Governo faz lei orgânica para acelerar PRR e resolver impasse na habitação

[VirtuaGod]

in WSJ

Negative Interest Rates Yield Positive Results—So Far

Challenging economic orthodoxy, central banks cut rates below zero without yet creating new problems

By
Greg Ip
March 4, 2015 12:17 p.m. ET

Interest rates can’t go below zero—or so says a longstanding rule of economics.

Savers would sooner hold cash, goes the logic, than lose money leaving it in the bank. Economists call this presumed floor the “zero bound.” It’s why many central banks, having cut rates to zero, have tried to revive growth with more-exotic tools, such as massive purchases of government bonds.

But as with so many other rules in recent years, the zero bound is being rethought as central banks push rates into negative territory to revive their slowing economies. The big question is whether this new monetary tool will be enough to resuscitate spending and push inflation back up in the many parts of the world where it’s sagging.

Sweden led the way below zero for a brief time in 2009 and 2010, followed by Denmark from 2012 to 2014. Last year, the European Central Bank introduced a negative interest rate. Largely in response, Switzerland and Denmark have since pushed a key policy rate to minus 0.75% and Sweden to minus 0.85%, unprecedented in modern times.

Individual savers have mostly been spared, but big customers aren’t so lucky: Some German banks are charging for large deposits, and in the U.S., J.P. Morgan Chase will do the same, though the Federal Reserve has stayed on the positive side of zero and looks set to raise rates this year. About 16% of the world’s government bonds now sport negative yields, meaning investors are paying to lend to those governments.

This is a potential game-changer for central banks. Normally, they stimulate spending by lowering the real interest rate, that is, the nominal interest rate minus inflation. With inflation now close to zero or lower in many countries, negative nominal rates make possible more negative real rates.

Interest rates are normally positive because it suits both savers and borrowers. It provides households with an incentive to save for tomorrow rather than spend their money today. Companies, meanwhile, are willing to pay to borrow because they plow the money into projects that promise higher returns.

These relationships, however, are not immutable. Worry over the future can drive people and companies to stash money away even if they receive nothing in return. Companies can have such low expectations about the viability of new projects that only zero or negative rates can entice them to borrow and expand. That seems to be the case now. Central banks have held real rates in negative territory since 2008 because of the moribund investment environment and very low inflation.

Historically, however, central banks have almost never pushed rates below zero. First, it wasn’t needed. Second, it might disrupt the financial system; For example, money-market mutual funds would close up shop if they couldn’t promise investors a positive return. Third, it could push depositors to simply take their money out as cash.

Europe’s experience has eased some of those worries. The Danish central bank found that after rates went negative in 2012, the money market continued to function normally, and there was no surge in demand for large-denomination krone notes. Rates today in Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland are more negative than they were in Denmark in 2012, yet none has yet seen a surge in currency demand.

There are several reasons why. Thanks to debit cards, online payments and smartphone wallets, physical cash has become relatively more burdensome and costly. An ECB study found cash 11 times as costly as checks for handling most transactions. In digitally savvy Sweden, currency in circulation has fallen by about 25% since 2009.

Moreover, small savers for the most part haven’t been hit. For big savers such as banks and investment funds, transporting and storing hundreds of millions of euros, dollars or francs, not to mention complying with anti-money-laundering laws, is expensive and time-consuming.

This all suggests the zero bound binds less than central bankers once thought. How much of a difference this makes depends on what they are trying to achieve. Denmark’s goal is to keep the krone pegged to the euro. Negative rates have accomplished this by deterring inflows of so-called hot money from foreign investors, which might push the krone up. The prospect of losing money on a super-safe government bond could be a powerful psychological spur driving money into stocks and commodities.

But what central banks would prefer is that households and firms spend more, and a barely negative interest rate is only a bit more of a stimulus than a rate of zero.

Getting a bigger bump may require a deeper dive into the negative, which would force banks to charge individual depositors, who would howl.

And at some point, a negative enough interest rate makes the hassles of handling millions of dollars of cash worthwhile. Someone, for example, could create an exchange-traded fund that invests in paper currency as an alternative to bank deposits. To deter such behavior would require phasing out paper currency, as Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff has suggested, or taxing it, an idea first put forward a century ago by Silvio Gesell, a German businessman and economist.

