Trabalhadores do Novo Banco querem bónus pela venda ao BPCE

[LTCM]

Since late July 2012, the premium that 10-year Greek and Portuguese government bonds yielded over equivalent German bonds—also known as their spread over bunds—dropped 16 and five percentage points, respectively, to 7.8 and 5.2 percentage points. Falling yields mean rising prices.

The same happened, albeit less drastically, among the euro zone's biggest weak economies. The spreads on 10-year Italian and Spanish government debt over 10-year bunds dropped from 5.3 and 6.3 percentage points, respectively, in late July 2012 to 2.84 and 2.56 percentage points now.

The good times may continue for Spain and Italy, as spreads on those countries' debt have continued to decline. However, spreads have started to widen again on Portuguese and Greek debt, especially during the third quarter.

While Spanish fell 0.31 percentage points and Italian spreads remained flat since the end of June, the spreads on Portuguese debt expanded by 0.36 percentage points in the same period. Even Rome's latest political crisis caused Italian government bonds to underperform their German counterparts only modestly during recent trading sessions.

In effect, investors have started to put euro-zone bonds into two separate baskets: those issued by countries that they view as too big to fail, and those issued by the rest.

"The ECB has been careful not to say that [the central bank] will stand behind every country under every circumstances," said Toby Nangle, head of multiasset allocation at Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd., which manages £84 billion ($134 billion) in assets.

"'Whatever it takes' is focused on systemic risks, not on small countries with fundamentally unsustainable debts," said Myles Bradshaw, London-based portfolio manager for the Allianz SE unit Pacific Investment Management Co., the world's biggest bond-fund management firm by assets. "Portugal is not systemic. Italy and Spain are."

And Portugal's fundamentals are poor enough to make investors think twice about the prospects of getting their money back.

"Portugal has the worst of Italy and Spain" in terms of economics, Mr. Bradshaw said.

[ghorez]

http://socialize.morningstar.com/NewSoc ... vSeq=25766

Taylor Larimore Thu, Feb 6 2003, 9:23 PM | Post #78891 |

Hi Diehards:
In Conversation 25754 I used nearly 200 years of U.S. stock market returns in an attempt to show why Stay the Course works. I'm going to add to that Conversation and share some personal information I have never revealed on this forum.

We are in a deep and lengthy bear market that has plunged 44.8% and no one knows how much worse it could get. In the terrible bear market of 1929-1935 the Dow plunged 89%. I remember it well (we lost our home).

My grandfather, Christopher Coombs, and two other investment bankers, organized the United Founders Corporation which was the largest mutual fund holding company (called investment trust) at that time. Unfortunately, my Grandfather was almost entirely invested in shares of his company using up to 90% margin. He lost nearly everything.

I have studied bear markets because I don't want to see my family lose everything in another one. The biggest help came from a book by John Merrill, "Outperforming the Market". Mr. Merrill's excellent book has a table showing that a diversifed portfolio of stocks, bonds, and cash, and held for approximately five years, would have enabled an investor to survive and eventually prosper during the worst bear market of all time.

Using a moderate risk portfolio of 47% domestic stocks; 47% 5-year Treasuries; and 6% Cash; here is what would have happened to a diversified $1,000,000 portfolio on September 1, 1929 (the market peak).

YR.
END
1929 $863,000
1930 $769,000
1931 $598,000
1932 $603,000
1933 $842,000
1934 $901,000
1935 $1,124,000
1936 $1,339,000

Other reasonably diversified allocations also would have survived intact. For example, a 67% stock/28% bond/and 5% cash portfolio had a low of $416,000 in 1932 but was worth $1,195,000 at the end of 1936.

"Stay the Course"

[LTCM]

A quick quiz

Consider the following four questions:

The annualised return for the S&P 500 index for the 20 years ended 31 December 2010 was 9.1%pa. What annualised return did the average equity mutual fund holder achieve?

The Dow Jones Industrial Average index was created on 26 May 1896 (opening value 40.94) and has risen from its all-time low of 28.48 (in the summer of 1896) to around 13,000 (rounded up, May 2012). If the index measured total return, with dividends reinvested, instead of the price-only return what value would it be at now?

According to the Barclays Equity Gilt Study 2012 the real (above inflation) return on US equities from 1925 to end 2011 was 6.6%. How would actual investor results be distributed around this result?

We create a hypothetical, highly-skilled investor that can outperform cash by 15% each year, with a volatility of 10% pa. Assuming the investor works 8 hours a day (480 minutes), how many minutes a day is the investor ahead of the market?

