IRS: Maiores reduções sentem-se nos 6.º, 7.º e 8.º escalões. Veja as simulações

[Dr Tretas]

Tenho também pensado em alguma forma de o Estado emitir algum tipo de quase-moeda, digamos cheque educação, cheque saúde, cheque justiça, cheque reforma, cheque habitação, que seriam títulos emitidos para pagar serviços que o Estado supostamente deve garantir à luz da Constituição. Seriam títulos atribuídos gratuitamente aos cidadãos e só poderiam ser redimidos em dinheiro em certas condições, mas serviam para pagar os ditos serviços. Seriam títulos ao portador transacionáveis em bolsa, claro
Assim aumentava-se o dinheiro em circulação na economia, sem emitir formalmente moeda.

Mas pronto, isto é completamente off topic...

[Artista Romeno]

Claro, e os vistos gold já renderam quase mil milhões, mas isso não é nada. A coisa tinha que ser multiplicada por 10, isto em cada ano. 10mM a entrar todos os anos, isso já era uma ajuda dava para os juros da dívida e depois podíamos concentrar-nos em ir reduzindo a dita suavemente, com menos pressão sobre a economia.

Agora, não deixar entrar em bolha é difícil e nem sei se a bolha não seria até desejável, desde que queimasse só os estrangeiros. A coisa tinha que ser pleneada ao milímetro

Eu ia dizer que esse plano para impingir imobiliário caro aos estrangeiros de forma exclusiva já existia e se chamava vistos gold não vejo nada de mal numa injecção de liquidez a nível central desde que com um objectivo de manter a inflação entre 2 e 3%.. não são valores demasiado altos que desincentivem a poupança mas suficientemente altos para incentivar o investimento. Embora a inflação justa fosse 0% a verdade é que a psicologia humana não o permite: a população geral prefere aumentos de 2% com inflação de 3% a não ter qualquer aumento mas ter inflação de 0%, e já nem falo da possibilidade de corte de vencimentos num ambiente deflacionário (apesar de na prática o poder de compra se manter)...

e-0,7 em julho serve a inflação nao deve nunca ser 0% nem menos por um motivo obvio as pessoas começavam a ter a tentação de adiar a comprar de certos bens e isso parava a economia, logo a inflação nao pode nem deve ser 0, e sim nos ultimos anos portugal cortou nos custos do trabalho, resumindo entre 2 e 4% esta bem eu acho que a economia deve funcionar livremente, devendo-se garantir que o valor permanece num intervalo saudavel

fonte:http://www.bportugal.pt/en-US/Estatisticas/PublicacoesEstatisticas/BolEstatistico/Pages/BoletimEstatistico.aspx

[Dr Tretas]

Lembro-me do José da Silva Lopes uma vez nos prós e contras falar disso. Que quando era governador, com uma inflação de 15%, dáva-se aumentos de 10% às pessoas e elas ficavam todas contentes, apesar de perderem 5% de poder de compra

[rollingsnowball]

Claro, e os vistos gold já renderam quase mil milhões, mas isso não é nada. A coisa tinha que ser multiplicada por 10, isto em cada ano. 10mM a entrar todos os anos, isso já era uma ajuda dava para os juros da dívida e depois podíamos concentrar-nos em ir reduzindo a dita suavemente, com menos pressão sobre a economia.

Agora, não deixar entrar em bolha é difícil e nem sei se a bolha não seria até desejável, desde que queimasse só os estrangeiros. A coisa tinha que ser pleneada ao milímetro

Eu ia dizer que esse plano para impingir imobiliário caro aos estrangeiros de forma exclusiva já existia e se chamava vistos gold não vejo nada de mal numa injecção de liquidez a nível central desde que com um objectivo de manter a inflação entre 2 e 3%.. não são valores demasiado altos que desincentivem a poupança mas suficientemente altos para incentivar o investimento. Embora a inflação justa fosse 0% a verdade é que a psicologia humana não o permite: a população geral prefere aumentos de 2% com inflação de 3% a não ter qualquer aumento mas ter inflação de 0%, e já nem falo da possibilidade de corte de vencimentos num ambiente deflacionário (apesar de na prática o poder de compra se manter)...

[Artista Romeno]

CATRAPUM EU JA NAO TINHA GOSTADO NADA DO LFL DA SONAE....
O indicador de actividade económica divulgado pelo Banco de Portugal recuou para níveis negativos, em Julho, o que aponta para uma contracção da economia.
O indicador coincidente da actividade económica, divulgado pelo Banco de Portugal, recuou, em Julho para -0,3%, de acordo com os relatórios dos indicadores de conjuntura publicados esta sexta-feira, 22 de Agosto.

Este indicador tem vindo a dar mostras de abrandamento. Em Dezembro de 2013 atingiu o maior crescimento homólogo, de 0,7%, tendo verificado o mesmo crescimento no primeiro mês de 2014. Desde então a tendência tem sido de abrandamento constante, tendo, em Junho, tido uma evolução nula.

Um mês depois o indicador da actividade económica volta a deteriorar-se, dando sinais de contracção da economia nacional.

Este indicador aumenta os receios em torno da economia nacional, num período em que a incerteza é elevada. Um dos factores de incerteza é o BES e o seu resgate. Por saber ainda está qual será o impacto para a economia nacional deste problema na banca nacional.

Os últimos referentes ao produto interno bruto (PIB) conhecidos referem-se ao segundo trimestre do ano. Com a economia a crescer 0,6% face aos três meses anteriores. Em comparação homóloga a economia continua a desacelerar, tendo crescido apenas 0,8%.

No documento divulgado hoje é também revelado que o indicador de consumo privado está a abrandar o ritmo de crescimento. Em Julho, o indicador cresceu 0,9%, depois de quatro meses consecutivos a crescer 1%.

[Dr Tretas]

Claro, e os vistos gold já renderam quase mil milhões, mas isso não é nada. A coisa tinha que ser multiplicada por 10, isto em cada ano. 10mM a entrar todos os anos, isso já era uma ajuda dava para os juros da dívida e depois podíamos concentrar-nos em ir reduzindo a dita suavemente, com menos pressão sobre a economia.

Agora, não deixar entrar em bolha é difícil e nem sei se a bolha não seria até desejável, desde que queimasse só os estrangeiros. A coisa tinha que ser pleneada ao milímetro

[Artista Romeno]

Mas se vires no quadro do PIB a recessão no RU foi mais profunda que na EU. Provavelmente o PMI do RU é mais volátil que o da Zona Euro, também. Enfim, nem sei se será válido falar em betas do PMI... E eu sei que >50 é expansão, como é óbvio, mas é assim, directamente proporcional, tipo 60 causa um efeito no PIB 2x maior que 55? Não me parece que seja tão linear.

Em relação ao QE, por exemplo, no Japão a coisa não funciona assim tão bem.

De qualquer modo, eu acho que já percebi qual seria o método mais adequado para atrair dinheiro para Portugal, injectar massa para olear a economia, melhor que o QE, que tem de ser invertido um dia (o FED quer inverter o QE até ao fim do ano, ou seja bye bye compra de acções próprias do Marriot e outros, que são um resultado indirecto do QE).

