do post do Alquimista?

Lá pelo facto de leres muitos artigos, isso, por si só, não te transforma num bom leitor, se não tiveres uma elevada capacidade de interpretação e dedução desses textos técnicos, e muito menos te transforma num bom escritor financeiro, e neste último caso é preciso ser sério técnicamente, coisa que já demonstraste que não és quando não respeitas minimamente os conceitos básicos da estatística.

[Artista Romeno]

1-especular não tem nada a ver com investir, especular é comprar numa espetativa de lucro de curto prazo e ir atras do rebanho é aquilo que se designa de castles in the air, investir é comprar porque se acredita no valor interinseco das coisas e numa perspetiva de medio longo prazo
2-por AF, ha quem invista em liquidações de empresas e ai objectivo é esse, mas na generalidade dos casos em AF nao se anda a comprar empresas no pressuposto de que elas vão falir,é isso comprar a um preço com margem de segurança relativamente ao valor económico do ativo

[danieljpires]

Bom dia ppl

Estava a ler este topico e gostaria de dar a minha humilde opinião...

A questao de fundo que quando fazemos a nossa analise seja por analise micro (fundamental de empresas), macro (tendências económicas) tecnica (gestao de risco e psicologia de mercado), Quantica (estatística e arbitragens) é tentar encontrar um hedge , ou seja quando alguem investe ou especula (para mim o sinonimo e igual pois tentam encontrar o mesmo resultado) tenta encontrar vantagem ou seja:

Por fundamentais: se a empresa falisse conseguiria ganhar ainda dinheiro pois contabilizando divida contra património (esquecendo receitas) fico a ganhar dinheiro
Por tecnico: quando ha uma vantagem de projecção psicologica de mercado ou quando o fluxo de dinheiro esta a ir para um determinado rumo e queremos entrar na onda
por macro - a tendencia reverteu e as perpectivas sao melhores ou seja vou aproveitar agora e vender mais tarde (ou vender agora e comprar mais tare)
por quantico - estatisticamente tenho uma vantagem se comprar agora

Nao sei se me fiz entender:

Não sei se foi a 2 anos ou a mais mas o premio novel da economia foi para dois economistas e os estudos deles eram contraditorios:

1º economista - a bolsa é aleatoria
2º economista - a bolsa nao e aleatoria

Ou seja o que importa e a percepção de vantagem sobre o resto dos participantes - (disciplina de economica - Teoria dos Jogos)

Abraço a todos

zone4traders.blogspot.com

[fj201]

Normal em países de socialistas. Pessoas que acham que basta a 'força de acreditar' para dar certo. Os aumentos de capital de alguns bancos em Portugal são paradigmáticos dessa profunda ignorância.