And the answers are...

The answers are potentially surprising, but are hopefully illuminating. For the first question, while it is possible for a single investor, or small group of investors, to outperform the market, it is clearly not possible for the aggregate. We will assume the reader also knows to deduct average mutual fund costs of around 2% so a reasonable opening guess would be a return of 7.1% pa for the 20- year period. The actual answer is that the average equity mutual fund investor earned a return of 3.8% pa, which was only 1.2% pa above inflation.1 This answer ought to shock us. It is an almost incredible needless destruction of value. It turns out that retail investors in mutual funds aren’t very good at ‘buy and hold’ and instead go chasing higher returns, with tragic results. The story is essentially the same for institutional investors, although the scale of value destruction is smaller.2

The answer to the second question should be equally arresting. Meir Statman, a respected finance professor, calculated where the Dow Jones would now stand if dividends had been reinvested. His answer is in excess of 1,300,000, or 100 times above the level we are familiar with.3 Even index values can be a poor guide to past returns – and that is before we start worrying about whether the index is the appropriate one to use.

This leads us straight onto our third question. The power of investing comes from compounding – reinvesting the dividends and earning a return on an ever-growing capital sum. So to answer the question we need to consider who is disciplined enough to constantly re-invest dividends for 85 plus years. Even perpetual endowments need to take an income. Warren Buffett has only done it for around 50 years – and who knows how many of his original investors have left their initial investment untouched?.

Then there is the cost of reinvesting dividends – before the internet and low-cost dividend re-investment prices it would have been prohibitive for ‘normal’ private investors. If you are getting a mutual fund manager to reinvest your dividends for you, then the cost drag remains substantial. And then there is tax.

The 6.6% pa real return assumes the reinvestment of gross dividends, which tax-paying investors clearly cannot do. Now we accept that it is theoretically possible for an investor to have had a highly concentrated portfolio and achieve a return considerably higher than real 6.6% pa. We just don’t think there are many such investors around. And so our answer to the question is that we believe the vast majority of actual investor real results would be less than 6.6% pa. In other words, in this case past returns are a guide to the reasonable maximum expected return an investor could have earned.

Our questions so far have sought to illustrate that we need to apply context and understanding to the raw data. We need to adjust for costs, activity, inflation, compounding and whether the implied investment strategy can be replicated in practice.

Our fourth question changes tack slightly and considers whether the frequency of measurement matters. The highly-skilled investor we created has a probability of making money in any one year of 93%, which is well above real-world expectations. But on a minute-by-minute basis, the very same statistics tell us that they now have a probability of being ahead of just 50.17%. So during their eight-hour day they will have 241 pleasurable minutes against 239 unpleasant ones. Not only will our investor be emotionally drained, but we also know from behavioural finance that they will feel the losses far more keenly than any boost they get from the gains. In addition to the high emotional cost, high frequency performance measurement makes it difficult to distinguish between noise and signal. Our conclusion once more is that past returns alone are a weak guide to the past, let alone the future.
Practical takeaways

The short-term performance information in defined contribution (DC) annual statements should be downplayed in prominence to discourage DC investors from being tempted to transact after a market fall, which is rarely the best course of action (and we consider a single year’s result to be short term).

In themselves past data, even information ratios, have limited value – interpretation is everything.

We should reduce the frequency of our performance monitoring to a level compatible with fulfilling fiduciary duties.

We need to introduce a monitoring process that is independent of performance results. In other words, we need to do more qualitative monitoring. We should only ever take action in the light of anticipated future performance. The problem with monitoring investment performance is that it leads us into extrapolating recent trends, which in investment is often a dangerous business.

The rule is ‘investor know thyself’. If we are likely to want to take a ‘sell’ decision based on bad results, then we should develop processes to act a check on that behaviour.

So maybe it is time to stop looking at past returns, and instead spend the time doing some hard thinking about possible future outcomes.

[LTCM]

What Happens When An ETF Closes?

When the board of trustees decides to delist a particular ETF, it is usually liquidated as well—so investors receive cash instead of being forced to trade over the counter (OTC). Once the decision has been made, a prospectus supplement will state the ETF's last trading date and its liquidation date.

At this point, “business as usual” ceases, and the fund halts creations and redemptions as it prepares to convert to cash. This causes ETF performance to diverge from the performance of its underlying index.