O método é criar uma bolha turística para atrair milionários corruptos Chineses/Angolanos e reformados Alemães/Nórdicos, charters cheios deles . Seria necessária uma campanha massiça de propaganda. A massa seria injectada por via da formação de uma bolha imobiliária em casas de praia e cenas dessas. Dizem que o imobiliário é um bem não transacionável, mas não é bem assim. Se fosse vendido quase exclusivamente a estrangeiros estava tudo bem. O Estado iria implementar uma política que mantivesse os tugas afastados da bolha até ela rebentar, uma vez que o dinheiro entrasse na economia já não interessava.

Chamo a isto o Plano Tretas

Ah aqui ha nao muitos anos sem duvida o uk esteve doente aqui estamos de acordo mas analise e mais presente e futuro, essa teoria do imobiliario nao era má de todo, nao podiamos era acabar depois como a espanha acabou, tinhamos que travar a bolha

já tenho um slogan e tudo Portugal, the western europe best hidden secret destination for criminals mas nao é isso que os vistos gold são

[Dr Tretas]

Mas se vires no quadro do PIB a recessão no RU foi mais profunda que na EU. Provavelmente o PMI do RU é mais volátil que o da Zona Euro, também. Enfim, nem sei se será válido falar em betas do PMI... E eu sei que >50 é expansão, como é óbvio, mas é assim, directamente proporcional, tipo 60 causa um efeito no PIB 2x maior que 55? Não me parece que seja tão linear.

Em relação ao QE, por exemplo, no Japão a coisa não funciona assim tão bem.

De qualquer modo, eu acho que já percebi qual seria o método mais adequado para atrair dinheiro para Portugal, injectar massa para olear a economia, melhor que o QE, que tem de ser invertido um dia (o FED quer inverter o QE até ao fim do ano, ou seja bye bye compra de acções próprias do Marriot e outros, que são um resultado indirecto do QE).

O método é criar uma bolha turística para atrair milionários corruptos Chineses/Angolanos e reformados Alemães/Nórdicos, charters cheios deles . Seria necessária uma campanha maciça de propaganda. A massa seria injectada por via da formação de uma bolha imobiliária em casas de praia e cenas dessas. Dizem que o imobiliário é um bem não transacionável, mas não é bem assim. Se fosse vendido quase exclusivamente a estrangeiros estava tudo bem. O Estado iria implementar uma política que mantivesse os tugas afastados da bolha até ela rebentar, uma vez que o dinheiro entrasse na economia já não interessava.

Chamo a isto o Plano Tretas

[Artista Romeno]

Claro que a Europa está em crise, esse não é o ponto. O problema é achar que o RU e os USA têm economias muito mais saudáveis que a Europa.
Os Estados Unidos, enfim, a suas estatísticas económicas têm uma forte dose de propaganda, para mim valem pouco mais que as da China, aquilo é tudo muito massajado. Aquela mania de anualizar o PIB todos os trimestres...

Nos gráficos do artigo que citaste, se calhar esqueceram-se deste:

O Ficheiro uk_pmi.png não está disponível

Não se nota grande diferença do resto da Europa.

atenção que o pmi le-se acima de 50 expansao e vejo o uk melhor como mostra esta tabela alias dos melhores no mundo

[Dr Tretas]

Claro que a Europa está em crise, esse não é o ponto. O problema é achar que o RU e os USA têm economias muito mais saudáveis que a Europa.
Os Estados Unidos, enfim, a suas estatísticas económicas têm uma forte dose de propaganda, para mim valem pouco mais que as da China, aquilo é tudo muito massajado. Aquela mania de anualizar o PIB todos os trimestres...

Nos gráficos do artigo que citaste, se calhar esqueceram-se deste:

uk_pmi.png (6.39 KiB) Visualizado 13136 vezes

Não se nota grande diferença do resto da Europa.

[Artista Romeno]

Cá está o que eu dizia

1 - EUA e RU são fixes.

While neither the US nor the UK are back to full strength, both of their economies have surpassed their pre-crisis peak.

2 - A Europa não presta. Quando muito a Irlanda, que é perto do RU.

“Is Europe going the same way as Japan? Yes,” Mr Stiglitz said

“Europe has very talented people and [if] country after country is not working, it has to be a systemic problem. The basic problem was that it’s not an optimal currency area,” Mr Stiglitz said. “Combining flawed structure with flawed policies has been devastating.”

3 - Dentro da Europa, a Zona Euro é ainda pior que o resto.

Dire gross domestic product figures, which showed the eurozone’s recovery had stuttered to a halt in the second quarter

the eurozone has begun resembling Japan, which has faced a decade-long struggle to eliminate deflation and stagnant growth

É sempre a mesma conversa, já leio disto desde que foi criada a moeda única.

eu ja tinha respondido acima, mas os graficos nao mentem tretas, nem os dados economicos que andam pela lama, inflação mediocre, a europa deixou paises tomarem rumos desordenados e agora está a pagar muito caro, se no uk e us houve uma crise derivada essencialmente do subprime das consequencias do mesmo etc etc, na europa do sul foram mesmo às mas politicas publicas a rebentar com tudo
eu disse que so tinha 2 titulos diretamente, via fundos tenho mais
edit: la andamos de edit em edit, mas podemos discutir se teria os mesmos efeitos numa economia romena, mas nos eua resultou minimamente tal a catastrofe que se avizinhava e o ponto é combater a baixa inflação injetando dinheiro na economia, compensando o efeito da velocidade em queda citando horta osorio a ridicularizar gomes ferreira deus
minuto 43.35 em diante

[Dr Tretas]

Cá está o que eu dizia

1 - EUA e RU são fixes.

While neither the US nor the UK are back to full strength, both of their economies have surpassed their pre-crisis peak.

2 - A Europa não presta. Quando muito a Irlanda, que é perto do RU.

“Is Europe going the same way as Japan? Yes,” Mr Stiglitz said

“Europe has very talented people and [if] country after country is not working, it has to be a systemic problem. The basic problem was that it’s not an optimal currency area,” Mr Stiglitz said. “Combining flawed structure with flawed policies has been devastating.”

3 - Dentro da Europa, a Zona Euro é ainda pior que o resto.

Dire gross domestic product figures, which showed the eurozone’s recovery had stuttered to a halt in the second quarter

the eurozone has begun resembling Japan, which has faced a decade-long struggle to eliminate deflation and stagnant growth

É sempre a mesma conversa, já leio disto desde que foi criada a moeda única.

Edit: O QE poderá ser adequado para economias com a estrutura dos EUA ou UK, ainda que eu acredite que vão acabar por se queimar. Para a UE, não creio que seja. Por exemplo, a economia portuguesa nunca sofreria mudanças a não ser à bruta: não há dinheiro, não há vícios. As economias "romenas" do sul, pelos interesses instalados e outros factores civilizacionais, não devem nunca ter acesso a algo como o QE. Só serviria por exemplo, para o grupo BES ter sobrevivido, isso era bom?

