Havia apetite pela Luz Saúde. Preço é que não convenceu

[Artista Romeno]

Caro Artista,

alguma vez olhaste p os CTT?
1) Pq é q o rácio solvabilidade ( cap.proprio / ativos ) é na ordem dos 20%? (Abaixo das utilities q andam na ordem dos 30% (EDP creio q 29%, e REN 23%) ?

2) Costumas analisar as empresas de uma perspetiva de risco especifico (variação não explicada pela variação do mercado psi 20?)

3) Se sim costumas dar preferência a empresas com mais passivo corrente do que passivo não corrente?
(Pois assim em caso de crise nacional/mundial podem mais facilmente reduzir o passivo corrente adaptando-se a uma possível nova realidade?)

obrigado desde já.

Estou no mobile depois elaborarei melhor. Assim
Ctt: e uma empresa num setor em queda e que nao domino na totalidade. Mas tem 235m de cash um market cap de 1100m, ebitda anual de 135 m para20114 e corrigido o que da um ev ebitda a rondar as7x salvo erro e mais que 8x nao creio que os ctt valham. Os ctt tem alguns segmentos de negocio em queda estrutural, pelo que mesmo os cortes de custos da empresa nao darao crescimentos indefinidos em certos segmentos...pelo que numa empresa deve se ver sempre o futuro e este aqui a meu ver impede ev acima de8x
Vejo sempre o ambiente macro o setor e as especificidades da empresa a comecar pelas financeiras e terminando nas operacionais
Muita divida de cp e mau, pois em caso de crise a empresa fica sob pressao para vender ativos ou algo pior caso o funding aperte.... divida vejo sempre liquida, gosto de empresas moderadamente endividadas com bons indicadores Operacionais e com futuro risonho pela frente...o valor de uma empresa e a somoa dos free cash flows atualizados futuros por accao...o preco reflete no longo prazo a expetativa do mercado sobre eles quando e minimamente eficiente

[dozens]

Caro Artista,

alguma vez olhaste p os CTT?
1) Pq é q o rácio solvabilidade ( cap.proprio / ativos ) é na ordem dos 20%? (Abaixo das utilities q andam na ordem dos 30% (EDP creio q 29%, e REN 23%) ?

2) Costumas analisar as empresas de uma perspetiva de risco especifico (variação não explicada pela variação do mercado psi 20?)

3) Se sim costumas dar preferência a empresas com mais passivo corrente do que passivo não corrente?
(Pois assim em caso de crise nacional/mundial podem mais facilmente reduzir o passivo corrente adaptando-se a uma possível nova realidade?)

obrigado desde já.

[Artista Romeno]

Desemprego nos eua
recomendo os seguintes links do new york times
Jobless Rate in U.S. Falls Below 6% as Hiring Picks Up
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/business/economy/monthly-jobs-report-september.html?rref=business/economy&module=Ribbon&version=origin&region=Header&action=click&contentCollection=Economy&pgtype=article

A Strong Jobs Report, Charted
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/upshot/a-strong-jobs-report-charted.html?rref=business/economy&module=Ribbon&version=origin&region=Header&action=click&contentCollection=Economy&pgtype=article

de resto acho que para quem investe em euros é procurar empresas americanas expostas ao mercado interno ou pouco expostas à europa, eu após sair do linkedin já o fiz

[Artista Romeno]

Don’t Judge the Economy by the Number of Start-Ups
by Daniel Isenberg and Fernando Fabre | 2:00 PM October 1, 2014
http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/10/dont-judge-the-economy-by-the-number-of-start-ups/
não são necessariamente só as empresas jovens as que inovam vejam alguns casos conhecidos
"More new businesses are better for society, right?

That’s a common assumption. For instance, take this recent Washington Post piece, headlined, “More businesses are closing than starting. Can Congress help turn that around?” Sounds ominous at first. But wait a minute – is starting more new businesses always a good thing ? Isn’t it a basic economic tenet that well-functioning markets will have many entrances and exits, that weak businesses (including thousands of one-person enterprises) will get recycled quickly (fast failure) and that over time, vigorous, well-regulated markets will support strong and growing companies, which in turn provide dignified jobs and prosperity?

This conflation of startups with entrepreneurship, and more broadly with “business dynamism,” has become so widespread it can muddle even the most serious research. For example, the admired Brookings Institution recently purported to explain an apparent decades-long decline in American entrepreneurship. The supporting evidence? More and more American companies are surviving and growing beyond 16 years. The implicit axiom here is that robust companies that have sustained and grown over the longer term are somehow less innovative. The authors of this study, as well as other commentators, imply or even proclaim explicitly that these dead weight dinosaurs are dampening American society’s entrepreneurial spirit. (It should be noted that amongst this group of apparently innovation-barren 16-somethings are: eBay [19], Google [16], Starbucks [43], Netflix [17], Apple [28], Cisco [30], Boston Scientific [35], and Dell [30].) In attempting to explain the root causes of the decline, the Brookings report also points to the parallel decline in the number of new companies registered during the same period. Their solution: “America needs more startups.”

The danger here lies in our unquestioning acceptance of the assumptions built into these reports, i.e. that having more growing, sustaining companies is somehow destructive of entrepreneurship in the economy; and that the decline of newly registered businesses, in and of itself, is a bad thing. (Note that Germany has witnessed an almost identical “decline” in dynamism over the past thirty years and most experts would agree their economy has been quite strong. And Alibaba is a 16 year-old company, and no one is claiming it is sluggish or un-innovative.) Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the decline in new business formation is associated with increased per capita income, and the more new businesses countries have, the lower their GDPs are.

Most of us who have built or invested in sustainably growing business ventures (as we have) would be thrilled at their survival and growth. Anyone who has successfully built a company knows that it typically takes 15-20 years or more to take root. The WhatsApps are the rare exceptions.

These growing businesses – which we call “scale-ups” to distinguish them from start-ups – represent exactly the kind of long-term entrepreneurship that improves societies, jobs, quality of life, and innovation. Entrepreneurial scale-ups are companies – young or old – which are run and owned by growth-driven leaders, and which at any stage of their lives may launch a new growth trajectory. Study after study shows the following: Relatively high-growth ventures are often at least 16 years old, and are disproportionately high drivers of jobs, growth, value, and sustainability. New company starts are easier to count, but they alone don’t have the positive impact on economies that growing a company does."

[Artista Romeno]

Por falar em ABS ALEMANHA TRAVA A FUNDO

Euro zone manufacturing slows, Germany contracts
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102047895
"Activity in the euro zone's manufacturing sector slowed more than first estimated in September, as Germany's manufacturing sector contracted for the first time in 15 months.The sector slowed closer to stagnation, as inflows of new orders contracted for the first time since June 2013.

New orders in Germany also dried up, with firms hit by the impact of Russian sanctions and a weakening economic environment.Markit's final Manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) for the euro zone fell to 50.3 in September from August's 50.7 and lower than earlier estimates of 50.5
The figure marks a 14-month low for the region, as input costs and selling prices were both lower than in previous months.
"September's euro zone PMI makes for gloomy reading. The euro area's manufacturing economy has lost the growth momentum seen earlier in the year, lurching closer to stagnation," said chief economist at Markit, Chris Williamson.
"The near-term outlook also looks worrying. Order books are now deteriorating for the first time since June of last year, suggesting output could start to fall as we move into the final quarter of the year," he said.
Along with Germany, Greece's factory activity contracted at the fastest rate in almost a year with Markit's PMI reading for the country coming in at 48.4, down from 50.1 in August.
Ireland remained on top of the national PMI league table for the seventh straight month in September, despite seeing its rate of growth ease from August's near 15-year high, followed by Spain."In a sign of spreading economic malaise, Germany, Austria and Greece all joined France in reporting manufacturing downturns in September," Williamson added."