During this period, the ETF issuer will continue to publish iNAV every 15 seconds during the U.S. trading day, and should still be referenced when buying or selling the ETF. Most investors sell their shares before the last day of trading, but even those who don’t will receive cash equal to NAV after the fund liquidates its holdings.

So, even if you fall asleep at the wheel and don’t notice one of your ETF investments is closing, you still receive the fair value of your shares—most of the time. This is how the process operates nines times out of 10. However, there have been several high-profile cases where investors did not fare as well.

At one point, Credit Suisse took years to liquidate delisted ETNs—leaving investors up a river without a paddle. In another example, when MacroShares finally liquidated their products, they stuck investors with the bill ($0.87/share).

Even more recently, J.P. Morgan announced that it will delist JFT from NYSE Arca but will not liquidate the ETN. Consequently, investors who don’t sell before the last trading date (Oct. 10) will have to trade the note OTC (probably at a huge discount) or, if they can round up 50,000 shares, redeem directly with J.P. Morgan.

In light of these instances, it’s a stretch to assume that all future closures will be smooth, and it further emphasizes the value in avoiding high-closure-risk ETPs

Even if the delisting and closure goes smoothly, it can still be hugely inconvenient for a few reasons.

Egg-in-the-Face

First, from the perspective of advisors, avoiding funds at high risk of closure can help avoid egg-in-the-face phone calls to clients after recommending a fund that’s now closing: “Remember that great ETF I told you about? About that … ”

Reinvestment Risk

Second, ETF closures create reinvestment risk and burden. Once you receive your cash-equivalent NAV, you’ve got to find somewhere else to put it, which could mean repeating the entire process that landed you in the ETF to begin with.

Tax Burden

Third, since investors must either sell their shares or receive cash equivalents of NAV, they are forced to realize any capital gains. Realizing capital gains earlier than planned can create a tax burden that investors (and clients) might not have anticipated.

Closure Risk Factors

Low Assets Under Management

Low AUM is definitely one of the best indicators of closure risk. After all, funds with hundreds of millions of dollars in assets under management are too profitable for their issuers to close them.

The only problem with using AUM as an indicator of fund-closure risk is that you’re ruling out far too many ETFs. There are hundreds of ETFs with low AUM that do not close each year—and some of them are great products.

Still, as a general rule of thumb, once a fund surpasses the $50 million mark in AUM, it’s likely sufficiently profitable for issuers and is unlikely to close.

Issuer Strength

Surprisingly, even more important than AUM in predicting fund closure is the strength of its issuer. A recent study from IndexUniverse concluded that issuer strength was the primary reason for closure in 47 percent of the 284 closures evaluated. After all, “When the issuing company is unprofitable overall, it tends to shutter its entire ETF line,” resulting in far more closures than big issuers simply closing ETFs that are slow out of the gate, the research found.

Consequently, when evaluating whether a low-AUM fund is at risk of closure, consider the strength of its issuer as well as the issuer’s history and general culture surrounding closures.

Fund Rank In Segment

The same IndexUniverse study also concluded that in only 7 percent of the closures studied did the issuers cite a lack of competitiveness as the primary reason for closure. Still, market competitiveness is a significant factor, and issuers are likely understating competitiveness as a primary factor for closure to “save face.”

After all, if an ETF is first to market in a particular market segment, it could take a while for the space to gain traction with investors, but if it does, the lone ETF in the market is the go-to fund by default—a tail wind for AUM.

In contrast, the ETF will face head winds and have a much harder time surviving if it’s the least popular ETF in a market segment that’s otherwise already popular with investors.

Other

Other factors come into play when evaluating the degree of closure risk for a particular ETF (i.e., daily trading volume, automatic triggers, etc.), but all things considered, they’re less important than the three factors outlined above.

In Sum

Ultimately, don’t let media headlines about ETF closures invoke fear, because first and foremost, ETF investors don’t necessarily stand to lose when an ETF closes. Secondly, funds at risk of closure are largely easy to identify, which is to say that it should be easy for you to avoid the high-risk funds—there’s almost always a larger and more viable ETF offering similar exposure.

[LTCM]

The key for investors is to realize why something isn't a big deal before it happens, not afterwards.

Markets could certainly react to a shutdown by quickly dropping 10%, but the serious declines in markets don't historically come from political dysfunction -- they come from extreme excesses like tech stocks in 2000, the real estate market in 2006 and, perhaps as a more serious threat today, excessive accommodative central bank policy.

