CALDEIRÃO DE BOLSA

Jim Cramer Escreveu:...Baidu... of course it is overvalued. It was overvalued at $100, $200 and now $300... it will be overvalued at $400... "suspend" your judgment temporarily and play the bubble... what is more important is that you choose the right instrument to play the bubble... I caught the last 2000 points in the Nazz in the 1999-2000 period...

Ele tem razao. Nao e por ser uma bolha que nao vai continuar a subir. A China esta agora em pleno feedback loop. No livro Irrational Exuberance, fala-se de varios tipos de feedback loops. Por exemplo:

Price-to-price feedback, where initial price increases lead to more price increases as the effect of the initial price increases feed back into higher prices.

Price-to-GDP-to-price feedback, where the value of the stock market increases, and the resulting wealth and optimism encourages expenditures. Higher expenditures impact the GDP. The higher GDP is interpreted by the public as evidence of a healthier and stronger economy rather than a bubble.

Price-to-corporate-earnings-to-price feedback, when stock market prices increase, people spend more, and this boost corporate profits, encouraging people to have higher expectations for the stock market.

Os precos podem continuar a subir mesmo quando os investidores (profissionais ou nao) consideram que se esta numa bolha. Um exemplo disso foi a sondagem feita pelo Barron's a varios Money Managers em Abril de 1999 (11 meses antes do rebentamento da bolha .com) onde se perguntava se o mercado estava numa bolha. 72% disseram que sim.

Abraco

CN, com bolhas

A mim parece-me ser o que aparenta, ou seja, alguém que delira com o protagonismo e que não olha a meios para ganhar dinheiro.

Julgo que muitos portugueses gostariam de seguir o exemplo dele. Eu pessoalmente prefiro seguir o exemplo de investidores com integridade.

eu tambêm gosto de ler os artigos dele(e de muitos outros)convêm ver sempre as coisas com abertura mental!

neste caso só tenho a agradecer o teu contributo,Ulisses!

O Cramer está mesmo a apostar num corte de 50 pontos por parte da Fed... será que vamos bombar?

Prognósticos, querem dar?

Abraços
TB

Gosto de ler um tipo que nos últimos 15 anos tem 14 anos de resultados positivos. Goste-se ou não do estilo. Discorde-se ou não da arrogância e do estilo espalhafatoso, ele tem valor.

E acho que os artigos valem a pena serem para aqui transcritos. Nem que seja para gerar esta polémica

Deixa-me cá transcrever outro

Um abraço,
Ulisses


"Only Hope for Mortgage Insurers: Short Squeeze"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist
10/29/2007 10:40 AM EDT



"If you are trapped in AMBAC Financial (ABK - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating), MBIA (MBI - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating), PMI (PMI - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) or MGIC (MGIC - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating), you have to hope for a short squeeze in the next 72 hours.

You need 50 basis points of Fed cuts, you need panicked shorts and you need some sense that the Countrywide rose-colored glasses stay on for a bit.

That's really a tall order, but I see no value in any of these stocks. That doesn't mean they are expensive; it means that I believe they are worthless.

I don't care that ABK is down 47%, that MBI is down 19% -- bargain! -- PMI down 55% and MTG down 66% year over year.

These companies are going to take it on the chin when the brokers and insurance companies write down their portfolios as they will have to (as per the New York Times' Gretchen Morgensen's excellent coverage this weekend on the brokers).

These companies are so on the hook for business and so unable to raise capital that I believe those who believe they have value have to be very confused about what's really going on.

I am widely chided for my "hysterical" Armageddon tape with Erin Burnett on CNBC, but so far I have been born out pretty consistently.

These companies will be next to prove my point. They have largely relied on ratings agencies to determine the insurance they offer the holders of these mortgages, including the unbelievably extended Fannie Mae (FNM - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating). They seem to have not a clue about what happens to AAA mortgages when you layer on home equity, which I believe is the case for 50% of the mortgages that have been taken in the last two years.

I have said over and over again that we are looking at half a trillion in losses from the period 2005 to 2007. Who really knows how much exposure there is here.

Ooops, I do: Too much to stay solvent.

We have had some recognition of the problems with suspended buybacks and cut dividends. But these companies need capital infusions.

Only a sucker would supply capital to these guys. They don't even have a servicing arm, like CFC does, that make them worth something.