[Artista Romeno]

Na sequencia de um tema falado nesta página.....e de um banco já falado atrás como ainda tendo possivelmente que melhorar o capital....
RBS Said to Sell ABS to Bolster Capital Before ECB Plan
By Richard Partington and Alastair Marsh Sep 30, 2014 3:47 PM GMT 1 Comment Email Print
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-3 ... -plan.html

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc offloaded 9 billion euros ($11 billion) of bonds, mostly asset-backed securities, to reduce the amount of capital it’s required to hold, according to a person with knowledge of the matter.

Britain’s largest state-owned lender said in a trading update today that it “took advantage of improved market prices” to sell the debt securities for about 200 million pounds ($324 million) less than they were valued on its own accounts, without giving details. Most of the bonds were ABS held at RBS’s Dutch entity, said the person who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.

European banks are seeking ways to bolster their capital buffers ahead of stress tests in the euro area and the U.K. later this year. Demand for ABS has increased after European Central Bank President Mario Draghi pledged on Sept. 4 to buy a broad portfolio of “simple and transparent” bundled securities with underlying assets such as mortgages.

“A positive consequence of the ABS program may be that banks effectively see an improvement in their capital ratios when they sell ABS to the ECB,” said Philip Shaw, an economist at Investec Securities Ltd. in London. “It’s very expensive to hold ABS compared to other instruments.”

British banks are preparing for the results of stress tests from the Bank of England as part of a health-check on the industry based on the financial position of lenders at the end of 2013. It may be “beneficial” for RBS to show the BOE it has since made progress building capital, Investec’s Shaw said.

[Artista Romeno]

Deixo aqui um artigo na sequencia do que penso que o DR Tretas defendeu, após le-lo em papel e na sequencia do que pode vir aí ou não ( isto não creio que venha, creio que é interessante... dito isto acho que o aproach adicional devia ser misto meio QE, meio por via de redução temporaria de impostos sobre o rendimento, compensados por divida publica comprada pelo bce para compensar a perda de receita fiscal, sendo depois isto reposto quando as ecnomias da zona euro melhorassem
Print Less but Transfer More
Why Central Banks Should Give Money Directly to the People
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141847/mark-blyth-and-eric-lonergan/print-less-but-transfer-more

In the decades following World War II, Japan’s economy grew so quickly and for so long that experts came to describe it as nothing short of miraculous. During the country’s last big boom, between 1986 and 1991, its economy expanded by nearly $1 trillion. But then, in a story with clear parallels for today, Japan’s asset bubble burst, and its markets went into a deep dive. Government debt ballooned, and annual growth slowed to less than one percent. By 1998, the economy was shrinking.

That December, a Princeton economics professor named Ben Bernanke argued that central bankers could still turn the country around. Japan was essentially suffering from a deficiency of demand: interest rates were already low, but consumers were not buying, firms were not borrowing, and investors were not betting. It was a self-fulfilling prophesy: pessimism about the economy was preventing a recovery. Bernanke argued that the Bank of Japan needed to act more aggressively and suggested it consider an unconventional approach: give Japanese households cash directly. Consumers could use the new windfalls to spend their way out of the recession, driving up demand and raising prices.

As Bernanke made clear, the concept was not new: in the 1930s, the British economist John Maynard Keynes proposed burying bottles of bank notes in old coal mines; once unearthed (like gold), the cash would create new wealth and spur spending. The conservative economist Milton Friedman also saw the appeal of direct money transfers, which he likened to dropping cash out of a helicopter. Japan never tried using them, however, and the country’s economy has never fully recovered. Between 1993 and 2003, Japan’s annual growth rates averaged less than one percent.

Today, most economists agree that like Japan in the late 1990s, the global economy is suffering from insufficient spending, a problem that stems from a larger failure of governance. Central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, have taken aggressive action, consistently lowering interest rates such that today they hover near zero. They have also pumped trillions of dollars’ worth of new money into the financial system. Yet such policies have only fed a damaging cycle of booms and busts, warping incentives and distorting asset prices, and now economic growth is stagnating while inequality gets worse. It’s well past time, then, for U.S. policymakers -- as well as their counterparts in other developed countries -- to consider a version of Friedman’s helicopter drops. In the short term, such cash transfers could jump-start the economy. Over the long term, they could reduce dependence on the banking system for growth and reverse the trend of rising inequality. The transfers wouldn’t cause damaging inflation, and few doubt that they would work. The only real question is why no government has tried them.

Instead of trying to drag down the top, governments should boost the bottom.
EASY MONEY

In theory, governments can boost spending in two ways: through fiscal policies (such as lowering taxes or increasing government spending) or through monetary policies (such as reducing interest rates or increasing the money supply). But over the past few decades, policymakers in many countries have come to rely almost exclusively on the latter. The shift has occurred for a number of reasons. Particularly in the United States, partisan divides over fiscal policy have grown too wide to bridge, as the left and the right have waged bitter fights over whether to increase government spending or cut tax rates. More generally, tax rebates and stimulus packages tend to face greater political hurdles than monetary policy shifts. Presidents and prime ministers need approval from their legislatures to pass a budget; that takes time, and the resulting tax breaks and government investments often benefit powerful constituencies rather than the economy as a whole. Many central banks, by contrast, are politically independent and can cut interest rates with a single conference call. Moreover, there is simply no real consensus about how to use taxes or spending to efficiently stimulate the economy.

Steady growth from the late 1980s to the early years of this century seemed to vindicate this emphasis on monetary policy. The approach presented major drawbacks, however. Unlike fiscal policy, which directly affects spending, monetary policy operates in an indirect fashion. Low interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing and drive up the prices of stocks, bonds, and homes. But stimulating the economy in this way is expensive and inefficient, and can create dangerous bubbles -- in real estate, for example -- and encourage companies and households to take on dangerous levels of debt.

That is precisely what happened during Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Fed chair, from 1997 to 2006: Washington relied too heavily on monetary policy to increase spending. Commentators often blame Greenspan for sowing the seeds of the 2008 financial crisis by keeping interest rates too low during the early years of this century. But Greenspan’s approach was merely a reaction to Congress’ unwillingness to use its fiscal tools. Moreover, Greenspan was completely honest about what he was doing. In testimony to Congress in 2002, he explained how Fed policy was affecting ordinary Americans:

"Particularly important in buoying spending [are] the very low levels of mortgage interest rates, which [encourage] households to purchase homes, refinance debt and lower debt service burdens, and extract equity from homes to finance expenditures. Fixed mortgage rates remain at historically low levels and thus should continue to fuel reasonably strong housing demand and, through equity extraction, to support consumer spending as well."

Of course, Greenspan’s model crashed and burned spectacularly when the housing market imploded in 2008. Yet nothing has really changed since then. The United States merely patched its financial sector back together and resumed the same policies that created 30 years of financial bubbles. Consider what Bernanke, who came out of the academy to serve as Greenspan’s successor, did with his policy of “quantitative easing,” through which the Fed increased the money supply by purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of mortgage-backed securities and government bonds. Bernanke aimed to boost stock and bond prices in the same way that Greenspan had lifted home values. Their ends were ultimately the same: to increase consumer spending.

The overall effects of Bernanke’s policies have also been similar to those of Greenspan’s. Higher asset prices have encouraged a modest recovery in spending, but at great risk to the financial system and at a huge cost to taxpayers. Yet other governments have still followed Bernanke’s lead. Japan’s central bank, for example, has tried to use its own policy of quantitative easing to lift its stock market. So far, however, Tokyo’s efforts have failed to counteract the country’s chronic underconsumption. In the eurozone, the European Central Bank has attempted to increase incentives for spending by making its interest rates negative, charging commercial banks 0.1 percent to deposit cash. But there is little evidence that this policy has increased spending.