Whatever your investing strategy -- here investing is differentiated from trading -- it was designed to withstand small declines. If your strategy includes taking some sort of defensive action based on index levels, then you should be disciplined and stick to your strategy as opposed to trying to outguess what the market might do ahead of a possible political event.

[Max_Filas]

Boa tarde.

Alguém me ajuda nas questões colocadas em baixo?

Pesquisa feita, eis os resultados para obrigacionistas replicação física e acc, mas não vejo referências a "hedged" nos nomes dos ETFs.

Globais só encontrei este:

IE00B3B8PX14 IGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF USD http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IGIL?utrack=true
DE000A0RFED7 EGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR

Europeus encontrei alguns:

...

FR0010028860 LYQ1 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS Global Inv. Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search

...

IE00B0M62X26 IBCI iShares Euro Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF (IBCI) http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IBCI?utrack=true
...

Boa tarde

Reduzindo o leque de escolhas a estes 4 ETF, qual aconselham a investir?

Mais algumas questões:

Considerando o ETF da ishares o iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF :

Os links abaixo são todos do mesmo ETF?
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.google.com/finance?q=LON%3A ... Obl0QHiiQE

Os ETFs só diferem entre si no que diz respeito à bolsa onde são negociados? Os ISIN são diferentes.
Que diferença faz para um investidor básico ter um ou outro? A diferença são os preços de negociação das bolsas?

Estes ETFs são negociados na bolsa de Londres. Não era suposto estarem disponiveis para compra no BTP? Não os encontro.

[LTCM]

De forma simplificada é a medida da rotação de activos num determinado portefólio.

Dada a dificuldade, generalizada, em gerar alfa quanto menor for o rácio de Turnover melhor (<25% [Um fundo passivo só transaccionará nas raras alterações do seu índice de referência]), uma vez que a alteração de activos tem custos associados (transacção, impostos,…) que vão prejudicar a rentabilidade global da carteira.

Uma taxa de rotatividade de 100% ou mais (gestão activa), não sugere necessariamente que todos os activos em carteira foram negociados. Em termos práticos, o Turnover representa sensivelmente a percentagem de participações da carteira que mudaram ao longo do ano.

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/turnoverratio.asp

[VirtuaGod]

O que significa o turnover?
Obrigado

Definition of 'Turnover'

1. In accounting, the number of times an asset is replaced during a financial period.

2. The number of shares traded for a period as a percentage of the total shares in a portfolio or of an exchange.

Investopedia explains 'Turnover'

1. In accounting, turnover often refers to inventory or accounts receivable. A quick turnover is desired because it means that inventory is not sitting on the shelves for too long.

2. In a portfolio, a small turnover is desired because it means the investor is paying less in commissions to the broker. It is called "churning" when a broker unethically generates numerous trades solely in order to increase commissions.

Investopedia

[Sr_SNiper]

O que significa o turnover?
Obrigado

[LTCM]

Another source of unproductive turnover is too-frequent rebalancing. The optimal frequency of rebalancing is a trade-off
among several factors: the opportunity to profit from long-term mean reversion of stock prices, the cost of trading against
short-term price momentum, and the cost of turnover.

[LTCM]

Is it just something weird going on with the indices? Nope. Check out the performance of 10 of the largest managed futures programs at the end of 2008. Since then, you can see the problem is widespread, with these big programs averaging a current drawdown of -16.95% and 24 months, on average, since their last equity high.

[Max_Filas]

Boa tarde.

Alguém me ajuda nas questões colocadas em baixo?

Pesquisa feita, eis os resultados para obrigacionistas replicação física e acc, mas não vejo referências a "hedged" nos nomes dos ETFs.

Globais só encontrei este:

IE00B3B8PX14 IGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF USD http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IGIL?utrack=true
DE000A0RFED7 EGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR

Europeus encontrei alguns:

...

FR0010028860 LYQ1 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS Global Inv. Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search

...

IE00B0M62X26 IBCI iShares Euro Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF (IBCI) http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IBCI?utrack=true
...

Boa tarde

Reduzindo o leque de escolhas a estes 4 ETF, qual aconselham a investir?

Mais algumas questões:

Considerando o ETF da ishares o iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF :

Os links abaixo são todos do mesmo ETF?
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.google.com/finance?q=LON%3A ... Obl0QHiiQE

Os ETFs só diferem entre si no que diz respeito à bolsa onde são negociados? Os ISIN são diferentes.
Que diferença faz para um investidor básico ter um ou outro? A diferença são os preços de negociação das bolsas?