[Artista Romeno]

É um facto que a bcg ficara queimada se dentro de 2 a 3 anos de facto esse dito comeback nao for significativo aceito o que dizes parcialmente do uk e dos EUA e dos autores ai sediados poderem ter esse bias, mas é um facto que o uk está melhor que a europa presentemente em termos de crescimento economico
apesar disso atenção a bcg tem escritorios pelo mundo todo, Portugal inclusive
deixo tambem o editorial do FT

August 14, 2014 6:32 pm
Europe now needs full-blown QE ( eu ja acho isto há uns meses)
ECB must take bold moves to lift growth across eurozone

It is hard to imagine how much more evidence European policy makers need before conceding their eurozone growth plan is not working.
It transpires that as Germany’s footballers were surging triumphantly through the early stages of the World Cup, its companies and households were performing more like the England team, dumped out in the first round. Data released yesterday showed that even allowing for weather-related timing effects, the German economy underperformed expectations by shrinking 0.2 per cent in the second quarter of the year. The contraction dragged down second-quarter eurozone growth to nil and prompted German 10-year Bund yields to fall below 1 per cent for the first time in history.


The French economy was little better, flatlining for the second quarter in a row. With Italy already in recession, the core of the eurozone – which has yet to regain its output levels before the global financial crisis – is deep in trouble. Michel Sapin, the French finance minister, took the opportunity yesterday to state the blindingly obvious – that France would miss its fiscal target of 3.8 per cent of gross domestic product this year and could only reduce it “at an appropriate pace” thereafter.
That such a comment would be anything other than a commonplace in itself shows how wrong-headed eurozone economic policy has been. Despite everything that has happened, the official belief remains that the eurozone’s route to growth is fiscal consolidation to crowd in the private sector and driving down costs to increase competitiveness. In reality, the eurozone is risking chronic economic stagnation and a continual threat of slipping into deflation.
Structural reform to try to achieve greater productivity growth is always important. But governments such as those of France and Italy, which are attempting to kick-start politically painful liberalisation programmes, need to know that supportive fiscal and monetary policy will be there to reward them with higher short-term demand.
The currency union cannot return to health without its core economies generating growth. Yet this will be hard to achieve as long as Germany’s expansion remains dependent on exports rather than domestic demand. With global trade having risen only modestly for several years, and the risk of disruptions with Russia ahead, an export-led model for Germany always risks cannibalising growth from other eurozone countries.


The actor with the main responsibility for arresting the slide is the European Central Bank. The eurozone sovereign crisis saw national fiscal authorities and the International Monetary Fund flailing around for two years before Mario Draghi, the ECB president, ended the threat of catastrophe by promising “whatever it takes”. Similarly, the ECB is the one institution with the reach and credibility to tackle deflation across the eurozone economy.
The ECB will almost certainly at some point be forced into quantitative easing to rescue the real economy – just as it was eventually forced to rescue peripheral sovereign debt. The problem remains resistance among some governments, notably Germany, and the Bundesbank. Mr Draghi has floated the idea of buying asset-backed securities. The faster that conversation reaches the conclusion of full-blown QE the better.
Since the eurozone crisis began in 2010, the authorities have been consistently late to grasp the true nature of the issue and slow to respond. Their tardiness has caused unnecessary economic pain across much of the continent. This week’s alarming new evidence that the eurozone is sliding towards deflation and stagnation must persuade governments and the ECB to get ahead of the problem once and for all.

nota: presentemente nao detenho muitas acções euro: vivendi intesa sp, mas estou atento ao dax, e a algumas empresas mas por enquanto apenas atento

[Artista Romeno]

Spectre of ‘lost decade’ haunting Europe -Financial times
By Claire Jones in LindauAuthor alerts

When Nobel Prize-winner Joseph Stiglitz was asked in Germany this week if the country and its neighbours would suffer a lost decade, his response was unequivocal.
“Is Europe going the same way as Japan? Yes,” Mr Stiglitz said in Lindau at a meeting for Nobel Laureates and economics students. “The only way to describe what is going on in some European countries is depression.”

Dire gross domestic product figures, which showed the eurozone’s recovery had stuttered to a halt in the second quarter, and inflation at a four-and-a-half year low of just 0.4 per cent in July have been a stark reminder of the problems befalling the world’s second-largest economic bloc.
Hopes of a meaningful recovery this year have faded, overtaken by concerns that a rise in geopolitical tensions could worsen conditions in the months ahead.
Beyond the latest figures, the big picture is bleaker still. Despite hopes that the worst ravages of the region’s sovereign and banking crises are behind it, the eurozone’s economy remains smaller than it was before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008.
With debt burdens worryingly high in parts of the currency area, low inflation and little growth risk causing another crisis. That has bolstered calls for the European Central Bank, facing price pressures of less than a quarter of its target, to embark on broad-based asset purchases immediately.


The ECB has signalled it will not embark on quantitative easing until at least the end of the year, preferring instead to gauge the impact of the package of measures announced in June, which include up to €1tn in cheap loans for the eurozone banks. The central bank further believes its health check of the bloc’s biggest lenders, whose results will be announced in October, will help to boost investor confidence.
The governing council will also hope that signs the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve are beginning to consider raising rates will weaken the single currency, boosting exports and lifting inflation.
But waiting carries risks.
John Llewellyn, of Llewellyn Consulting, said: “QE by the ECB looks almost an inevitability. But it would probably have to be massive. And having left it so late, with low-growth expectations now embedded; with deflation an increasing spectre; and with only a limited availability of financial instruments to buy, the ECB may well have missed the boat.”

Ken Wattret, economist at BNP Paribas, said: “The longer the inflation rate is allowed to stay so low, and continually approach zero, the smaller the cushion against deflation. Inflation expectations can also suddenly turn into something much more destabilising. The experience in Japan is a warning in both respects.”
Mario Draghi will speak at the Kansas City Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole’s symposium on Friday. But the ECB president has already insisted that the fate of the currency bloc’s recovery lies in the hands of governments; more monetary stimulus would be of little use unless national politicians make commitments to reform business practices, he said earlier this month.
Though Germany’s downturn is viewed by many as a blip, economists believe the problems in France and Italy, the region’s second and third largest economies, are more persistent.

Neither country has grown at all this year and a tense time in Brussels looks likely in the weeks ahead as leaders ask for leniency on budget deficit target. Berlin has already signalled it will resist their efforts, with Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, saying on Wednesday in Lindau that it was possible to achieve economic growth and cut spending.
Analysts warn political intransigence and lack of leadership have undermined confidence.
“Policy makers, and most economists, have forgotten the powerful self-fulfilling nature of expectations,” Mr Llewellyn said. “If businesses expect little or no growth in demand, they do not invest in new capacity. Demand remains weak; business expectations are thereby fulfilled; and stagnation results.”
The latest figures on GDP and inflation have also renewed arguments that the structure of monetary union is flawed. While neither the US nor the UK are back to full strength, both of their economies have surpassed their pre-crisis peak. Rather than mirroring its counterparts to the west, the eurozone has begun resembling Japan, which has faced a decade-long struggle to eliminate deflation and stagnant growth.