China is already struggling to cope with the consequences of similar policies, which it adopted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. To keep the country’s economy afloat, Beijing aggressively cut interest rates and gave banks the green light to hand out an unprecedented number of loans. The results were a dramatic rise in asset prices and substantial new borrowing by individuals and financial firms, which led to dangerous instability. Chinese policymakers are now trying to sustain overall spending while reducing debt and making prices more stable. Like other governments, Beijing seems short on ideas about just how to do this. It doesn’t want to keep loosening monetary policy. But it hasn’t yet found a different way forward.

The broader global economy, meanwhile, may have already entered a bond bubble and could soon witness a stock bubble. Housing markets around the world, from Tel Aviv to Toronto, have overheated. Many in the private sector don’t want to take out any more loans; they believe their debt levels are already too high. That’s especially bad news for central bankers: when households and businesses refuse to rapidly increase their borrowing, monetary policy can’t do much to increase their spending. Over the past 15 years, the world’s major central banks have expanded their balance sheets by around $6 trillion, primarily through quantitative easing and other so-called liquidity operations. Yet in much of the developed world, inflation has barely budged.

To some extent, low inflation reflects intense competition in an increasingly globalized economy. But it also occurs when people and businesses are too hesitant to spend their money, which keeps unemployment high and wage growth low. In the eurozone, inflation has recently dropped perilously close to zero. And some countries, such as Portugal and Spain, may already be experiencing deflation. At best, the current policies are not working; at worst, they will lead to further instability and prolonged stagnation.

MAKE IT RAIN

Governments must do better. Rather than trying to spur private-sector spending through asset purchases or interest-rate changes, central banks, such as the Fed, should hand consumers cash directly. In practice, this policy could take the form of giving central banks the ability to hand their countries’ tax-paying households a certain amount of money. The government could distribute cash equally to all households or, even better, aim for the bottom 80 percent of households in terms of income. Targeting those who earn the least would have two primary benefits. For one thing, lower-income households are more prone to consume, so they would provide a greater boost to spending. For another, the policy would offset rising income inequality.

Such an approach would represent the first significant innovation in monetary policy since the inception of central banking, yet it would not be a radical departure from the status quo. Most citizens already trust their central banks to manipulate interest rates. And rate changes are just as redistributive as cash transfers. When interest rates go down, for example, those borrowing at adjustable rates end up benefiting, whereas those who save -- and thus depend more on interest income -- lose out.

Most economists agree that cash transfers from a central bank would stimulate demand. But policymakers nonetheless continue to resist the notion. In a 2012 speech, Mervyn King, then governor of the Bank of England, argued that transfers technically counted as fiscal policy, which falls outside the purview of central bankers, a view that his Japanese counterpart, Haruhiko Kuroda, echoed this past March. Such arguments, however, are merely semantic. Distinctions between monetary and fiscal policies are a function of what governments ask their central banks to do. In other words, cash transfers would become a tool of monetary policy as soon as the banks began using them.

Other critics warn that such helicopter drops could cause inflation. The transfers, however, would be a flexible tool. Central bankers could ramp them up whenever they saw fit and raise interest rates to offset any inflationary effects, although they probably wouldn’t have to do the latter: in recent years, low inflation rates have proved remarkably resilient, even following round after round of quantitative easing. Three trends explain why. First, technological innovation has driven down consumer prices and globalization has kept wages from rising. Second, the recurring financial panics of the past few decades have encouraged many lower-income economies to increase savings -- in the form of currency reserves -- as a form of insurance. That means they have been spending far less than they could, starving their economies of investments in such areas as infrastructure and defense, which would provide employment and drive up prices. Finally, throughout the developed world, increased life expectancies have led some private citizens to focus on saving for the longer term (think Japan). As a result, middle-aged adults and the elderly have started spending less on goods and services. These structural roots of today’s low inflation will only strengthen in the coming years, as global competition intensifies, fears of financial crises persist, and populations in Europe and the United States continue to age. If anything, policymakers should be more worried about deflation, which is already troubling the eurozone.

There is no need, then, for central banks to abandon their traditional focus on keeping demand high and inflation on target. Cash transfers stand a better chance of achieving those goals than do interest-rate shifts and quantitative easing, and at a much lower cost. Because they are more efficient, helicopter drops would require the banks to print much less money. By depositing the funds directly into millions of individual accounts -- spurring spending immediately -- central bankers wouldn’t need to print quantities of money equivalent to 20 percent of GDP.

The transfers’ overall impact would depend on their so-called fiscal multiplier, which measures how much GDP would rise for every $100 transferred. In the United States, the tax rebates provided by the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which amounted to roughly one percent of GDP, can serve as a useful guide: they are estimated to have had a multiplier of around 1.3. That means that an infusion of cash equivalent to two percent of GDP would likely grow the economy by about 2.6 percent. Transfers on that scale -- less than five percent of GDP -- would probably suffice to generate economic growth.

LET THEM HAVE CASH

Using cash transfers, central banks could boost spending without assuming the risks of keeping interest rates low. But transfers would only marginally address growing income inequality, another major threat to economic growth over the long term. In the past three decades, the wages of the bottom 40 percent of earners in developed countries have stagnated, while the very top earners have seen their incomes soar. The Bank of England estimates that the richest five percent of British households now own 40 percent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom -- a phenomenon now common across the developed world.

To reduce the gap between rich and poor, the French economist Thomas Piketty and others have proposed a global tax on wealth. But such a policy would be impractical. For one thing, the wealthy would probably use their political influence and financial resources to oppose the tax or avoid paying it. Around $29 trillion in offshore assets already lies beyond the reach of state treasuries, and the new tax would only add to that pile. In addition, the majority of the people who would likely have to pay -- the top ten percent of earners -- are not all that rich. Typically, the majority of households in the highest income tax brackets are upper-middle class, not superwealthy. Further burdening this group would be a hard sell politically and, as France’s recent budget problems demonstrate, would yield little financial benefit. Finally, taxes on capital would discourage private investment and innovation.

There is another way: instead of trying to drag down the top, governments could boost the bottom. Central banks could issue debt and use the proceeds to invest in a global equity index, a bundle of diverse investments with a value that rises and falls with the market, which they could hold in sovereign wealth funds. The Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve already own assets in excess of 20 percent of their countries’ GDPs, so there is no reason why they could not invest those assets in global equities on behalf of their citizens. After around 15 years, the funds could distribute their equity holdings to the lowest-earning 80 percent of taxpayers. The payments could be made to tax-exempt individual savings accounts, and governments could place simple constraints on how the capital could be used.

For example, beneficiaries could be required to retain the funds as savings or to use them to finance their education, pay off debts, start a business, or invest in a home. Such restrictions would encourage the recipients to think of the transfers as investments in the future rather than as lottery winnings. The goal, moreover, would be to increase wealth at the bottom end of the income distribution over the long run, which would do much to lower inequality.

Best of all, the system would be self-financing. Most governments can now issue debt at a real interest rate of close to zero. If they raised capital that way or liquidated the assets they currently possess, they could enjoy a five percent real rate of return -- a conservative estimate, given historical returns and current valuations. Thanks to the effect of compound interest, the profits from these funds could amount to around a 100 percent capital gain after just 15 years. Say a government issued debt equivalent to 20 percent of GDP at a real interest rate of zero and then invested the capital in an index of global equities. After 15 years, it could repay the debt generated and also transfer the excess capital to households. This is not alchemy. It’s a policy that would make the so-called equity risk premium -- the excess return that investors receive in exchange for putting their capital at risk -- work for everyone.

MO' MONEY, FEWER PROBLEMS

As things currently stand, the prevailing monetary policies have gone almost completely unchallenged, with the exception of proposals by Keynesian economists such as Lawrence Summers and Paul Krugman, who have called for government-financed spending on infrastructure and research. Such investments, the reasoning goes, would create jobs while making the United States more competitive. And now seems like the perfect time to raise the funds to pay for such work: governments can borrow for ten years at real interest rates of close to zero.