That sounds sensible to economists but reprehensible to the public, which is why it won’t happen. There’s still a boundary below which rates cannot go, even if it’s no longer zero.

[BearManBull]

RPedroG

Não me parece que seja motivo suficiente até porque os USA já não têm o PIB acoplado ao preço do petróleo.

O par EUR/USD continua a cair vertiginosamente e parece que está a ficar fora de controlo.

[RPedroG]

No entanto fico um pouco apreensivo como é que os USA mantêm o bull à tanto tempo mesmo com apesar da política de QE nos últimos dois anos, talvez fosse mesmo pela crise na Europa por nos ter travado nesse aspecto competitivo relativamente a eles mas mesmo assim com a quantidade de dívida que têm e com o Dollar á vários anos mais fraco do que o Euro seria espectável que os mercados exigissem outro tipo de política.

na minha opiniao terá a ver com o gas de xisto e estarem a tornar-se independentes em termos energeticos, juntando naturalmente o facto da Europa ter alguns problemas.

[O Estóico Ocioso]

.

[BearManBull]

Um artigo extremamente elucidativo sobre os perigos de um Euro fraco e que como tenho vindo a defender, mais por coincidencia do que por conhecimento especializado na matéria :p, a razão do limite ser a paridade com o Dollar.

Este artigo é realmente eximio na forma como defende o porquê de uma moeda fraca ser caraterístico de países menos desenvolvidos (Socialistas cof cof) e como é um obstáculo à creatividade e à diferenciação.

É fácil de se compreender que moedas mais fortes atraiem talentos porque os porque os produtos/serviços são inerentemente mais caros logo á partida por são sempre obrigados a ter um factor diferenciador extra e é isto que faz avançar a tecnologia, a economia e a sociedade.

No entanto fico um pouco apreensivo como é que os USA mantêm o bull à tanto tempo mesmo com apesar da política de QE nos últimos dois anos, talvez fosse mesmo pela crise na Europa por nos ter travado nesse aspecto competitivo relativamente a eles mas mesmo assim com a quantidade de dívida que têm e com o Dollar á vários anos mais fraco do que o Euro seria espectável que os mercados exigissem outro tipo de política.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/bus ... 15322.html

The concern could be felt everywhere at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, the annual meeting of the rich and powerful. Would the major central banks in the United States, Europe and Asia succeed in stabilizing the wobbling global economy? Or have the central bankers long since become risk factors themselves? The question was everywhere at the forum, being addressed by experts at the lecturns and by participants in the hallways.


Central banks, said Harvard University economics professor Kenneth Rogoff, are surely the greatest source of uncertainty in the eyes of the financial markets, a statement that was not disputed by others on the panel. The fact that monetary policies at central banks in the US, Europe, Japan and elsewhere are drifting apart poses a major risk for the stability of financial markets, he said.
"It's important for the international community to work together to avoid currency wars which no one can win," Min Zhu, deputy managing director of the IMF, told the conference.

Yet last Thursday's decision by the European Central Bank to purchase €60 billion ($68 billion) a month in government bonds through September 2015 has increased the threat of exactly that kind of monetary conflict. It will further flood the markets with liquidity and will continue to apply downward pressure on the value of the common currency.

A weak euro, of course, is precisely what ECB President Mario Draghi wants. It makes exports to other currency areas cheaper, thereby increasing the competitiveness of euro-zone countries. At the same time, it increases the price of imports, thus reducing the threat of deflation.

Parity with Dollar?

Viewed in those terms, Draghi's policy has been thus far successful. The euro has fallen in value by 10 percent compared to the dollar since September, and many observers expect that the euro may soon achieve parity with the dollar.

But Draghi's policy also has inherent perils. By intervening in the exchange rate mechanisms, the EU is creating unfair advantages for itself globally at the expense of other countries. Those countries surely won't be pleased and are likely to respond by devaluating their own currencies. Ultimately, there can only be losers in such a contest. It will be "interesting to see how the Japanese follow up at this point" -- as well as the US -- Gary Cohn, president of investment bank Goldman Sachs, said at Davos.