Unlike Asia’s second-largest economy, however, where joblessness remained under 5.5 per cent, unemployment in the currency area is 11.6 per cent. If it does come, growth in the months ahead looks set to remain too weak to dent joblessness.
“Europe has very talented people and [if] country after country is not working, it has to be a systemic problem. The basic problem was that it’s not an optimal currency area,” Mr Stiglitz said. “Combining flawed structure with flawed policies has been devastating.”

Nota para o dr tretas, os graficos nao metem, tirando o pmi mas até esse apesar de acima de 50 parece ter parado de subir
a zona euro tem mesmo falhas, é heterogenea, e o QE já vem late a meu ver

[Dr Tretas]

É que me aborrece esses analistas geralmente provenientes dos EUA ou UK. Posso resumir as suas análises muito simplesmente, o resto é só paleio, não digo que não tenha o seu valor, mas é para ler com muito espírito crítico:

1 - EUA e RU são fixes.
2 - A Europa não presta. Quando muito a Irlanda, que é perto do RU.
3 - Dentro da Europa, a Zona Euro é ainda pior que o resto.
4 - A China talvez um dia se torne a maior economia mundial, mas esse dia ainda vem longe, 20 anos, no mínimo.

Este é o quadro mental de partida do analista. Depois vai buscar dados para apoiar a sua tese. Se não encontrar, arranja métricas tipo "índices de competitividade", calculados sempre de modo a colocar os EUA ou UK em posições favoráveis.

Fui ver o site do "Boston Consulting Group", de onde tiraste esses artigos, e claro que já repetem a sua tese há uns tempos:
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/manufacturing_supply_chain_management_made_in_america_again/

Passados 3 anos, já se devia pelo menos notar alguma inflexão na balança comercial dos EUA, não?

edit: ia destruindo esta mensagem, mas consegui recuperar...

[Artista Romeno]

Bom, então vamos comparar as análises desses tipos com a realidade, sob a forma de dados da OCDE relativos às balanças comerciais dos países desse estudo (falta Taiwan), que compilei num gráfico (sim, dei-me a esse trabalho, estarei farto das férias? )

Podemos ver que quem se safou melhor nos últimos 4 anos foram Itália (loosing ground), Polónia (under pressure), Espanha e República Checa (under pressure), ou seja 4 países da UE, dos quais 3 da zona euro. Os analistas anglo-saxónicos que se engasguem com esta

Quem afundou: Japão, Brasil (under pressure), Indonésia (holding steady).

Onde é que andam o México e os EUA, "rising global stars"? Basicamente na mesma como a lesma.
Nota-se bem a competência desses "analistas" , acertaram no Brasil

balança_2010-2014.png

Nota sobre a metodologia:
Peguei nos dados trimestrais e pus no Excel. Calculei os valores absolutos dos dados e fiz a média desses valores absolutos para cada país, para ter a magnitude média da balança comercial.
Dividi os dados originais pela magnitude média de cada país, para ficarem todos à mesma escala. Depois fiz um gráfico e descobri que não serve para nada, porque a sazonalidade dos dados obscurece qualquer análise "a olho" que se possa fazer desse gráfico. Deixo aqui só por curiosidade.
Portanto, acabei por fazer só um gráfico com os declives da regressão linear para cada país (x100 para ficar mais bonito, em percentagem).

O estudo categoriza os paises com base em 2014, não com base nos anos para trás, logo nao vejo assim tao evidente o fail, pretende ver os custos hoje em dia, logo as decisões de investimento e tudo o mais demora, a ter impactos
efeitos com o gas de xisto ou as reformas em curso no mexico por exemplo ainda veem pouco refletidos nesses dados que são do passado
de qualquer modo é uma boa sintese, vale sempre a pena o trabalho tretas
2- nalguns paises a balança melhorou porque com a crise as importações cairam
vou dar um exmplo em que eles falam so do uk
When India’s Tata Motors acquired Jaguar Land Rover from Ford Motor in June 2008 for $2.3 billion, many feared that another storied icon of the UK’s industrial past would be shipped off to Asia—and thousands of good-paying jobs along with it.
Yet the company’s three UK production facilities have enjoyed a remarkable turnaround. Jaguar Land Rover is now investing heavily to expand production. In March, it will fill the first of 1,400 jobs that will be created at the new, state-of-the-art, $840 million plant being built in Wolverhampton. That facility will make a new family of high-technology, low-emission engines. The company says it will create an additional 1,700 jobs by 2015 at its Solihull facility to make Jaguar XE premium sedans based off of its new, advanced aluminum architecture.
Other global automakers are also taking advantage of the UK’s new position as one of Western Europe’s cheapest manufacturing locations. Since 2010, car companies have announced £10 billion ($16.8 billion) in investments, according to the Financial Times, including expansions by Nissan, Honda, and the BMW Group’s MINI. UK auto output has already increased by around 50 percent since 2009, and the Financial Times projects that it will grow by another one-third by 2017, to 2 million vehicles. More than 80 percent of cars built in the UK are exported, with most sent elsewhere in Europe.
Because of moderate wage increases over the past decade that were almost entirely offset by productivity gains, the UK’s direct-manufacturing cost structure improved by up to 10 percentage points relative to other leading Western European manufacturing export economies, according to the BCG Global Manufacturing Cost-Competitiveness Index. The UK has also improved its competitive position compared with Eastern European nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as with Asian economies such as China.
As a result, manufacturers of everything from toy trains to fashion garments are reshoring production. In a recent Manufacturing Advisory Service survey, 11 percent of small and midsize manufacturers in the UK said they had brought production back from overseas in the previous 12 months—twice as many as said they were shipping work abroad.
The UK’s advantages go beyond labor costs. Corporate taxes in the UK are the lowest in Europe, and by 2015 they will drop further, from 28 percent to 20 percent—nearly half the level of the U.S. Strong advanced manufacturing ecosystems that include engineering and components suppliers have emerged in Midlands and Oxfordshire for automobiles, Bristol for aerospace, and East London and Warwickshire for high-tech manufacturing.
But it is labor flexibility that gives the UK a distinct edge. The country scores highest among both Western and Eastern European economies in terms of overall labor-­market regulation by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian policy research organization. This allows manufacturers in the UK to restructure much more quickly than those in other European economies. It also makes the UK an attractive place to build factories and create jobs once the investment cycle turns back toward growth.

[Dr Tretas]

Bom, então vamos comparar as análises desses tipos com a realidade, sob a forma de dados da OCDE relativos às balanças comerciais dos países desse estudo (falta Taiwan), que compilei num gráfico (sim, dei-me a esse trabalho, estarei farto das férias? )

Podemos ver que quem se safou melhor nos últimos 4 anos foram Itália (loosing ground), Polónia (under pressure), Espanha e República Checa (under pressure), ou seja 4 países da UE, dos quais 3 da zona euro. Os analistas anglo-saxónicos que se engasguem com esta

Quem afundou: Japão, Brasil (under pressure), Indonésia (holding steady).