Estes ETFs são negociados na bolsa de Londres. Não era suposto estarem disponiveis para compra no BTP? Não os encontro.

[LTCM]

An important part of the winning investment strategy is rebalancing the portfolio. Rebalancing is required because the market's movements cause the value at risk of a portfolio to drift. And as the time horizon increases, it is likely that the allocation to the riskier (and higher expected returning) assets will increase -- increasing the danger to the portfolio. Thus, rebalancing is essential to maintaining the plan's desired allocation.

A second reason for rebalancing is that it impacts the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio -- a well-diversified portfolio will benefit from the imperfect correlations among asset classes, contributing to lower portfolio volatility. A portfolio that is rebalanced on a regular basis will produce a higher return than the weighted average return of its components. This is often referred to as a "rebalancing bonus," or a "diversification return." Note, this is different than saying a rebalanced portfolio will provide a higher return than one that is not rebalanced. That isn't always going to be the case.

An investor begins in 1973 with a portfolio that is 50 percent stocks and 50 percent bonds. For the period ending in 2010, stocks outperformed bonds as they returned 9.8 percent versus 7.7 percent for bonds. If the portfolio was never rebalanced, the ending portfolio would have had an allocation of 68 percent stocks and the annualized (compound) return would have been 8.9 percent. Knowing that stocks beat bonds by 2.1 percent a year was the investor who never rebalanced better off?

My own experience tells me that most people would assume you would have been better off not rebalancing due to the much higher return of stocks. Yet, a rebalanced portfolio would have returned 9.5 percent, and done so with less volatility. In other words, the diversification benefit was sufficient to overcome the 2.1 percent disadvantage in returns. During this period the annual correlation of stocks to bonds was close to zero (0.1).

Through 2012, using the S&P 500 Index and five-year Treasury notes, a typical 60/40 portfolio produced the following results:

The S&P returned 9.76 percent.
Five-year Treasuries returned 7.69 percent.
A 60 percent S&P 500/40 percent five-year Treasury bond portfolio returned 9.38 percent.

A $100,000 portfolio that was never rebalanced would have produced an ending value of just about $3.2 million, with stocks representing 77 percent of the portfolio. A portfolio that was rebalanced annually to maintain the 60/40 allocation would have produced an ending value of about $3.6 million.

The example demonstrates that when you have assets with both high volatility and low correlation you will have a large "diversification bonus." The greater the volatility of stocks and the lower the correlation of stocks to bonds, the greater the excess performance of stocks must be to compensate for the loss of the diversification benefit gained from rebalancing the portfolio. It also demonstrates why rebalancing is such an important part of the winning investment strategy.

[LTCM]

Consider the example of the last 20 years. This period has included the so-called “bond bubble,” an era of extremely strong performance by bonds. Many market specialists have now concluded that the strong sell-off of bonds in 2013 marks the end of the bond bubble. Perhaps it has, or perhaps bonds can decline further: the key point is that investors going forward need to have a view of how bonds will perform over the next several years.

But even if the bond bubble had not occurred, investors would need to have a view about bond performance. In fact, it may surprise many investors that they actually need to have a stronger conviction about the performance of bonds than that of equities. Why this is so is reasonably simple. The optimal portfolio allocation is driven by the ratio of risk-adjusted returns of the underlying equities and bonds. On average, equity returns are higher than those of bonds. Given that, every dollar spent on bonds has a return “cost” associated with it that is traded off against the benefit of risk reduction[2]. The upshot is that moving away from 60/40 implicitly requires higher conviction about the performance of the bonds than that of equities.

In short, the analysis suggests that the 60/40 “rule” is indeed a useful starting point for investors considering a basic allocation choice between equities and government bonds, particularly for broad global portfolios where the differences in equity and bond markets across countries are less relevant. It sounds obvious to say that timing an allocation away from 60/40 requires an assumption on the likely future return of the two asset classes. However, it is perhaps less obvious that investors looking to do such timing should be much more focused on the bond component. This is because the optimal allocation will be more sensitive to changes in those views than those of the equity component.

[Max_Filas]

Pesquisa feita, eis os resultados para obrigacionistas replicação física e acc, mas não vejo referências a "hedged" nos nomes dos ETFs.

Globais só encontrei este:

IE00B3B8PX14 IGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF USD http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IGIL?utrack=true
DE000A0RFED7 EGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR

Europeus encontrei alguns:

...