It's a development that worries Anton Börner. "A currency war would be devastating for everyone," said Börner, the president of the Federation of German Wholesale, Foreign Trade and Services (BGA). He argues that one of the reasons Germany has become so economically competitive is that companies here have been forced to contend with a strong currency. It forced them to make a greater effort and to be more creative. "Investments are made in places where the currency is strong," the BGA boss says.

Börner's line of argumentation sounds a lot like the hallmark of the monetary policy of pre-unification West Germany. It is rare that a currency becomes such an important part of the national identity as the deutsche mark was to Germans prior to the euro's introduction. Many considered the deutsche mark to be guarantor of prosperity and the Bundesbank a venerable institution that both embodied that promise and commanded international acceptance for the young country.

The job became even easier the more the mark gained ground against the dollar, the British pound and the Italian lira. It slowly came to be seen as a hard currency and ultimately became the world's second most popular reserve currency behind the US dollar. The strong deutsche mark also turned Germany into a nation of travelers.

Now, though, Germans are having to adapt to a new reality. Rather than fighting for a strong currency as the Bundesbank used to do, the ECB is weaking the euro.

In a currency block, of course, the disadvantages of a weaker currency are not immediately felt. Most Europeans tend to vacation in Europe, thus limiting their exposure to stronger currencies abroad. And goods from abroad have not yet become more costly despite the euro devaluation because the price of oil has plunged as well.

Pros Outweigh Cons -- For Now

For the German economy, the advantages associated with a weaker currency outweigh the disadvantages. Coupled with the low oil price, the current euro exchange rate is like an "unexpected economic stimulus," government sources say. When he releases his current forecast as part of his ministry's annual economic report on Wednesday, Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel is expected to issue an upward correction. The Economics Ministry is expected to forecast growth of 1.5 percent for 2015, up from the 1.3 percent forecast last autumn.

Yet even though that new figure is just now being released, it is already obsolete. Government economists believe that the euro's downward trend coupled with low oil prices mean that the German economy is more likely to grow by 2 percent this year, assuming there are no major geopolitical upheavals. Officially, Berlin doesn't want to sound too optimistic, preferring to be pleasantly surprised with potentially positive developments later this year.

Nevertheless, the downward trend in the euro's value and oil prices has the potential to create new problems for the German government in the foreseeable future, particularly in its relations with partner countries and with international organizations like the International Monetary Fund. They've long complained about Germany's growing current account surpluses. The imbalance threatens the recovery of euro-zone crisis countries and the global economy because Germany imports too little.

Trade Imbalance

Relative to economic output, no other European country exports as many goods and services as Germany. The country had a current account balance surplus in 2013 equivalent to 7 percent of gross domestic product. The figure for 2014 is not much lower.

The surplus could get even bigger in the future. Experts in Wolfgang Schäuble's Finance Ministry have calculated that the combination of the weak euro and declining oil prices could increase the surplus by 0.5 percent.

Experts believe the weak euro may help spur economic growth in crisis countries on the short term. A current analysis by the European Commission suggests that a falling euro exchange rate will result in an increase in exports, particularly for Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. It will also make it more attractive for non-Europeans to take vacations in the euro zone.

At the same time, it is unlikely that the measures announced last week will restore inflation to the ECB's target rate of 2 percent. "Studies show that a low euro exchange rate has little influence on inflation," says Ansgar Belke, an economics professor at the University of Duisburg-Essen.

For the time being, the focus remains primarily on advantages the weak euro has for the economy. The general rule of thumb is that a devaluation of 5 percent will translate to additional growth of 0.3 percentage points in the euro zone. But what side effects will it have? And at what point might it get dangerous?

"At the moment, the situation is still relaxed," says Carl Martin Welcker, the CEO of the Kölner Schütte, the global market leader in grinding machines and multi-spindle automatic lathes and one of the medium-sized businesses that make up the backbone of the German economy. In light of the political situation, Welcker said he considers the depreciation of the euro to be an appropriate move, but says people need to keep an eye on developments. "If the euro were to lose another 15 percent in value, then things would be quite different," he said.

When Weakness Becomes a Problem

At that point, the euro would reach parity with the dollar -- a level at which the disadvantages of a weak euro could no longer be overlooked. Everything that is traded in dollars would then become palpably more expensive, especially commodities. If oil prices hadn't declined so dramatically in recent months, the cost per liter of diesel would be €1.50 today due to the weaker European currency. But at the moment, it costs €1.10 on average.