The problem with these proposals is that infrastructure spending takes too long to revive an ailing economy. In the United Kingdom, for example, policymakers have taken years to reach an agreement on building the high-speed rail project known as HS2 and an equally long time to settle on a plan to add a third runway at London’s Heathrow Airport. Such large, long-term investments are needed. But they shouldn’t be rushed. Just ask Berliners about the unnecessary new airport that the German government is building for over $5 billion, and which is now some five years behind schedule. Governments should thus continue to invest in infrastructure and research, but when facing insufficient demand, they should tackle the spending problem quickly and directly.

If cash transfers represent such a sure thing, then why has no one tried them? The answer, in part, comes down to an accident of history: central banks were not designed to manage spending. The first central banks, many of which were founded in the late nineteenth century, were designed to carry out a few basic functions: issue currency, provide liquidity to the government bond market, and mitigate banking panics. They mainly engaged in so-called open-market operations -- essentially, the purchase and sale of government bonds -- which provided banks with liquidity and determined the rate of interest in money markets. Quantitative easing, the latest variant of that bond-buying function, proved capable of stabilizing money markets in 2009, but at too high a cost considering what little growth it achieved.

A second factor explaining the persistence of the old way of doing business involves central banks’ balance sheets. Conventional accounting treats money -- bank notes and reserves -- as a liability. So if one of these banks were to issue cash transfers in excess of its assets, it could technically have a negative net worth. Yet it makes no sense to worry about the solvency of central banks: after all, they can always print more money.

The most powerful sources of resistance to cash transfers are political and ideological. In the United States, for example, the Fed is extremely resistant to legislative changes affecting monetary policy for fear of congressional actions that would limit its freedom of action in a future crisis (such as preventing it from bailing out foreign banks). Moreover, many American conservatives consider cash transfers to be socialist handouts. In Europe, which one might think would provide more fertile ground for such transfers, the German fear of inflation that led the European Central Bank to hike rates in 2011, in the middle of the greatest recession since the 1930s, suggests that ideological resistance can be found there, too.

Those who don’t like the idea of cash giveaways, however, should imagine that poor households received an unanticipated inheritance or tax rebate. An inheritance is a wealth transfer that has not been earned by the recipient, and its timing and amount lie outside the beneficiary’s control. Although the gift may come from a family member, in financial terms, it’s the same as a direct money transfer from the government. Poor people, of course, rarely have rich relatives and so rarely get inheritances -- but under the plan being proposed here, they would, every time it looked as though their country was at risk of entering a recession.

Unless one subscribes to the view that recessions are either therapeutic or deserved, there is no reason governments should not try to end them if they can, and cash transfers are a uniquely effective way of doing so. For one thing, they would quickly increase spending, and central banks could implement them instantaneously, unlike infrastructure spending or changes to the tax code, which typically require legislation. And in contrast to interest-rate cuts, cash transfers would affect demand directly, without the side effects of distorting financial markets and asset prices. They would also would help address inequality -- without skinning the rich.

Ideology aside, the main barriers to implementing this policy are surmountable. And the time is long past for this kind of innovation. Central banks are now trying to run twenty-first-century economies with a set of policy tools invented over a century ago. By relying too heavily on those tactics, they have ended up embracing policies with perverse consequences and poor payoffs. All it will take to change course is the courage, brains, and leadership to try something new.

[Artista Romeno]

Para esclarecer questões que ja me têm metido tambem sobre isto deixo aqui de um documento la de tras a seguinte imagem sobre o enterprise value, e assim retomamos um registo mais Be AH Bah
o link ficou na pagina dois deste topico

[Artista Romeno]

o que fazes basicamente é calcular o crescimento das vendas num determinado período e por ai encontras uma taxa (G)... retiras o ebitda do mesmo período e posteriormente divides o ebitda pelas vendas... calculando assim a percentagem das vendas que correspondem ao ebitda...retiras o capex e fazes o mesmo...

depois de concluíres este processo fazes uma actualização das vendas, imaginemos que tens um G(crescimento das vendas nos últimos 5 anos de 5%. então pegas nesses 5% e no primeiro ano fazes. vendas*(1+0.05)^1 o segundo ano elevado a dois... e por ai. o ebitda é a multiplicação da media percentual que deu nos anos anteriores... o capex é a média percentual da su importância nas vendas... fazendo o ebitda menos o capex tens o free C-F...

daqui calculas o wacc que te dá a taxa de desconto... faes a capitalização do wacc e divides os valores do free c-f pelo wacc. vai darte os valores actualizados aos dias de hoje... a partir dai tens os cash-flows futuros (normais)...

depois calculas os perpétuos... e ai fazes os cash-flows normais*(1+wacc)^numero de anos que correspondem os cash-flow livres... a partir dai tiras a dívida e os interesses minoritários e tens o firm value... a partir dai é so dividir pelo numero de acções

a minha dúvida em todo este processo é so uma, ent quando fazemos as perpetuas não temos de fazer o wacc-g? estou a acabar de afinar isto... para a noite enviarei a minha análise para ver se tá feita correctamente...

no perpetuo é como em qualquer valor leia-se fcf/( r-g) mais info aqui na corticeira viewtopic.php?f=3&t=62178&start=175 , no 2º comentario da pagina

[ParaCima]

o que fazes basicamente é calcular o crescimento das vendas num determinado período e por ai encontras uma taxa (G)... retiras o ebitda do mesmo período e posteriormente divides o ebitda pelas vendas... calculando assim a percentagem das vendas que correspondem ao ebitda...retiras o capex e fazes o mesmo...

depois de concluíres este processo fazes uma actualização das vendas, imaginemos que tens um G(crescimento das vendas nos últimos 5 anos de 5%. então pegas nesses 5% e no primeiro ano fazes. vendas*(1+0.05)^1 o segundo ano elevado a dois... e por ai. o ebitda é a multiplicação da media percentual que deu nos anos anteriores... o capex é a média percentual da su importância nas vendas... fazendo o ebitda menos o capex tens o free C-F...

daqui calculas o wacc que te dá a taxa de desconto... faes a capitalização do wacc e divides os valores do free c-f pelo wacc. vai darte os valores actualizados aos dias de hoje... a partir dai tens os cash-flows futuros (normais)...

depois calculas os perpétuos... e ai fazes os cash-flows normais*(1+wacc)^numero de anos que correspondem os cash-flow livres... a partir dai tiras a dívida e os interesses minoritários e tens o firm value... a partir dai é so dividir pelo numero de acções

a minha dúvida em todo este processo é so uma, ent quando fazemos as perpetuas não temos de fazer o wacc-g? estou a acabar de afinar isto... para a noite enviarei a minha análise para ver se tá feita correctamente...

[Artista Romeno]

enfim glory days já la eram
After a life of trend spotting, Bill Gross missed the big shift
Gillian TettBy Gillian TettAuthor alerts

Now it is governments that are intimidating – or at least wrongfooting – the bond gurus
Pimco's Total Return fund, managed by Bill Gross, is one of 14 US funds with assets of over $100bn
Bill Gross
The power of the bond market has long frustrated the ambitions of politicians, a resentment famously captured by James Carville in the early 1990s . The Clinton adviser’s remark that he would like to be reincarnated as the bond market so “you can intimidate everyone” – especially governments – resonated for years.
No one wielded the power of the bond market better than Bill Gross, who last week suddenly and acrimoniously parted ways with Pimco, the company he co-founded in 1971. The market is still digesting his abrupt exit, which came after lurid tales of personality clashes inside the $2,000bn asset management group.
But the drama has also highlighted a bigger trend: the power balance between governments and the bond market has shifted . These days it is governments that are intimidating – or, at least, wrongfooting – the bond gurus. It is government action, such as unorthodox monetary policy, that is shaping bond prices now . And that is making it difficult for bond titans such as Mr Gross to recreate their old magic.