Despite their absolutely cool, calm and collected attitudes at these firms, there has to be panic in the halls. They are as underreserved as the S&Ls in 1990, with not life raft anywhere in site.

You are going to get a golden opportunity to sell them this week.

Ready the masts! "

(in www.realmoney.com)

a teoria dele qualquer um ganha dinheiro:basta abrir as posições que lhe apetecer,e quando as coisas começarem a correr para o lado contrário é só pedir ajuda(à alqaeda,à fed ou a quem quer que lhe apare os erros)

interessa-se em fazer dinheiro,mas quando as coisa lhe correram mal,em vez de assumir os erros,parecia um macaco a guinchar pelo socorro do FED:que hipócrita!

"China Bubble? Who Cares?"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist
10/29/2007 8:44 AM EDT


"I don't care if China's a bubble. I care about making money. And that's one of the reasons why I am so disliked by so many "professionals" on Wall Street.

A couple of weeks ago when Baidu (BIDU - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating) was at $209, I went on CNBC and talked about a conversation I had with Patrick Schultz, one of the fine researchers who work with me at TheStreet.com. Patrick had just completed a video with me in which he said Baidu could double and it would not be outrageous. He didn't say it would be cheap, he simply said it would not be outrageous. He even hinted that it could trade much higher than that.

No sooner did I finish the appearance on CNBC with my good friend Erin Burnett then I was bombarded by angry hedge fund managers who were short Baidu.

One went so far as -- holy cow! -- accusing me of doing "no homework." That, by the way, is always code: code for "you disagree with me and you are a nitwit because you do."

(In a line of total arrogance, albeit parenthetical, might I just say that I am always amazed at how stupid I am and how little homework I did and how many tens of millions I made in the market. I guess it shows that the more stupid you are and the less homework you do the more money you make.)

I initially tried to debate these poor, angry souls, but that is never worth it, because they are really just jealous that they are not on TV driving home their points and that my statements have just caused them to lose even more money.

That's OK, too. Being wrong costs money.

What amazed me, oddly, was that any of the critics really thought I believed that Baidu "deserved" to be at $500. I could care less what Baidu's worth. I care about what it could trade to. I couldn't care less if it is "overvalued." Of course it is overvalued. It was overvalued at $100, $200 and now $300. Oh, and stop trading, it will be overvalued at $400.


What I care about, as I said at the top of this piece, is making money, and sometimes you have to suspend the rules to make money if that's what you really want to do.

Some people want to be "right" and make money, and I am telling you that being right is not always the same as making money. Sometimes the really rigorous thing to do is to "suspend" your judgment temporarily and play the bubble because the money can be made so fast and it is so lucrative that it is worth playing.

"Aha, the intellectuals say, "how do you know when it will stop? How do you know you won't get caught in the bubble's bursting?" To which I say, "I don't know, who cares?" I think what is more important is that you choose the right instrument to play the bubble and play it whole-hog.

For example, if I really wanted to play Baidu I would have used stock replacement, I would have bought deep-in-the-money calls out a couple of months and then rolled them up each time it took out a new milestone. That way, in the end I am playing with house money and cutting my risk by accepting a 25-point loss -- typically the depth of the strike I pick -- in order to play the bubble. Again, I don't care that it is a bubble, I acknowledge that it is a bubble. I just want to be able to capitalize off the bubble rather than simply say "Nope, it is a bubble, I know better."

In the end, this is a fundamental difference between me and most others who have been at this game for a long time. It is why I was and will always be glad that I caught the last 2000 points in the Nazz in the 1999-2000 period even though I am reviled for not giving everyone the sell call or for staying bullish right up to the top and still recommending stocks. I don't know how else to do it. If you think I am going to sit on the sidelines and pass up 2000 Nazz points out of principle, you are nuts!

So, I say, criticize me all you want about recommending Baidu, or Focus Media (FMCN - commentary - Cramer's Take - Rating), or China Mobile (CHL - commentary - Cramer's Take) or PetroChina (PTR - commentary - Cramer's Take) -- the four horsemen of China -- I will ride them to the bank, and then I will give some back when the bubble bursts. But not before I have taken enough off while the critics sniffed.

Or, to put it more succinctly, they don't ask you at the bank whether you made it in Baidu.

They just take your money like any other deposit."

(in www.realmoney.com)