Investments made by German companies in the dollar zone also get more expensive when the euro's value slips. German chemicals giant BASF is currently planning to spend €5 billion to expand its North American business between 2014 and 2018. The chemical company says it still intends to stick with its plans. "Short-term currency fluctuations have no influence on our investment decisions," BASF officials state. The question is how long the euro will remain weak.

Potentially even more important is the psychological effect devaluation has. A weak euro can give companies a false sense of security. "This kind of thing only provides a temporary boost," warns BGA President Börner. "You can't create any prosperity through devaluation," he says. "It's window dressing."

Thomas Mayer, Deutsche Bank's former chief economist, views the situation similarly. "In addition to reducing the pressure to reform in countries, an artificially depressed euro exchange rate could also stifle innovation in industry," the economist said. With a devalued euro, products practically sell themselves and, experience has shown, companies tend to hold on to older products as well as inefficient manufacturing processes.

But there's an even greater danger that is far more decisive. "If the downward trend in the euro accelerates, in the worst case scenario, investors could lose trust in the durability of the euro zone," warned Clemens Fuest, the head of the Center for European Economic Research in Mannheim. "Then the opposite of what the ECB is trying to achieve would happen."

Is It Contagious?

Last week's decision by the Swiss central bank to unpeg the franc from the euro illustrated just how dangerous markets can be for banks and investors alike. Swiss stock prices dropped sharply and banks, funds and currency traders around the world -- but also many private individuals and German municipalities -- who had invested in Swiss francs suffered painful losses. The move even drove one major US hedge fund out of business.

Still, Axel Weber, the former president of Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, and currently chairman of the Swiss bank UBS, praised the ECB's decision even though it could ultimately be a burden for his institution. "It has always been clear that pegging the franc to the euro was a temporary thing," he said. "The Swiss National Bank made the right move. It's better to make a painful break than to draw out the agony."

Officials within Germany's Finance Ministry are already concerned that the currency turbulence could prove contagious and hit countries neighboring the euro zone. Like Switzerland, a few other countries have pegged their currencies to the euro exchange rate, and they too may now feel the pinch of appreciation pressures.

This is especially true of Denmark and Poland, which could become the next focus of speculators. The Danish crown and the Polish zloty are more or less pegged to the euro exchange rate. Central bank officials in both countries almost slavishly follow each move made by the ECB in order to ensure their currency values remain stable. But it's an arrangement that will be thrown into jeopardy if the ECB now starts purchasing large quantities of government bonds. In order to prevent speculation against the crown, the Danish central bank recently lowered its key interest rate by 0.15 percent to 0.5 percent.

Upheaval Inevitable

Still, further upheaval appears inevitable. It's possible that both countries will ultimately have to establish a new exchange rate in relation to the euro or that they will have to unpeg from the common currency completely.

Germany's Finance Ministry has also registered with concern that the euro's role as a reserve currency is suffering as a result of monetary policy decisions made by the ECB. Around one-fifth of global currency reserves are currently held in euros, but that share used to be considerably larger. If the ECB opens up the floodgates for additional quantitative easing, they fear that share could fall even further.

Central banks normally sell their reserves in a weak currency in order to limit their losses. But if they push their euros onto the market, it will further weaken the common currency, triggering a self-perpetuating downward spiral.

For months, the Americans and the IMF have been calling on the Europeans to implement precisely the monetary policy that is now making the euro weaker. They will now have to accept the increasing trade imbalance as the logical consequence of this move. "You can't have both -- a loose monetary policy and at the same time a reduction in imbalances," one government expert in Berlin said.

It's for the same reasons that Schäuble and Economics Minister Gabriel don't believe that the latest developments will lead to competitive devaluations or currency wars. The Europeans are now following precisely the monetary policy Washington has been requesting for years. Now Washington will have to be able to cope with the risks and the side-effects that come with it.

Are Europe and America Trapped?