During most of his career, Mr Gross wielded brilliant trend-spotting skills. These emerged in the 1960s, when he turned $200 into $10,000 at Las Vegas blackjack tables. In the 1970s he made the bet of his life by creating a small fund to invest in bonds – a deeply unfashionable move at the time. But he saw that interest rates were heading down as central bankers began to whip inflation. The conditions for a multi-decade bull market in bonds were in place.
He also saw that this trend would not affect all bonds the same way: changes in the bond market’s structure allowed investors to trade individual securities with greater precision. He began picking corporate and sovereign winners , and was highly successful at this for almost four decades . In 2007 his flagship $220bn Pimco Total Return Fund outperformed 99 per cent of its peers.
But recently his performance has crumbled. This year his flagship fund is in the bottom 20 per cent of industry tables, measured by returns. This partly reflects the fact that low interest rates have cut returns across the board. Ultra loose monetary policy has raised prices so indiscriminately that there is less scope for picking winners.
But Mr Gross also has been wrongfooted by government. In January 2010 he declared that the British bond market was “sitting on a bed of nitroglycerine”, suggesting UK sovereign bond yields would rise. It seemed a rational bet, given that the UK had a 7 per cent structural budget deficit – a postwar high. But British bond yields subsequently fell to a record low because the Bank of England started buying bonds.
Similarly, there was sound logic to Mr Gross’s declarations in 2010 and 2013 that the bull market in bonds was over. But instead of rising, yields fell to new lows in the US and Europe. That is partly because markets are “under the spell” of unconventional monetary policy, as the Bank for International Settlements says.


More recently Gross has placed heavy bets on the idea that the “new neutral” for US interest rates should be 2 per cent. This implies that the US Federal Reserve will not raise rates as high as markets currently predict, making medium-term US government bonds attractive. But this trade also produced losses.
When the Fed’s crisis-fighting policies end, Mr Gross’s bets may turn out to be correct. It is also possible that fundamentals will start to shape markets more forcefully – allowing bond investors to intimidate governments again.
But, as John Maynard Keynes observed, the problem with markets is that they can remain “irrational” longer than investors can stay solvent – or than eccentric investment gurus can command respect. In that sense, then, Mr Gross is a potent symbol of a distorted investment world.

[ricardmag]

[Artista Romeno]

Caso pratico em termos de capital, nem sempre compensa
"Risk-capital treatment of securitisation – A case study
In this box we compare the capital requirement for a securitised portfolio (leaving 5% on the book as per retention rules) with that of the underlying loan portfolio. In the analysis, we have assumed that the bank uses the Standardised Approach for the calculation of risk-weighted assets. A. Capital requirement for a typical securitisation
For a bank that keeps 5% of the portfolio on its books, the maximum capital charge would be as follows:
Risk weighted = 5 * 1250% = 62.5
Capital requirement = 0.08 * 62.5 = 5% B. Capital requirement for typical loan portfolio
E como seria sem securitizar?
We take three types of loan portfolios and apply the CRR CRDIV risk weights under the Standardised Approach. We take a secured residential mortgage, a commercial mortgage and unsecured corporate loan as three loans, and present our capital charge analysis below:
i) Residential mortgage – risk weight = 35%, capital requirement = 0.08*35 = 2.4%
ii) Commercial mortgage – risk weight = 100%, capital requirement = 0.08*100 = 8%
iii) Unsecured corporate loan – risk weight = 150%, capital requirement = 0.08*150 = 12%
We thus see that a bank does not always gain a capital relief from securitisation. For residential mortgages, for example, the capital requirement (albeit using the Standardised Approach) is greater for the securitised asset than that for the underlying loan portfolio.
This differential capital treatment might encourage securitisation only in some types of assets, i.e. on a risk-based measure, a higher risk-weighted SME asset would generate more relief than a lower risk-weighted residential mortgage"

the following will be the key drivers of a revival in the European ABS market :
1. Increased transparency and information on banks' balance sheets – this needs to be maintained on an ongoing basis and not merely a 2014 AQR exercise. We think that the ABS loan level reporting in ensuring transparency on an ongoing basis is vital. Successful completion of AQR and stress tests on a recurrent annual basis will play a key role in increasing the transparency of banks' balance sheets. The ECB can play a critical role in effectively acting as the 'rating agency' by imposing stricter and clearer disclosure and running annual stress tests on banks' balance sheets. On the other hand, the setting up of the SSM will likely bring further uniformity across the different legislations in the euro zone.
2. Regulatory initiatives that ensure a level playing field and ease the process. Regulatory changes that ease and enable further growth in the absorption of securitised products by the insurance companies and pension funds could accelerate the growth and investor take-up of ABS.
3. European bankruptcy law needs to be made more uniform to further harmonise the ABS market.
4. Which banks benefit the most from the ECB supporting a widespread ABS programme in Europe will vary. On the one hand, the capital relief offered to issuers with the appropriate profile of assets should see a more immediate lowering of sustainable funding costs. Conceptually, they would also be giving up on NII and hence it is not clear that profitability would necessarily increase. This means that we need to think of ABS on a case-by-case basis keeping in mind
regulatory capital consumption and alternative uses for capital. In its simplest form, though, it looks likely that the area that will see more demand will be SME securitisation as this would offer both the higher yield pick-up for buyers and capital relief for issuers. This is the market that the ECB is aiming to target in terms of its credit transmission mechanism and to this extent we believe it can be transformational.
5. Another topic is which other banks would generate earnings from such a change in the market. As the assets initially move from balance sheets into the ABS market, originator banks would be able to charge fees for creating such instruments. Furthermore, once an ABS market is established, banks could also trade the flow of these securities. In terms of which banks could benefit the most, we would initially think that these would fall into two categories: ■ Banks with a greater proportion of higher RWAs would as a result get greater capital relief and potentially greater benefit from sustainable lower funding costs. The table below ranks the European banks under our coverage according to the absolute and relative to total Exposures at Default SME exposure

nota: na figura os racios de capital são a valores nao fully loaded e de 2013


Este foi o tema que trouxe esta semana até porque apareceu ai um comunicado do banif e os resultados dos testes estão para breve

[Artista Romeno]

O que é a securitização no que consiste
"Definition of securitisation
Securitisation is a process of pooling together a large number of loans (such as mortgages, auto loans or SME loans) held on balance sheets of banks or other financial institutions (the 'originator') and selling them to a separate legal entity ('special purpose vehicle' or SPV). The entity (the 'issuer') finances the purchase of the loans by issuing bonds to investors. The loans generate cash flows, which are then used to repay the investors. In this way, illiquid loans can be converted into more liquid and tradable securities (source: AFME).
CRR/CRD IV defines two types of securitisations –~
A. Traditional securitisation is a securitisation involving economic transfer of exposures being securitised. This shall be accompanied by the transfer of ownership of the securitised exposures from the originator to a Special Purpose Entity (SPE).
B. Synthetic securitisation means securitisation where transfer of risk is achieved by use of credit derivatives or guarantees, and exposures being securitised remain exposures of the originator institution.
In 2013, aggregate traditional securitised assets holdings in Europe were about €1,434bn, whereas the synthetic securitised loans stood at just €4.7bn This compares with total outstanding loans of c. €39tn for the Euro area banks under ECB supervision (source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).

beneficios do processo
Below we briefly summarise the benefits that may accrue to the relevant stakeholders.
Benefit to the originator
■ Banks are able to transfer part of the risk on their balance sheets to non-bank investors, in the process freeing up bank capital and thus allowing banks to extend new credit to the real economy. The amount of regulatory capital relief depends on the reduction in risk weighted assets relative to risk weights on the underlying pool, depending on the quality and amount of securitisation transferred to third parties. This also leaves the originators potentially more vulnerable to the credit markets as they will only be able to price and issue their tranches based on credit pricing conditions directly impacting their front book loan growth; ■ Access to a broader range of investors, tailoring tranches of ABS based on investors' risk/return profiles; ■ Reduced dependency of banks' lending decisions on the business cycle and thus a reduction in re-financing and liquidity risk; ■ Low asset encumbrance as compared to covered bonds as securitisation does not have the same claim on assets.