Onde é que andam o México e os EUA, "rising global stars"? Basicamente na mesma como a lesma.
Nota-se bem a competência desses "analistas" , acertaram no Brasil

balança_2010-2014.png (5.6 KiB) Visualizado 13217 vezes

Nota sobre a metodologia:
Peguei nos dados trimestrais e pus no Excel. Calculei os valores absolutos dos dados e fiz a média desses valores absolutos para cada país, para ter a magnitude média da balança comercial.
Dividi os dados originais pela magnitude média de cada país, para ficarem todos à mesma escala. Depois fiz um gráfico e descobri que não serve para nada, porque a sazonalidade dos dados obscurece qualquer análise "a olho" que se possa fazer desse gráfico. Deixo aqui só por curiosidade.
Portanto, acabei por fazer só um gráfico com os declives da regressão linear para cada país (x100 para ficar mais bonito, em percentagem).

[Artista Romeno]

as forças por de tras destas conclusões
Forces That Are Redrawing the Competitivess Map
Four factors are most responsible for the dramatic shifts in manufacturing competitiveness from 2004 to 2014. (See Exhibit 4.) The factors are now blurring the traditional boundaries between low-cost and high-cost regions.
Wages. The range of hourly pay differentials for manufacturing workers remains enormous. But rapidly rising wages have significantly eroded the competitive advantage of a number of major exporters. Although manufacturing wages rose in all 25 countries from 2004 to 2014, nations such as China and Russia have experienced more than a decade of annual increases ranging from 10 to 20 percent. In other economies, wages have only risen by 2 to 3 percent per year.
Exchange Rates. Changing currency values can make an economy’s exports either more expensive or cheaper in international markets. Currency shifts from 2004 to 2014 have ranged from a nearly 26 percent devaluation of the Indian rupee against the U.S. dollar to a 35 percent increase in the Chinese yuan.
Labor Productivity. Gains in output per manufacturing worker—or productivity—have varied widely around the world from 2004 to 2014 and explain some of the biggest shifts in total manufacturing costs. Manufacturing productivity rose by more than 50 percent in countries such as Mexico, India, and South Korea from 2004 to 2014 but shrank in others, such as in Italy and Japan. Some economies with low wage rates are not particularly competitive in terms of unit labor costs when wages are adjusted for productivity.
Energy Costs. Prices for natural gas have fallen by 25 to 35 percent since 2004 in North America because of large-scale production of shale gas resources. In contrast, they have risen by 100 to 200 percent in economies such as Poland, Russia, South Korea, and Thailand. This has had a significant impact on the chemicals industry, which uses natural gas as a feedstock for production. Likewise, the industrial price of electricity has risen sharply in manufacturing economies such as Australia, Brazil, and Spain. As a result, overall energy costs in many countries outside of North America are between 50 to 200 percent higher than they were in 2004. This has caused major changes in competitiveness in energy-dependent industries.

To compare cost shifts in each of these four dimensions from 2004 to 2014 for the world’s 25 leading exporters of manufactured goods, we used the U.S. as the baseline. We aggregated scores for the four dimensions into an overall manufacturing-cost-competitiveness score for each economy in relation to the U.S. The score for the U.S. remains 100. If an economy has a score of 110 in our Manufacturing Cost-Competitiveness Index, its average manufacturing costs are 10 percent higher than in the U.S.
Of course, factors other than wage rates, productivity, exchange rates, and energy costs also weigh heavily on corporate decisions about where to focus supply chains. Logistics costs, the overall ease of doing business, and the presence of corruption—among other issues—can affect the attractiveness of potential locations. In our research, we have found that manufacturing growth in a number of countries that have very attractive direct costs is stunted because of weaknesses in these areas. (See Exhibit 5.) These factors are local in nature—and can vary widely in different locations even within countries. Therefore, we have not modeled them into our cost index. Wise manufacturers, however, must account for these factors when they make decisions.


OS 4 GRUPOS:
our Diverging Paths
Adecade of volatile changes in exchange rates and labor and energy costs has resulted in striking shifts in relative manufacturing-cost structures among the top 25 export economies. Manufacturing competitiveness—once concentrated in a few regions—is now truly global. There has also been a dramatic reordering of cost competitiveness among specific countries around the world.
As we dug more deeply into these macroeconomic trends, we identified four common patterns that describe cost shifts occurring in the majority of the economies in our index. We grouped these economies into categories that we describe as under pressure,losing ground, holding steady, and rising global stars.
Under Pressure
Five countries that have traditionally been regarded as low-cost manufacturing bases have seen their competitive edge erode significantly from 2004 to 2014: Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia. In several of these countries, average manufacturing costs are now estimated to be higher than those of the U.S. Brazil experienced the most dramatic swing: its average costs were around 3 percent lower than in the U.S. in 2004 and are estimated to be 23 percent higher in 2014. In 2004, average costs in Poland and Russia were estimated to be 6 percent and 13 percent cheaper, respectively, than in the U.S. Now they are both roughly at parity. Costs in the Czech Republic were around 3 percent lower than in the U.S. in 2004 but are now an estimated 7 percent higher than in the U.S. China’s estimated manufacturing-cost advantage over the U.S. has shrunk from 14 percent to just 4 percent over that period.
The key factors driving these changes vary widely by economy. Skyrocketing labor and energy costs have eroded the competitiveness of China and Russia. A decade ago, for example, manufacturing wages adjusted for productivity averaged an estimated $4.35 an hour in China and $6.76 in Russia, compared with $17.54 in the U.S. Again, adjusted for productivity differences, labor costs have roughly tripled in both countries, to an estimated $12.47 an hour in China and $21.90 in Russia. Average productivity-adjusted manufacturing labor costs in the U.S. have risen by only 27 percent since 2004, to $22.32. The cost of industrial electricity increased by an estimated 66 percent in China and 78 percent in Russia, while the cost of natural gas soared by an estimated 138 percent in China and 202 percent in Russia from 2004 to 2014. (See Exhibit 6.)

The erosion of Russia’s energy-cost advantage may seem surprising. Russia is a major exporter of natural gas and oil, and domestic manufacturers pay around 30 percent less for gas than industrial customers in the U.S. But Russian gas prices have risen sharply compared with those in the U.S. Why? The dramatic increase of the production of shale gas has caused U.S. prices to drop sharply. Russia still relies on conventional natural gas, which has become more expensive. So even though Russian manufacturers continue to enjoy the world’s lowest natural-gas costs for industrial manufacturers, the cost advantage over the U.S. has significantly narrowed. Russia’s manufacturing competitiveness is further weakened by factors that are not included in our cost index. In international indices, Russia ranks a low 92nd for ease of doing business, 95th for logistics performance, and 127th for the perception of corruption.
Brazil has lost ground across all dimensions. It should be noted that despite being regarded as a major emerging market, Brazil was not a significantly cheaper manufacturing destination than the U.S.—once productivity was factored in—even a decade ago. However, the situation has become worse. Higher wages combined with very weak productivity growth accounted for more than three-quarters of a 26 percentage-point manufacturing-cost increase compared with the U.S. from 2004 to 2014.
Brazilian factory wages have more than doubled in the past ten years. Higher incomes are typically a healthy sign of development. And the past decade was one of steady and stable economic growth that enabled millions of households to leap from poverty to the middle class. But rising wages were not offset by productivity gains. Indeed, total labor productivity improved by only 1 percent per year from 2004 to 2014—ranking Brazil 19th out of the 25 economies in our index on this dimension.
Previous BCG research has shown that Brazil’s high wage growth and weak productivity gains can largely be attributed to a shortage of talent, underinvestment, inadequate infrastructure, and an excessively complex and costly institutional framework for business. (See Brazil: Confronting the Productivity Challenge, BCG report, January 2013.) A doubling of industrial-electricity costs and a nearly 60 percent leap in natural-gas costs have also hurt competitiveness. Because of these factors, Brazil is tied with Italy and Belgium as the fourth least-cost-competitive manufacturing economy in our index, ahead of only Australia, Switzerland, and France.
Poland was the most cost-competitive economy in Europe a decade ago, and it remains well positioned compared with its neighbors. It has an estimated 20 percentage-point cost advantage over Germany, for example, although that has narrowed slightly from 23 points in 2004. But because of higher energy costs and rising wages, Poland has lost ground to some of the strongest global competitors. The country generated moderate productivity growth of approximately 38 percent from 2004 to 2014, but this benefit was largely offset by currency appreciation.
Losing Ground
Manufacturing costs in most of Western Europe were relatively high a decade ago, and cost competitiveness has weakened considerably in several countries. Average manufacturing costs in Belgium rose by an estimated 7 percent compared with those in the U.S. They rose by 8 percent in Sweden; 10 percent in France, Italy, and Switzerland; and 21 percent in Australia. (See Exhibit 7.)