FR0010028860 LYQ1 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS Global Inv. Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search

...

IE00B0M62X26 IBCI iShares Euro Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF (IBCI) http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IBCI?utrack=true
...

Boa tarde

Reduzindo o leque de escolhas a estes 4 ETF, qual aconselham a investir?

Mais algumas questões:

Considerando o ETF da ishares o iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF :

Os links abaixo são todos do mesmo ETF?
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
https://www.google.com/finance?q=LON%3A ... Obl0QHiiQE

Os ETFs só diferem entre si no que diz respeito à bolsa onde são negociados? Os ISIN são diferentes.
Que diferença faz para um investidor básico ter um ou outro? A diferença são os preços de negociação das bolsas?

Estes ETFs são negociados na bolsa de Londres. Não era suposto estarem disponiveis para compra no BTP? Não os encontro.

[LTCM]

existe sempre alguém que sabe mais

[Max_Filas]

... que não te falta são opções de replicação física e acc. Se possível vai para os hedge (principalmente nos obrigacionistas).

Pesquisa feita, eis os resultados para obrigacionistas replicação física e acc, mas não vejo referências a "hedged" nos nomes dos ETFs.

Globais só encontrei este:

IE00B3B8PX14 IGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF USD http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IGIL?utrack=true
DE000A0RFED7 EGIL iShares Global Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR

Europeus encontrei alguns:

FR0010820258 LYPK Lyxor UCITS ETF EuroMTS High. Rated M.W. Gov. Bond (FCP) (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0010411413 LYM5 Lyxor UCITS ETF EuroMTS 5-7Y (FCP) Investment Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0010411439 LYM6 Lyxor UCITS ETF EuroMTS 7-10Y (FCP) Investment Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0010481093 LRX1 Lyxor UCITS ETF EuroMTS 15+Y (FCP) Investment Grade A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search


FR0010028860 LYQ1 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS Global Inv. Grade (DR) - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0011146349 LYS5 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS High. Rated M.W. Gov. 3-5Y (DR) - C https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0010037234 LYQ3 Lyxor ETF SICAV (FR) - UCITS EuroMTS 3-5Y Inv. Grade (DR) A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0011146356 LYS6 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS High. Rated M.W. Gov. 5-7Y (DR) - C https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
FR0010037242 LYQ6 Lyxor UCITS ETF SICAV (FR) - EuroMTS 10-15Y Inv. Grade - A https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search

IE00B0M62X26 IBCI iShares Euro Inflation Linked Government Bond UCITS ETF (IBCI) http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/IBCI?utrack=true

IE00B3VTQ640 CBIE iShares Euro Inflation Link Bond UCITS ETF EUR http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR
IE00B3VTQ640 SXRS iShares Euro Inflation Link Bond UCITS ETF EUR http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/etf/sna ... encyId=EUR

IE00B3VTMJ91 CBE3 iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3 UCITS ETF (Acc) B https://www.justetf.com/uk/etf-profile. ... rom=search
IE00B3VTML14 CBE7 iShares Euro Government Bond 3-7 UCITS ETF (Acc) EUR http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/CBE7?utrack=true
IE00B3VTN290 CBE0 iShares Euro Government Bond 7-10 UCITS ETF (Acc) EUR http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/products/CBE0?utrack=true


Mais uma vez, se quiserem comentar/sugerir/aconselhar algum destes fico grato pela ajuda. Depois só volto a "chatear" quanfo for para acrescentar outro ETF ao portofolio.
Abraço

[LTCM]

Clive Capital, one of the world’s largest commodity hedge funds, is to shut down and return about $1bn of capital to investors at the end of the month.

In a letter sent to clients on Friday, a copy of which was obtained by the Financial Times, London-based Clive said there were “limited suitable opportunities” available for it to profit from in the commodity markets.

The fund’s “directional, long volatility approach” was unsuitable, it said, and could not generate the same kind of returns the fund had accomplished in previous years. Clive is on course for its third consecutive year of losing money for investors.

“It is unclear as to when a heightened opportunity environment will return in commodities, although ultimately, it most certainly will,” Clive added.

The fund, which at its peak had $5bn of assets under management, has shrunk as clients withdrew their investments in recent months. A spokesperson for Clive declined to comment.

Soon after its launch in 2008 by Chris Levett, a former star trader at Moore Capital, Clive carved a name for itself as one of the savviest commodity investors in the world. It was dubbed an “overnight sensation” by one trade magazine and rapidly pulled in money from clients eager to profit from a then-booming commodity cycle.