Benefit to the investors
■ Securitisation provides a means of diversifying exposures to the real economy by gaining access to a broader pool of assets; ■ ABS tend to be more suited to non-banks such as pension funds and insurance companies as these securities help in better duration matching with their own liabilities; ■ Banks have historically been one of the largest, if not the largest investor group in European ABS. This reduced significantly in the post crisis world given losses occurred in security portfolios and liquidity regulatory constraints. With the introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), this currently only allows more senior and liquid bonds to be included;

■ We could see joint ventures being formed between banks and insurance companies similar to what already is the case in France.
Benefit to the borrower ■ Increased investor base for the lenders, which transmits into better access to funds and lower sustainable borrowing costs for the real economy.

DESAFIOS
Challenges to securitisation
Nevertheless, there remain major impediments which are preventing the securitisation market from picking up pace, not least an association with some of the more erratic financial practices before the financial crisis. The following have been identified by the ECB/BoE in their joint discussion paper. A. Lack of transparency and standardization of ABS and related data on underlying assets – We believe that this is key to restoring confidence amongst the investor base. The ECB has started capturing loan level data for several ABS categories in order to achieve greater transparency of the ABS markets. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has also recently proposed that minimum common information on ABS be available in a single portal. Further, as we mentioned, the AQR process should help in increasing transparency of balance sheets and restoring confidence amongst investors. We thus think that the European policymakers are taking significant steps in this direction and the AQR and stress test are critical to give investors further comfort around disclosure and comparability of data. B. Regulatory uncertainty and arbitrage – There are two issues here:
a. Some of the rules on requirements of capital charges against a securitised asset remain uncertain as the relevant authorities are still finalising their rules. The ECB and BoE have called for authorities to reconsider these requirements for investors in those securities.
b. Secondly, we believe that different rules applicable to different investors with further variation across different jurisdictions creates an unlevel playing field which dis-incentivises certain investor categories.
C. Post crisis stigma – Many investors remain cautious about holding securitised assets due to their misuse before the crisis. This may partly explain the low percentage of ABS issuance placed in the market in 2013 (only €76.4bn of a total of €181bn issuance). It is also associated with the large litigation fines that banks have incurred as a result of selling ABS products.
The table below highlights work from our recent bank litigation report (see – European banks – Litigation – more risk, less return – 4 June 2014), where we estimate that US mortgage litigation will cost European banks c.€12bn, representing 18% of the total cost of litigation for European banks. This value would likely be substantially higher for the US banks themselves.

D. Sovereign caps by the credit rating agencies – The ECB have also highlighted concerns on the sovereign rating caps applied by the rating agencies. The agencies, irrespective of the quality of the underlying asset, place a maximum rating cap on the ABS. This cap tends to prevent certain investors from buying such transactions, thus increasing the capital and liquidity requirements against those assets.

[Artista Romeno]

Estão ai a chegar os resultados dos testes de stress e no ambito de um documento que tenho deste mes vou deixar algumas coisas interessantes 1- os testes
"Stress test methodology
The stress tests have been conducted by the EBA in coordination with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the ECB, the national supervisory authorities and the European Commission. On 29th April, the EBA published guidelines on the methodology it will use to conduct the stress tests along with the macroeconomic assumptions under the adverse scenario (see link). We summarized our views on the EBA methodology in a recent note (see EBA stress test methodology - Thoughts).
Key attributes of 2014 EU-wide stress tests
1. The stress test horizon will be a three-year period starting December 2013 and will be based on a static balance sheet assumption. The stress test will cover 124 institutions, and will be run at the highest consolidation level.
2. The hurdle rates under the adverse and baseline scenario will be a 5.5% and 8% CET1 ratio with transitional arrangements (as per CRR/CRDIV). ( aqui não é fully loadaded o que ajuda os bancos, se fosse basel3 fl outro galo cantaria )
3. The starting point balance sheet and capital positions (YE2013) will take into consideration any adjustments stemming from the AQR.
4. Stress test to focus on five key areas of risk – credit risk, market risk, securitisation risk, sovereign exposures and funding costs. 5. The projections for the baseline scenario are based on the 2014 winter forecast extended through a model-based approach or following technical assumptions to cover the year 2016. 6. The adverse scenarios proposed by the ESRB are based on the following areas of risk:
a) An increase in global bond yields;
b) A further deterioration of credit quality in countries with feeble demand, with weak fundamentals and still vulnerable banking sectors;
c) Stalling policy reforms; and
d) A lack of necessary balance sheet repair.
In the stress test manual published in August, the ECB further outlined details of Quality Assurance (QA) once the banks have carried out the stress tests in accordance with the EBA methodology. The ECB and NCAs will conduct a series of tests, including comparisons with significant bank peers, in-country peers and also with the results of the ECB's top-down stress test models. QA results will be in the form of Red/Amber/Green (RAG) threshold:
a) 'Green' results will be considered in line with the EBA methodology and will not necessarily require any modification;
b) 'Amber' results will be subject to a 'comply or explain' test, with the standards of evidence being specified by the ECB;
c) 'Red' results will indicate non-compliance with the EBA methodology and will thus need to be modified.
The QA process has been designed to ensure that the stress test methodology prescribed by the EBA has been applied in a consistent manner. The ECB aims to focus on areas where the banks' stress test results may materially underestimate the capital impact of the stress test.

In the manual, the ECB has further described the 'join-up' process of the stress test with the AQR exercise. Any changes identified in the AQR will be directly applied to the starting point balance sheet. If AQR points to a bank having insufficient provisions, this will be reflected in adjustments to the banks' simulated projected losses in 2014, 2015 and 2016 for both the baseline and adverse scenarios.
There will be stress tests each year but it may not be as comprehensive as the ones taking place this year. One major addition has been that the results of the AQR will directly feed into the stress test exercise.
The current stress tests will also include the sovereign exposures held 'available for sale' in banking books, a step-up from the previous stress tests (in 2011) which only included the sovereign debt reported in the trading book and the ones 'held to maturity' on the banking book. The risk weightings to sovereigns is clearly an area of contention and discussion. The Belgium regulator has suggested that sovereigns will be risk weighted for their banks, and non-euro area sovereigns are being risk weighted already.
US – Introducing qualitative assessment through the CCAR process and a potential model for future EU stress tests
Besides the quantitative review run by the Federal Reserve known as the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) the Fed further conducts an annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) to assess whether the largest US banks have sufficient capital to continue operations throughout times of economic and financial stress.
The process has evolved significantly since it was first launched in 2009 on the backdrop of the 2008 credit crisis. Each year, the Fed has refined the elements of both the substance and process of stress tests. The basic approach of stressing a banks' balance sheet for hypothetical macroeconomic scenarios and estimating the post stress capital levels and comparing those with the regulatory benchmarks has remained the same. However, the hypothetical scenarios have been refined over the last five years, as they now include developments such as large declines in house prices, a sharp drop in the value of financial assets or a significant increase in interest rates.
Another major change has been the addition of qualitative indicators as a part of the overall assessment. Previously, the focus was just on post stress loss and capital numbers. Now, the exercise also includes indicators such as the effectiveness of firms' risk management practices and capital planning processes. This includes the assessment of the extent to which the design of a firm's internal scenario captures specific risks from its activities, its method of projecting losses under stress scenario and how the firm identifies appropriate capital levels and plans for distributions. In the 2014 stress test results, four out of five rejected capital plans were based on the Fed's qualitative assessment of the banks' capital planning processes. The Fed especially noted deficiencies in governance, control and modelling. The aim is to integrate the CCAR exercise with the ongoing supervisory assessments of risk management and other internal control processes. This should also ensure that the supervisory work is more aligned with the focus areas of CCAR.
In comparison, the EU-wide stress tests are still primarily a quantitative exercise. As a part of AQR, the ECB is reviewing banks' policies and procedures, however, the review is only limited to understanding banks' interpretation of the relevant accounting rules. Going forward, we think that the EU-wide stress tests are also likely to integrate the qualitative supervisory assessments once the SSM is established and a uniform supervisory mechanism is in pl"

outro assunto que tratarei de seguida é a securitização

nota : isto de Be Ah Bah já não tem muito.....