Rising energy costs, strong currencies, and weak productivity growth are the main culprits. Electricity costs have risen by an average of 59 percent in the six economies. Natural-­gas costs have soared by an estimated 94 percent since 2004 on average. Wages in those countries losing ground rose by approximately 10 percent more than they did in the U.S., while productivity growth lagged that of the U.S. by an estimated 10 percent. In Australia, for example, wages rose by 48 percent from 2004 to 2014, and labor productivity remained virtually flat. (See “Australia: Losing Ground.”)
To get a sense of how dramatically productivity gains have lagged in some losing-ground countries, consider the following comparison. In South Korea, average output per manufacturing worker increased by nearly 56 percent from 2004 to 2014. In Italy, output per worker declined by more than 6 percent over that same period. Italy’s performance also is in stark contrast with that of neighboring Austria, where output per worker rose by around 24 percent since 2004. Even though Austria has the sixth-highest average factory wage of the 25 countries in our index, its relative cost competitiveness did not drop significantly over the past decade as productivity gains helped to offset other increases.
Relatively inflexible labor markets also contribute to the high productivity-adjusted labor costs in most losing-ground countries. France, another laggard in productivity, illustrates some of the challenges. From 2004 to 2014, this economy’s growth in output per worker was approximately 14 percent lower than that of the U.S. Part of the reason is that France has the most rigid work rules of any major exporting economy in our index. For example, the official workday is seven hours, employers must pay for 30 days of annual leave for workers, and night work is highly restricted.
Holding Steady
Four countries in our group of 25—representing both developing and developed economies—managed to sustain their cost competitiveness from 2004 to 2014, despite higher global energy costs. They are India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the UK. Overall costs in each nation changed by no more than 2 percent in either direction compared with the U.S.
These four nations have significantly increased their cost competitiveness within their regions. The direct-manufacturing cost structures of the UK and the Netherlands, for example, have improved against each of the other ten European economies in our index as well as against Russia. Likewise, India and Indonesia have improved their cost competitiveness compared with each of the five other Asia-Pacific economies. As such, we refer to the UK, the Netherlands, India, and Indonesia as “regional rising stars.”
The UK has emerged as the lowest-cost manufacturing economy of Western Europe, just ahead of Spain. The UK’s indexed competitiveness improved by an estimated 5 percentage points relative to Belgium, 6 points relative to Poland, 8 points relative to France, and 9 points relative to Switzerland. The UK’s flexible labor market, which makes it easier to adjust the size of the workforce when economic circumstances change, is a major competitive edge. (See “The UK: A Rising Regional Star.”) The UK, therefore, may be a more attractive proposition as a location for investment in new capacity.
In the Netherlands, productivity-adjusted labor costs fell from 2004 to 2014 relative to the U.S. That is because manufacturing wages rose by only around 1.7 percent annually during that period, while productivity grew by an estimated 2 percent annually. Natural gas and electricity for industrial users cost approximately 10 to 30 percent less in the Netherlands than in most of its European neighbors. rendas continuem a proteger a EDP......
Manufacturing costs in India and Indonesia experienced more significant movement, rising in some dimensions but declining in others. Even though average manufacturing wages more than doubled in both countries over the past decade, these increases were offset by productivity gains and by currency devaluation. The Indian rupee declined by 26 percent against the U.S. dollar from 2004 to 2014, while the Indonesian rupiah fell by 20 percent. Energy costs increased relatively modestly. The price of natural gas rose by 5.2 percent annually from 2004 to 2014 in Indonesia and by 6.5 percent annually in India—substantially less than in other leading Asian manufacturing economies.
Both India and Indonesia could take better advantage of their low labor and energy costs to significantly increase exports of manufactured goods if they could improve in other areas that currently hinder their competitiveness. Even though Indonesia has the lowest direct cost structure of the world’s top 25 exporting countries, it earned the number 59 spot in logistics performance, 114 in corruption perception, and a lowly 120 in ease of doing business. In addition, Indonesia needs to improve its local supply base to reduce its reliance on imported materials, parts, and machinery. India’s low-cost advantage is significantly offset by its low rankings on logistics performance (46), corruption perception (94), and ease of doing business (134). (See “India: Holding Steady.”)
Rising Global Stars
The manufacturing cost competitiveness of the U.S. and Mexico improved substantially over the past decade compared with all the other economies in our index. For these two rising global stars, productivity-adjusted wages and currency rates have remained stable or improved relative to the other countries. Both nations also have very competitive energy costs. (See Exhibit 8.)