Efforts by the Federal Reserve to become the first major central bank to reverse its quantitative easing illustrated just how risky the flood of money can be. A year and a half ago, the Fed began suggesting that it would end its loose monetary little by little. The statements led to a reverse in capital flows in large parts of the world, with investors pulling money out of developing nations and investing it in the US. In countries like India, the markets fell sharply and currencies were strained. Quiet has since returned to the markets, but the Fed still hasn't raised its interest rates.

Worry about the possibility of new turbulence may even prevent the Fed from taking that step this year. Conditions for raising the interest rate are actually favorable given that the US economy is currently undergoing its first upswing in many years. But higher interest rates would also attract more capital to the US, leading the dollar to continue its ascent. Developing nations would fall into difficulties and the euro exchange rate would fall even further.


That's why a return to normal monetary policies is unlikely for the time being. Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic appear to be trapped.
If the value of the dollar relative to the euro continues to increase, the Fed may feel forced to take countermeasures. "As long as things are going decently with the US economy, people will accept appreciation of the dollar," says economist Mayer. "But if the mood shifts at some point, the exchange rate will become a political issue." Accusations of currency manipulation, he says, would quickly follow.

In that event, the US Congress has the means of imposing punitive measures against countries or entities deemed guilty of such manipulations. And, as the case of China has shown, US lawmakers aren't afraid of threatening to use those powers.

[BearManBull]

Mas afinal a Alemanha tem interesse em ter o Euro baixo ou não?

E a velha questão permanece, será que o Euro é realmente uma vantagem competitiva? Fica um artigo antigo mas muito bem elaborado embora fique reticente em relação a alguns pontos.

Também deixo uma imagem com a evoluçaõ do PIB per capita, continuo a achar que das duas uma:

Ou estão todos a beneficiar do Euro
Ou estão todos a prejudicar com o Euro

Não acredito portanto em afirmações que a Alemanha tire vantagens do Euro á custa dos periféricos e parecem-me afirmações infundadas.