[Artista Romeno]

edp: não pois vendeu dois projetos logo é mesmo um extraordinario não perde o que não tinha... deixa é de receber e entretanto o lucro saiu acima..."São Paulo - A EDP Brasil, controlada pelo grupo EDP - Energias de Portugal, anunciou a conclusão do negócio de venda de 50% nas hidreléctricas Santo Antônio do Jari e Cachoeira Caldeirão à China Three Gorges.

Nesta operação, que tinha sido anunciada em dezembro de 2013, a EDP Brasil recebeu do grupo chinês, através da subsidiária CWEI, R$ 420,6 milhões, informou a companhia em comunicado ao mercado.

A usina hidrelétrica Santo Antônio do Jari terá uma potência de 373 megawatts (MW), enquando a hidrelétrica Cachoeira Caldeirão terá uma capacidade instalada de 219 MW.

"Com a conclusão destas operações, EDP e CWEI consolidam sua parceria no mercado de energia, sob uma estrutura acionária equilibrada, com controle compartilhado, direitos equivalentes e tomada de decisão com base em consenso entre as partes", indica a EDP no mesmo comunicado.

Este negócio foi realizado no âmbito da parceria estratégica acordada em dezembro de 2011 entre a EDP e a China Three Gorges, que então se tornou o maior acionista do grupo português, adquirindo uma participação de 21,35% na privatização promovida pelo Estado luso.

Imediatamente após vencer a privatização, a China Three Gorges estabeleceu uma parceria estratégica com a EDP prevendo o investimento do grupo asiático em novos projetos da EDP em vários mercados."
Na galp, não sou especialista em petroleos, MAS ESSE METODO AÍ É INCORRETO, pois o valor da galp. advem essencialmente das suas reservas de petroleo cuja produção irá aumentar muito até 2020 logo os lucros passados deixam isso ao lado e o valor da galp é aí.....
bottom line é precisamente por este exemplo da galp que se deve olhar sempre para o edit futuro....deduzido do lastro do presente a divida liquida...e não para o passado e isso é facil de fazer assim para um particular.. resposta: por vezes não é

[dozens]

1) podes fazes mas cuidado com o 2 e 3
2) depende do setor e do crescimento dos resultados e da estrutura financeira das empresas em causa um per de 20 pode nem ser caro e eu de 15 ser muito caro depende... e de que per estamos a falar,? de um resultante de uma venda de ativos no ano anterior que martelou as contas o per é informação barata se fosse o per o petroleo já toda a gente tinha ficado rica..... num indice até que o forward pode dizer qualquer coisa... agora numa empresa é curto
3) podes incorrer num grande erro há setores como as telecom cuja rentabilide vendas e lucros foram pelo cano (entao em pt nem se fala) e já não voltam mais a ser o que foram em 2008 ou 2009,
3 b) eu nao suavizo vou ver e tiro os extraordinarios acabou-se....... isso de suavizar basta eu ter uma mais valia ou menos numa participação qualquer e isso sai tudo trocado... tipo vender a vivo....
4) comparar com o valor de mercado é fazer sempre.....

edit: a edp penso que no brasil vendeu uma participação numa hidroelectrica e isso influenciou para cima as contas salvo erro, ora é precisamente com esse tipo de coisas que se tem que ter cuidadinho....

2) Daí eu fazer médias por exemplo dos últimos 5 exercícios... se tu vendes uma hidroeletrica tens esse encaixe extra, mas dps também perdes o dinheiro que ela pode gerar (e o próprio activo já não podes voltar a vender). O que significa que no meio dos últimos 5 exercícios esse factor perde expressão. Ou estou a ver mal?
No fundo o que quero dizer é que "extraordinários" diluem-se nos sucessivos exercícios.

3) De facto no caso das TELECOM e PETROLEOS estou com alguma dificuldade:
A PT para mim não seria problema, antes de descer para 1,75 já tinha tido um trimestre negativo o que segundo as minhas premissas (logo a 1a: dar sempre lucro) seria sinonimo de vender. Mas quando tento fazer p a NOS a cotação da empresa dá-me sempre acima do valor que calculo: traduzindo nunca compraria a NOS Não estou a dizer que seria mau. Por exemplo a JM ao longo dos últimos anos tem me dado sempre um valor acima... e pelos vistos esta recente descida está a provar de certo modo que estive certo em não me meter em valores como 14/16 ou 17 EUR
No caso da GALP é a mesma coisa: a cotação dá-me sempre bem acima do valor que chego;

A última vez que tive "sinal" p comprar a GALP foi em 2008... e foi necessário duplicar os valores que defini no ponto 2)
Ou seja em vez de fazer 10 x resultados liq/ação anuais, fiz 20 x...e mesmo assim só teria sido "barata" em 2006 e 2008. Não quero apertar tanto a malha da prudência e da segurança ao ponto de não investir em bons negócios como por exemplo a GALP, percebes?

Abraço.

[Artista Romeno]

Se colocares certas premissas, por ex.:
- Dá lucro (trimestre após trimestre): lucro > 0;
- Rácio dívida liquida/ebitda < 4 (ou 3 ou o que entenderes);
- Margem EBITDA > 10%;
- Autonomia financeira > 30% (utilities...preferencialmente > 50% se possível tipo corticeira amorim ou ibersol)

Em que erro posso incorrer se:
1) Dividir os resultados líquidos do exercício pelo número ações (excluindo interesses minoritários);
2) Multiplicar por 10 (resultados anuais) / por 20 (semestrais) / por 40 (trimestrais);
3) Fazer uma média dos últimos 5 exercícios (ou mais +) para "suavizar" resultados particularmente bons ou maus mas positivos;
4) Comparar com o valor de mercado;

No caso da edp o rácio divida até é superior, mas para exemplo segue em anexo um mapa.

1) podes fazes mas cuidado com o 2 e 3
2) depende do setor e do crescimento dos resultados e da estrutura financeira das empresas em causa um per de 20 pode nem ser caro e eu de 15 ser muito caro depende... e de que per estamos a falar,? de um resultante de uma venda de ativos no ano anterior que martelou as contas o per é informação barata se fosse o per o petroleo já toda a gente tinha ficado rica..... num indice até que o forward pode dizer qualquer coisa... agora numa empresa é curto
3) podes incorrer num grande erro há setores como as telecom cuja rentabilide vendas e lucros foram pelo cano (entao em pt nem se fala) e já não voltam mais a ser o que foram em 2008 ou 2009,
3 b) eu nao suavizo vou ver e tiro os extraordinarios acabou-se....... isso de suavizar basta eu ter uma mais valia ou menos numa participação qualquer e isso sai tudo trocado... tipo vender a vivo....
4) comparar com o valor de mercado é fazer sempre.....

edit: a edp penso que no brasil vendeu uma participação numa hidroelectrica e isso influenciou para cima as contas salvo erro, ora é precisamente com esse tipo de coisas que se tem que ter cuidadinho....