Mexico has regained its status as a leading low-cost manufacturing base. The country enjoyed a surge of manufacturing investment and booming exports to the U.S. following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. But a significant share of factory work went to China after that country entered the World Trade Organization in 2001. The pendulum is now starting to swing back.
The biggest factor is the cost of labor adjusted for productivity. In 2000, Mexican manufacturing labor was roughly twice as expensive as Chinese manufacturing labor. Since 2004, however, Chinese wages have nearly quintupled, and Mexican wages have risen by only 67 percent—less than 50 percent in dollar terms. And despite the fact that China has had higher productivity growth, the average Mexican productivity-adjusted labor costs are now estimated to be 13 percent lower than those of China. Add attractive electricity and natural-gas costs, and Mexico’s total costs are estimated to be 5 percent below those of China, 9 percent below those of the U.S., 10 percent below those of Poland, 11 percent below those of South Korea, and a full 25 percent below those of Brazil. (See “Mexico: A Rising Global Star.”)
The manufacturing-cost gap between the U.S. and other highly developed economies widened significantly from 2004 to 2014. Average U.S. costs are now estimated to be 9 percentage points lower than those of the UK, 11 points lower than in Japan, 21 points lower than in Germany, and 24 points lower than in France. Of the large developed-economy exporters, only South Korea—at roughly 2 percent higher costs—is close. Indeed, as discussed in previous BCG research, the U.S. has emerged as the lowest-cost manufacturing location of the developed world. (See Behind the American Export Surge: The U.S. as One of the Developed World’s Lowest-Cost Manufacturers, BCG Focus, August 2013.) At the same time, the U.S. has achieved approximate cost parity with low-cost countries in Eastern Europe. The cost gap with China has shrunk dramatically and, if the trend of the last ten years continues, will disappear before the end of the decade.
Labor is one key to the growing U.S. competitive advantage. The U.S. has one of the developed world’s most flexible labor markets, ranking as the most favorable economy in terms of labor regulation among the top 25 manufacturing exporters. The U.S. also has by far the highest worker productivity among the world’s 25 biggest manufactured-goods exporters. Adjusted for productivity, U.S. labor costs are an estimated 20 to 54 percent lower than those of Western Europe and Japan for many products.
The big U.S. energy-cost advantage is a recent development. While industrial prices for natural gas have risen around the world, they have fallen in the U.S. by around 50 percent since 2005, when large-scale recovery from underground shale deposits began in earnest. Natural gas currently costs more than three times as much in China, France, and Germany than in the U.S.—and nearly four times as much in Japan. In addition to being an important feedstock for industries such as chemicals, low-priced shale gas has also helped keep electricity prices in the U.S. below those of most other major exporters. That translates into a sizable cost advantage for energy-intensive industries such as steel and glass. Natural gas accounts for only 2 percent of average U.S. manufacturing costs, and electricity represents just 1 percent. But in most other major goods-exporting countries, natural gas accounts for 5 to 8 percent of manufacturing costs and electricity for 2 to 5 percent. (See “Nearly Every Manufacturer in the U.S. Will Benefit from Low-Cost Natural Gas,” BCG press release, February 13, 2014.)
Because of its vast reserves, U.S. prices are expected to remain within a range of $4 to $5 per thousand cubic feet for several decades. What’s more, because it will take time before other nations are able to begin large-scale recovery of shale gas or before the U.S. can export domestic supplies, the cost advantage will remain largely exclusive to North America for at least five to ten years.
Several leading manufacturing export economies didn’t fit into our four categories because shifts in their cost structures didn’t follow one of the distinct patterns. (See Exhibit 9.) While Germany and Japan lost ground relative to economies such as the UK, the U.S., and the Netherlands, for example, they held steady or gained ground relative to China, Brazil, and many European economies. For South Korea and Taiwan, cost positions deteriorated compared with the U.S., India, and Indonesia, but these two economies gained significant ground on other emerging markets, such as China, Russia, Thailand, Poland, and the Czech Republic—and they gained a lot of ground relative to Brazil, Australia, and France. Although Canada lost 11 percentage points in cost competitiveness relative to the U.S. since 2004, it didn’t meet our criteria as a losing-ground economy because it has also benefited from declining natural-gas costs.



Bottom line: este artigo desfaz muitos mitos, e vem dentro de algo que hoje em dia parece consensual a china tem que alterar o seu modelo economico, deixando de se focar exclusivamente em mão de obra barata, curiosos outros pontos destacados a bold, relativamente ao mexico acredito que de facto tenha mais para dar que o brasil, pois este ultimo é governado por tipos que nao sabem percebem puto de economia , o resto a destacar está assinalado a bold

[Artista Romeno]

Foi prometido e cá está by The boston Consulting Group
The Shifting Economics of Global Manufacturing
How Cost Competitiveness Is Changing Worldwide AUGUST 19, 2014 by Harold L. Sirkin, Michael Zinser, and Justin Rose



For the better part of three decades, a rough, bifurcated conception of the world has driven corporate manufacturing investment and sourcing decisions. Latin America, Eastern Europe, and most of Asia have been viewed as low-cost regions. The U.S., Western Europe, and Japan have been viewed as having high costs.
But this worldview now appears to be out of date. Years of steady change in wages, productivity, energy costs, currency values, and other factors are quietly but dramatically redrawing the map of global manufacturing cost competitiveness. The new map increasingly resembles a quilt-work pattern of low-cost economies, high-cost economies, and many that fall in between, spanning all regions.
In some cases, the shifts in relative costs are startling. Who would have thought a decade ago that Brazil would now be one of the highest-­cost countries for manufacturing—or that Mexico could be cheaper than China? While London remains one of the priciest places in the world to live and visit, the UK has become the lowest-cost manufacturer in Western Europe. Costs in Russia and much of Eastern Europe have risen to near parity with the U.S. (See Exhibit 1.)
exhibit

To understand the shifting economics of global manufacturing, The Boston Consulting Group analyzed manufacturing costs for the world’s 25 leading exporting economies along four key dimensions: manufacturing wages, labor productivity, energy costs, and exchange rates. These 25 economies account for nearly 90 percent of global exports of manufactured goods.
The new BCG Global Manufacturing Cost-Competitiveness Index has revealed shifts in relative costs that should drive many companies to rethink decades-old assumptions about sourcing strategies and where to build future production capacity. To identify and compare the shifts in relative costs, we analyzed data in 2004 and 2014. The evaluation is part of a series of findings from our ongoing research into the shifting economics of global manufacturing.
In developing the index, we observed that cost competitiveness has improved for several countries and become relatively less attractive for others. Within the index, we identified four distinct patterns of change in manufacturing cost competitiveness. (See Exhibit 2.) They include the following:
Under Pressure. Several economies that traditionally have been regarded as low-cost manufacturing bases appear to be under pressure as a result of a combination of factors that have significantly eroded their cost advantages since 2004. For example, at the factory gate, China’s estimated manufacturing-cost advantage over the U.S. has shrunk to less than 5 percent. Brazil is now estimated to be more expensive than much of Western Europe. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia have also seen their cost competitiveness deteriorate on a relative basis. They are now estimated to be at near parity with the U.S. and only a few percentage points cheaper than the UK and Spain.
Losing Ground. Several traditional high-cost countries that were already relatively expensive a decade ago have lost additional ground, resulting in 16 to 30 percent cost gaps relative to the U.S. This is largely because of weak productivity growth and rising energy costs. The countries losing ground include Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Holding Steady. From 2004 to 2014, the manufacturing cost competitiveness of a handful of countries held steady relative to the U.S. Rapid productivity growth and depreciating currencies have helped keep costs in check in economies such as India and Indonesia—even as wages have grown quickly. In contrast to the dynamic changes in India and Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK have seen relative stability across all the cost drivers we examined. The performance of these four countries has positioned them as potential future leaders in each of their respective regions.
Rising Global Stars. Cost structures in Mexico and the U.S. improved more than in all of the other 25 largest exporting economies. Because of low wage growth, sustained productivity gains, stable exchange rates, and a big energy-cost advantage, these two nations are the current rising stars of global manufacturing. We estimate that Mexico now has lower average manufacturing costs than China on a unit-cost basis. And except for China and South Korea, the rest of the world’s top-ten goods exporters are 10 to 25 percent more expensive than the U.S.