For years, I have warned my European students of the fiscal free-rider problem built into the structure of the euro area. My examples have always been fiscally undisciplined peripheral governments seeking political gain by running budget deficits at the expense of their euro partners. Now, though, as the debate unfolds over measures to cope with the European sovereign debt crisis, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Germany, the long-time locomotive of the euro, is also, in its own way, free-riding on the common currency.
The free-rider problem arises whenever someone is able to capture the full benefits of an action while shifting all or part of the the costs to others. I introduce the concept to my students with the example of ten friends eating dinner in a restaurant. If they know they will get separate checks at the end of the meal, they all order hamburgers and beer. If they know there will be one check, to be split equally among everyone at the table, they order steak and champagne.
In the case of deficit-prone peripheral members of the euro, individual governments capture the full economic and political benefits of fiscal stimulus while shifting part of the costs to other euro members. This happens in two ways.
In the short run, the shift works through monetary policy. Other things being equal, more fiscal stimulus puts upward pressure both on interest rates and inflation. To counteract the pressure, monetary policy must be tightened. In a country with an independent currency and its own central bank, the pain of tighter monetary policy (higher interest rates, a stronger exchange rate that hurts exporters) is fully internalized. In the euro area, though, there is just one central bank, so the pain is spread among all members of the currency area. Furthermore, the European Central Bank is in far-away Frankfurt, making it easy for the government of a peripheral country to shift the political blame for painful tightening measures.
The long-run costs of excessive short-run fiscal expansion come in the form of the tax increases or spending cuts that are eventually needed to avoid unsustainable debt and eventual default. Those costs, too, can be shifted to others. Even in a country with an independent currency, the current government is tempted to free-ride on the future governments that will have to pay the bills. With a common currency the problem is much worse because fiscally irresponsible governments can expect fiscal bailouts from their currency partners.
Even if the founding documents of the currency union include a “no bailout” clause, as is the case in the euro area, no such provision can be fully credible. That is because fiscally prudent members cannot, simply by refusing a bailout, force a profligate member to bear all the costs of a default. Even without a rescue the costs must be shared because default by any one member of a currency area would undermine the perceived credit risk of other members, thereby increasing their interest costs. That fact gives profligate members the leverage they need to extort a bailout, which is more or less what is happening now.
Germany understands all this very well. It is doing its best to assure that profligate peripheral states at least share the pain, even if some form of rescue cannot be avoided. Meanwhile however, Germany is open to the charge that it too is free-riding on the euro, although in a very different way.
Germany’s free-riding consists in using the euro as a mechanism for maintaining a weak exchange rate while shifting the costs of doing so to its neighbors. To see how that form of free-riding works, compare Germany and China.
Although there are vast differences between the two economies, each of them for its own reasons has chosen a growth model based on a high savings rate balanced by large net exports. In part, each country’s export success can be attributed to cultural traits favoring hard work, thrift, and efficiency. Far be it from me to denigrate those virtues, but they are not the whole story of China’s and Germany’s export success. The hyper-competitiveness of both countries is also due in part to policies that guard against unwanted exchange rate appreciation. Although the effects are similar, the mechanisms that China and Germany use to accomplish this are quite different.
China maintains its undervalued currency through classic methods of market intervention. As a country with an independent currency, it bears the full costs of doing so. To resist appreciation of the yuan, it has accumulated an ever-increasing mountain of low-yielding U.S. Treasury securities. Each purchase of U.S. securities results in an equivalent increase in the Chinese monetary base, thereby adding to inflationary pressure within China.
The inflationary pressure is relieved, in part, through sterilization in the form of selling central bank bills and raising commercial bank reserve requirements. However, the sterilization itself is costly. First, it involves an interest expense, since the central bank bills that are sold bear higher interest rates than the U.S. Treasuries that are bought. Second, high reserve requirements, interest rate restrictions, and other administrative measures distort the Chinese financial system. The whole package of monetary and exchange rate policy almost certainly involves costs to the Chinese economy that exceed the benefits. Many observers think that the policies are kept in place only by the concentrated political power of China’s export industries.
Germany, in contrast, can have its cake and eat it too. It is impossible to know what Germany’s exchange rate would be if its currency were independent, but as good a guess as any is that of Boris Schlossberg, Director of Currency Research at forex trader GFT, who thinks it would be the equivalent of about two dollars per euro. Germany does not have to engage in overt currency manipulation to maintain the current exchange rate; membership in the euro does the job without the need for intervention. The pressure toward appreciation that would be produced by the hyper-competitiveness of the German economy is offset by the opposite pressures from less competitive euro members like Greece and Portugal. On balance, the effect of the euro is to keep the German exchange rate undervalued at the expense of forcing overvaluation on peripheral members.
What is the bottom line? What should we want Germany to do that it is not now doing?
If we focus only on issues of fairness, it is tempting to say that Germany ought to be willing to pay for the benefits it gets from the euro by contributing more to the bail-out of peripheral members. One way to do so would be to back the concept of a common euro bond, something it has steadfastly resisted. However, I think that fairness alone is the wrong focus.
The real problem is that a currency area in which all members can free-ride on all others is inherently unstable. Restructuring the euro area to make it sustainable in the long run will require some fundamental changes.
First, as everyone acknowledges, the euro needs a better set of fiscal policy rules to replace the inadequate and unenforceable rules of the growth and stability pact. Sweden’s fiscal policy regime could be a good model.
Second, the euro undoubtedly needs more fiscal centralism. That is one reason the United States, where 60 percent of total government spending and taxes take place at the federal level, works better as a currency area than does the euro, where only 2 percent of fiscal activity is centralized. A common euro bond could be a part of the needed centralization. The concept itself makes sense as part of a general structural reform, despite the objections that can be raised against it as an ad-hoc bailout measure.
Stability of the euro as a currency area will also be improved if recent efforts at banking reform are successful. The case of Ireland shows that sovereign debt problems do not always begin with excessive government deficits. They can also arise from unsustainable private sector commitments entered into under implicit government guarantees.
Finally, like its Asian counterpart, Germany needs to think about the possibility that reforming the euro area in a way that makes it sustainable could also require a rebalancing its own economy. Edging away from single-minded reliance on exports would not have to mean abandoning national virtues. Instead, it would mean allowing workers and consumers to share more fully in the fruits of their own thrift, hard work, and efficiency. If the euro area is to be saved, it will not be enough to reshape other members in its own image. Germany will have to change, too.
- See more at: http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2 ... DZej1.dpuf

Aqui -> http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2 ... -the-euro/

[BearManBull]

VirtuaGod excelente post mas não é coisa para se perceber á primeira leitura :p

Aproveito para repostar o que coloquei no outro tópico da Grécia que talvez faça mais sentido aqui.