[ParaCima]

basicamente irias analisar 10 anos da empresa... qual a taxa de crescimento média ao longo desses 10 anos. qual a taxa de média do ebitda ao nível percentual das vendas... dos valores calculados tirarias vendas uma taxa de crescimento médio das vendas de 5% pegarias nas vendas no ano n de 100 e "concluirias" que as vendas seriam de 105. como pelos dados dos últimos 10 anos(por exemplo) tinhas uma margem do ebitda de 20% concluías que o ebitda seria de 21 u.m.

para calculares o g farias as 105 u.m. *(1-dividendo)/capital próprio

pegando naquelas formulas que meteste atrás... com o g roic coe calculas o ev... depois tiras a dívida (ev-dívida)e divides o valor do pelo numero de acções e obténs o "valor justo..."

é isso não é? parece-me a mim que essas formulas têm um grave problema.
a empresa só é apetecível quando a taxa de sustentabilidade é superior ao crescimento das vendas?!?!?

cumprimentos

Não teria que ser 10 anos poderia ser 5 ou 7... 10 anos é um espaço largo, há no entanto quem o faça
2- balanço a valores de mercado esqueçe os dividendos e os capitais proprios... deixa essa treta pos contabilistas... eu só quero saber o valor dos cash flows futuros atribuiveis aos detentores de acções----- se assumo que o a empresa tem vendas de 2000 no ano n-1 face a perpetuidade margem ebitda 20% capex 5% das vendas tenho que as vendas em n serão 2100 o ebitda 420 o capex 105 e o free cash flow 315 tão simples quanto isto fazes depois 315/( wacc-g) atualizado para o presente + a soma dos cash flows atualizados do preriodo finito para o presente menos a( divida liquida + interesses minoritarios hoje.).. esqueçe os capitais proprios e os dividendos e os roe olha para a questão assim
Após teres o valor da equity, da parte do bolo que é para os acionistas, divides pelo numero de acções e só há 3 hipoteses fair value, caro ou barato, uma empresa pode ter vendas a crescer pouco e estar barata e ou estar a crescer muito e cara

vou pegar numa empresa... fazer isso em excel e depois meto aqui para a malta toda ver a situação.

obrigado

em principio no domingo faço isso.

bom fim-de-semana

[dozens]

Se colocares certas premissas, por ex.:
- Dá lucro (trimestre após trimestre): lucro > 0;
- Rácio dívida liquida/ebitda < 4 (ou 3 ou o que entenderes);
- Margem EBITDA > 10%;
- Autonomia financeira > 30% (30% no caso das utilities ou transportes tipo CP... nas outras preferencialmente > 50% se possível tipo corticeira amorim ou ibersol)

Em que erro posso incorrer se:
1) Dividir os resultados líquidos do exercício pelo número ações (excluindo interesses minoritários);
2) Multiplicar por 10 (resultados anuais) / por 20 (semestrais) / por 40 (trimestrais);
3) Fazer uma média dos últimos 5 exercícios (ou mais +) para "suavizar" resultados particularmente bons ou maus mas positivos;
4) Comparar com o valor de mercado;

No caso da edp o rácio divida até é superior, mas para exemplo segue em anexo um mapa.

[Artista Romeno]

basicamente irias analisar 10 anos da empresa... qual a taxa de crescimento média ao longo desses 10 anos. qual a taxa de média do ebitda ao nível percentual das vendas... dos valores calculados tirarias vendas uma taxa de crescimento médio das vendas de 5% pegarias nas vendas no ano n de 100 e "concluirias" que as vendas seriam de 105. como pelos dados dos últimos 10 anos(por exemplo) tinhas uma margem do ebitda de 20% concluías que o ebitda seria de 21 u.m.

para calculares o g farias as 105 u.m. *(1-dividendo)/capital próprio

pegando naquelas formulas que meteste atrás... com o g roic coe calculas o ev... depois tiras a dívida (ev-dívida)e divides o valor do pelo numero de acções e obténs o "valor justo..."

é isso não é? parece-me a mim que essas formulas têm um grave problema.
a empresa só é apetecível quando a taxa de sustentabilidade é superior ao crescimento das vendas?!?!?

cumprimentos

Não teria que ser 10 anos poderia ser 5 ou 7... 10 anos é um espaço largo, há no entanto quem o faça
2- balanço a valores de mercado esqueçe os dividendos e os capitais proprios... deixa essa treta pos contabilistas... eu só quero saber o valor dos cash flows futuros atribuiveis aos detentores de acções----- se assumo que o a empresa tem vendas de 2000 no ano n-1 face a perpetuidade margem ebitda 20% capex 5% das vendas tenho que as vendas em n serão 2100 o ebitda 420 o capex 105 e o free cash flow 315 tão simples quanto isto fazes depois 315/( wacc-g) atualizado para o presente + a soma dos cash flows atualizados do preriodo finito para o presente menos a( divida liquida + interesses minoritarios hoje.).. esqueçe os capitais proprios e os dividendos e os roe olha para a questão assim
Após teres o valor da equity, da parte do bolo que é para os acionistas, divides pelo numero de acções e só há 3 hipoteses fair value, caro ou barato, uma empresa pode ter vendas a crescer pouco e estar barata e ou estar a crescer muito e cara

[ParaCima]

basicamente irias analisar 10 anos da empresa... qual a taxa de crescimento média ao longo desses 10 anos. qual a taxa de média do ebitda ao nível percentual das vendas... dos valores calculados tirarias vendas uma taxa de crescimento médio das vendas de 5% pegarias nas vendas no ano n de 100 e "concluirias" que as vendas seriam de 105. como pelos dados dos últimos 10 anos(por exemplo) tinhas uma margem do ebitda de 20% concluías que o ebitda seria de 21 u.m.

para calculares o g farias as 105 u.m. *(1-dividendo)/capital próprio

pegando naquelas formulas que meteste atrás... com o g roic coe calculas o ev... depois tiras a dívida (ev-dívida)e divides o valor do pelo numero de acções e obténs o "valor justo..."

é isso não é? parece-me a mim que essas formulas têm um grave problema.
a empresa só é apetecível quando a taxa de sustentabilidade é superior ao crescimento das vendas?!?!?

cumprimentos

[Artista Romeno]

boas, eu não quero que me dês o peixe... quero que me ensines a pescar para depois eu ensinar aos outros. como é que determinas o g?

por exemplo, para determinares o g tem a formula (RL(n+1)*(1-d)/capitalização bolsista) este é o valor de sustentabilidade

a questão é a previsão do RL(n+1)

eu nao ia por ai ia ver

quanto era o g das vendas na perpetuidade e para isso precisava de ver os pontos qualitativos todos anteriormente falados aposto entre 4 e 5%
depois ia ver a margem ebitda na perpetuidade e fazia uma analise de sensibilidade com uma range de preços possiveis
um lucro dependerá sempre das vendas e da margem no fim dia após,de somar os cash flows todos deduzia a divida liquida hoje e tirava o equity value dos cash flows futuros da empresa era isso que eu faria
mais simplisticamente ia pelo ev/ ebitda vs pares vs perspetivas da empresa vs as dos pares

[ParaCima]

boas, eu não quero que me dês o peixe... quero que me ensines a pescar para depois eu ensinar aos outros. como é que determinas o g?

por exemplo, para determinares o g tem a formula (RL(n+1)*(1-d)/capitalização bolsista) este é o valor de sustentabilidade

a questão é a previsão do RL(n+1)

[Artista Romeno]

eu não estava a analisar o jeronimo... estava a analisar várias empresas... meti foi esta por aqui... das portuguesas e pelos meus cálculos as únicas interessantes são esta a mota e a corticeira... esta não se aplica.. a corticeira tem um equity de 75% e a mota tem um beta de 1,84...

pela outra forma não consigo chegar ao g... e sem o g é difícil calcular os outros rácios... não me podes dar uma ajuda...

nessas duas da corticeira ja falamos em privado, mota o g não é facil , mas para o longo prazo 4 a 5% talvez e muito por alto mercados com potencial a mota tem...