Clive made its clients more than 44 per cent in 2008, a further 17 per cent in 2009 and 20 per cent in 2010. In late 2009 it announced it would turn away new investors in order to stay nimble in the relatively small commodity markets.

The past few years have been less forgiving, however. Clive lost 10 per cent in 2011, 9 per cent in 2012 and is down a further 9 per cent so far this year. In one single week in 2011, Clive lost more than $400m after steep, unanticipated falls in the price of oil.

Clive’s poor returns come as the economy decelerates in China, the main engine of growth in global commodities demand. Copper prices have fallen by a quarter since the start of 2011 and oil prices have been treading water despite fleeting spikes. In markets such as natural gas, volatility has died down.

The Newedge Commodity Trading Index, an index of commodity hedge fund performance, is heading for its third straight negative year, with a loss of 2.4 per cent in 2013 to date.

Clive’s admission of “limited, suitable opportunities” was “like taking a parting shot at the industry”, said an official at one commodities hedge fund group, which like others has seen assets under management decline.

BlueGold Capital, run by Pierre Andurand, shut in April last year after losses.

Arbalet Capital, which only launched in April 2012, announced earlier this week it would also be shutting down.

“All these inflows have stopped,” said one commodities hedge fund investor. “Now the discussion at board meetings is, what are we doing with this commodities crap? What are we in it for again?”

[VirtuaGod]

Realmente tens razão. O problema grave está em querer acc. Nunca pensei que fosse tão complicado mas de facto até os americanos se eu usasse filtro acc ficava muito limitado

Mas os ishares combinado com os que te deram talvez arranjes alguma coisa.

O problema dos ETF's de replicação indirecta é um, muito provável, risco de crédito das instituições envolvidas. Mas não vão estourar por serem usados SWAPS

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/synthetic-etf.asp

https://advisors.vanguard.com/iwe/pdf/ICRUSE.pdf?cbdForceDomain=false

http://corporate.morningstar.com/it/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/SyntheticETFsUnderMicroscope.pdf

[FDPC]

Pesquisaem: http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/ o que não te falta são opções de replicação física e acc. Se possível vai para os hedge (principalmente nos obrigacionistas).

Nos obrigacionistas só encontro 11 resultados que encaixam no meu critério. São estes 11 todas opções que dizes existirem da ishares, ou estou a pesquisar mal?? Acho que nenhum é hedge.

Pesquisa filtrada por:

Distribution policy: Reinvesting
Asset Fixed Income: Fixed Income All

Está difícil tomar uma descisão. Mas serão mais de mil descisões a tomar no mesmo momento. Os objetivos são generalistas, o longo prazo + de 5up, acabou.

[Max_Filas]

Pesquisaem: http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/ o que não te falta são opções de replicação física e acc. Se possível vai para os hedge (principalmente nos obrigacionistas).

Nos obrigacionistas só encontro 11 resultados que encaixam no meu critério. São estes 11 todas opções que dizes existirem da ishares, ou estou a pesquisar mal?? Acho que nenhum é hedge.

Pesquisa filtrada por:

Distribution policy: Reinvesting
Asset Fixed Income: Fixed Income All

[FDPC]

http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2013/09/19/beware-of-financial-advisers-who-wont-talk-about-fees/

What are key warning signs that should make you consider switching financial advisers?

RICK FERRI:
Key #1: It’s time to consider switching when you can’t figure out how much you’re paying in fees and expenses, and your adviser avoids the issue. Investment costs are important. You should know exactly what you’re paying and to whom. This includes the adviser fees, commissions, mutual-fund fees and any administrative costs.

Key #2: It’s time to consider switching when you can’t figure out how your portfolio has been performing or how this return compares to appropriate market indexes. Top advisers disclose their performance to clients for better or worse, and they create clear and concise reports that compare returns to appropriate benchmarks. These reports show net-net, meaning they include the adviser’s management fee in addition to all other costs.

Key #3: It’s time to consider switching when you ask your adviser about low-cost index funds and they scoff at the idea. The benefits of using low-cost index funds are well documented, and every learned adviser knows the facts (see A Case for Index Fund Portfolios). I’m not suggesting that all advisers should use index funds, but they should acknowledge that index funds are tough to beat and that there is no sure way to pick winning active fund managers.