These dramatic changes in relative costs could drive a large shift in the global economy as companies are prompted to reassess their manufacturing footprints. (See Exhibit 3.) One implication is that global manufacturing could become increasingly regional. Because relatively low-cost manufacturing centers exist in all regions of the world, more goods consumed in Asia, Europe, and the Americas will be made closer to home. These trends also have implications for governments, whose leaders increasingly recognize the economic importance of a stable manufacturing base. We hope that this report will encourage policy makers in developed and developing economies alike to identify growing areas of strength and weakness and take action to shore up their manufacturing competitivenes

[Artista Romeno]

deixo o balanço e mais info sobre a mar
tenho curiosidade de saber no psi 20 a quanto cotava esta empresa , nunca irei saber infelizmente porque nunca lá irá aparcer nenhuma assim, com uma marca internacionalmente conhecida, mas nao é isso é o valor dos cp, autonomia financeira, p/b, roe, tudo pelo ar

desde 2010 a marriot diminuiu o numero de acções em ciruclação de 367m para 292 o que representa cerca de 20% menos existe ainda um dividendo moderado assim por alto uns 30% dos lucros

trouxe esta empresa nao por estar na focus list do cs ou overwieght na jpm( isso vale o que vale....e tem sempre que ser lido com toda a precauçao e atençao), não por eu a ter em carteiras, mas porque mostra melhor que nada que analise fundamental vai muito alem de analise de racios

Por curiosidade, onde consegue recolher estes dados?

resposta:sec filling 2013 anual

o resto nao é publico

[Novo Aquario]

deixo o balanço e mais info sobre a mar
tenho curiosidade de saber no psi 20 a quanto cotava esta empresa , nunca irei saber infelizmente porque nunca lá irá aparcer nenhuma assim, com uma marca internacionalmente conhecida, mas nao é isso é o valor dos cp, autonomia financeira, p/b, roe, tudo pelo ar

desde 2010 a marriot diminuiu o numero de acções em ciruclação de 367m para 292 o que representa cerca de 20% menos existe ainda um dividendo moderado assim por alto uns 30% dos lucros

trouxe esta empresa nao por estar na focus list do cs ou overwieght na jpm( isso vale o que vale....e tem sempre que ser lido com toda a precauçao e atençao), não por eu a ter em carteiras, mas porque mostra melhor que nada que analise fundamental vai muito alem de analise de racios

Por curiosidade, onde consegue recolher estes dados?

[Artista Romeno]

deixo o balanço e mais info sobre a mar
tenho curiosidade de saber no psi 20 a quanto cotava esta empresa , nunca irei saber infelizmente porque nunca lá irá aparcer nenhuma assim, com uma marca internacionalmente conhecida, mas nao é isso é o valor dos cp, autonomia financeira, p/b, roe, tudo pelo ar

Bom, as empresas do PSI20, mesmo as maiores, não têm um custo da dívida de 3%. Assim torna-se fácil e rentável comprar acções próprias com recurso a dívida, e é prática corrente nos EUA. É o "quantitative easing" a funcionar... até ver

sim atendendo a divida liquida existente o custo da mesma em termos liquidos anda pelos 3,4% assim grosso modo falando, mas a mesma politica ainda que com um custo de financiamento superior era criadora de valor de qualquer modo tal o preço a que isto andou
edit: nunca é demais reforçar que qualquer nota de research deve ser lida de modo critico, até porque a % de sells normalmente anda pelos 13 a 15%

[Dr Tretas]

deixo o balanço e mais info sobre a mar
tenho curiosidade de saber no psi 20 a quanto cotava esta empresa , nunca irei saber infelizmente porque nunca lá irá aparcer nenhuma assim, com uma marca internacionalmente conhecida, mas nao é isso é o valor dos cp, autonomia financeira, p/b, roe, tudo pelo ar

Bom, as empresas do PSI20, mesmo as maiores, não têm um custo da dívida de 3%. Assim torna-se fácil e rentável comprar acções próprias com recurso a dívida, e é prática corrente nos EUA. É o "quantitative easing" a funcionar... até ver

[Artista Romeno]

deixo o balanço e mais info sobre a mar
tenho curiosidade de saber no psi 20 a quanto cotava esta empresa , nunca irei saber infelizmente porque nunca lá irá aparcer nenhuma assim, com uma marca internacionalmente conhecida, mas nao é isso é o valor dos cp, autonomia financeira, p/b, roe, tudo pelo ar

desde 2010 a marriot diminuiu o numero de acções em ciruclação de 367m para 292 o que representa cerca de 20% menos existe ainda um dividendo moderado assim por alto uns 30% dos lucros

trouxe esta empresa nao por estar na focus list do cs ou overwieght na jpm( isso vale o que vale....e tem sempre que ser lido com toda a precauçao e atençao), não por eu a ter em carteiras, mas porque mostra melhor que nada que analise fundamental vai muito alem de analise de racios

[Artista Romeno]

Marriot nem tenho muito que escrever porque trago já as imagens que falam por si, é uma acção com um desempenho recente fortissimo, a meu ver que fique claro já perto do topo, num cenario rosa diria que valera 80 a 85 usd em 2016, caso o revpar continue a subir assim como a economia americana e mundial nao tramem a boa evolução deste setor do lodging, vou apresentar excertos notas de reserach da jpm e do credit suisse que me parecem bem feitas, comentando depois nas imagens, sobre a empresa quero realçar:
management agressivo tanto nos guidances, como na forma de retribuição ao acionista que passa por comprar muitas acções proprias acima até do montante que a geração de cash flow permitiria no entanto a divida liquida a meu ver apresenta valores normais, será de facto extranho para quem gosta de fazer analise de contabilidade a dizer que é fundamental, uma empresa com a equity negativa valer tanto em bolsa até face ao invested capital, no entanto fixem isto bem e é por isso mesmo que eu fui buscar a marriot OS ATIVOS DE UMA EMPRESA TEM O VALOR QUE O MERCADO LHE ATRIBUI, uma empresa pode valer o mesmo mais ou menos que o seu book value dái decorre 0! esse racio é o pior de todos pior ainda que o per. Assim nessa teoria a decisão da empresa recomprar acções proprias criando um shareholder's deficit contabilistico era péssima , quando na verdade foi de génio dado que as acções estavam muito baratas esta industria rege-se por ciclos, nao tem book value sim e daí olhem po grafico isto vai fazer confusão a muito boa gente e é por isso mesmo que trago esta empresa, em que as vendas crescem 6%, o ebitda 15% e os eps 25%
dizer que obviamente a mar nao detem todos os hoteis que opera e isso é facilmente visivel no seu balanço que colocarei abaixo, vou deixar varias imagens

2- as vendas per si nao dizem muito sobre a rentabilidade de uma empresa vejamos vendas em 2011 10,9mm, vendas em 2014 13,9mm lucros/ acção 2011:1,31 usd; 2014: 2,43 lucro por acção cresce o tripo das vendas, por via da melhoria de margens e dos buybacks
3- como vem no post de ontem daqui para a frente o potencial disto dependerá do andamento do mercado do lodging e da percepção que o mercado terá do mesmo
comentarios adicionais no proximo post