Que coisa, mal comecei, aqui ainda a engatinhar, e já estou nessa situação, bem ao menos como sou paciente, fiz muito bem em decidir em não me decidir com qual instituição trabalhar, está tornando-se uma ligeira "dor de cabeça". Não me parecem Advisors, mais parecem robos com óculos.

Rick Ferri is founder of Portfolio Solutions LLC and the author of books on low-cost index fund and ETF investing. His blog is RickFerri.com.

OPS o meu comentário está fora do sitio, tomarei mais atenção no próximo. Desculpem lá.
FDPC

[FDPC]

http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2013/09/19/beware-of-financial-advisers-who-wont-talk-about-fees/

What are key warning signs that should make you consider switching financial advisers?

RICK FERRI:
Key #1: It’s time to consider switching when you can’t figure out how much you’re paying in fees and expenses, and your adviser avoids the issue. Investment costs are important. You should know exactly what you’re paying and to whom. This includes the adviser fees, commissions, mutual-fund fees and any administrative costs.

Key #2: It’s time to consider switching when you can’t figure out how your portfolio has been performing or how this return compares to appropriate market indexes. Top advisers disclose their performance to clients for better or worse, and they create clear and concise reports that compare returns to appropriate benchmarks. These reports show net-net, meaning they include the adviser’s management fee in addition to all other costs.

Key #3: It’s time to consider switching when you ask your adviser about low-cost index funds and they scoff at the idea. The benefits of using low-cost index funds are well documented, and every learned adviser knows the facts (see A Case for Index Fund Portfolios). I’m not suggesting that all advisers should use index funds, but they should acknowledge that index funds are tough to beat and that there is no sure way to pick winning active fund managers.

Que coisa, mal comecei, aqui ainda a engatinhar, e já estou nessa situação, bem ao menos como sou paciente, fiz muito bem em decidir em não me decidir com qual instituição trabalhar, está tornando-se uma ligeira "dor de cabeça". Não me parecem Advisors, mais parecem robos com óculos.

Rick Ferri is founder of Portfolio Solutions LLC and the author of books on low-cost index fund and ETF investing. His blog is RickFerri.com.

[VirtuaGod]

aliás a palavra "swap" associada aos ETFs de replicação indireta, até mete medo, pois sempre que a ouvimos na TV é por maus motivos

Porque foram SWAPS exóticos. Aquilo de swaps tinha muito pouco... mas os jornalistas estão mais preocupados em assustar (pois vende mais) do que em explicar (que é sempre chato e desinteressante para as massas).

Dito isto vai para o replicação directa claro, só tens desvantagens no de replicação indirecta.

Pesquisaem: http://uk.ishares.com/en/rc/ o que não te falta são opções de replicação física e acc. Se possível vai para os hedge (principalmente nos obrigacionistas).

[Max_Filas]

Max, podes dar uma olhadela no site do Deutsche Bank, que é um player importante em ETFs europeus, db X-trackers ETFs.

Pretendo investir em 2 ETFs (ações globais e obrigações globais) que capitalizem os dividendos, de replicação direta, para rebalancear 1 vez ao ano.

O objetivo da meu investimento é escolher 2 ETFs, obrigações/ações, 50/50, para rebalancear anualmente, e mantê-los tipo PPR.

Max, fazes bem em definir as tuas escolhas. Mais uma ajuda, queres ETFs em EUR e/ou USD, com Hedge (cobertura cambial) ou sem?

Boas

Já estive no site, e sem dúvida que têm muita oferta, mas quase todos os ETFs disponiveis dão de replicação indireta. De replicação direta têm, 5 ETFs!!

Quanto às perguntas que me fazes, vou-te ser sincero. Não sei. A ideia de investir em ETFs, apareceu quando li este tópico e outro de outro forum, onde me pareceu que a "teoria" original de investimento bastante interessante, e acessível até a um "rookie" nestas matérias como eu. Com a leitura dos tópicos e devido ao montante a investir, decidi começar só com 2 ETFs, e devido à fiscalidade dos dividendos, optei pelos que capitalizam. Como já disse atrás, a ideia para já "fixa" de ter ETFs de replicação direta vem também do que lí nestes tópicos (aliás a palavra "swap" associada aos ETFs de replicação indireta, até mete medo, pois sempre que a ouvimos na TV é por maus motivos).

Por isso se são em EUR ou USD e com cobertura cambial ou não, não sei quais serão os mais indicados ao meu "objetivo". Se calhar até é indiferente, mas voçês me dirão. Espero .