O euro já esteve abaixo da paridade, não há grande problema nisso enquanto as commodities estiverem fracas.
Aliás, estava aqui a ver se vislumbrava alguma correlação, mas nem por isso

A diferença é que quando o Euro cotava abaixo do Dollar era porque o Dollar era uma moeda forte, os USA viviam tempos áureos e a divida rondava os 70% do PIB.

Com o as politicas expansionistas e gastos de guerra a divida foi subindo e Dollar foi perdendo valor face ao Euro.

Neste momento os USA continuam a aumentar a dívida sem grande controlo sobre o défice ou seja na prática o não foi o Dollar que valorizou tem sido o Euro a desvalorizar mais rápidamente do que o Dollar.

Deixo um gráfico que mostra a evolução do Dollar contra outras moedas, relativamente aos países que seguiram á risca a austeridade com aumento da dívida o Dollar está mais ou menos em paridade UK, Euro, Japão.

Note que a leitura do gráfico deve ser feita relativamente á relação de preços em 5 de Setembro de 2003 em que 1 Euro equivalia +/- 1,12 Dollars tal como no final do dia de hoje.

Agora a relação Dollar Americano vs Dollar Canadiano e Australiano é de 10% e 27% .

Relativamente aos maiores credores a situação piora ainda mais Dollar vs Yuan perdeu uns 24% e mais de 30% para os Suiços.

Portanto a situação é muito diferente da vivida no inicio de Euro uma paridade agora é muito pior que há dez anos atrás para os Alemães. Sendo dos poucos que andam com as contas certas é um país completamente divergente do resto da zona Euro, não faz qualquer sentido perder poder de compra global para estarem inseridos num meio com o qual pouco se identificam.

O Euro esteve mesmo a ganhar terreno a todas as divisas de referência antes da crise da dívida, mas foi um teste falhado ainda houve um vislumbre de retoma em 2013 mas o caminho neste momento parece ser para novos mínimos e isso vai certamente acabar com o que sobra do Euro, a chegada e quebra da paridade vai ser o primeiro sinal da insustentabilidade da situação.

[O Alquimista]

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2 ... ond-yields

[VirtuaGod]

Negative yields Q&A: what is the rationale?

"Negative bond yields now account for some $2tn of debt issued across Europe and that figure is rising. This week, Germany sold five-year government paper for the first time at a negative rate.

So what does it really mean, when someone buys a bond with a negative yield?

In essence, negative yielding bonds mean investors pay more than the face value of a bond plus interest payments, accepting a guaranteed loss if they hold it to maturity.

So why are investors buying negative yielding bonds?

First we need to understand the relationship between bond prices and yields. All bonds trade at a price, which is inversely related to its yield. In simple terms, when a bond price rises, the yield falls. When a bond price drops, the yield rises.

Governments and companies regularly sell bonds that pays a coupon or fixed rate of interest over the life of the issue. If a bond is sold with a coupon of say 1 per cent, and the price is set at 100 or par, the yield is 1 per cent. Should the bond price fall below 100, the yield will rise, while a price above 100 during the life of a bond means investors who initially bought the bond now have a capital gain.

The rationale for buyers?

Well, for banks, minus 0.08 per cent is better than placing their money on deposit at the European Central Bank starters at minus 0.20 per cent.

Now that we have mentioned the ECB, we can elaborate further and this really gets to the major burning question.

So how negative can yields get?

The central bank plans to start buying massive amounts of bonds in the coming months in order to jump start the eurozone economy.

Hence there is a very good chance bond yields will fall further into negative territory as the ECB and other central banks buy up huge amounts of debt. That will push prices higher and means investors will reap a capital gain that offsets a negative yield.

While negative bond yields are a compelling sign of a serious dysfunction, bond investors see an opportunity for capital gains or what is known as a positive total return. That is what makes bond investors very happy."

Financial Times

[Dialmedia]

Se quisessem beneficiar da subida das yields / descida do valor de mercado de obrigações (nomeadamente de mercados emergentes ou fortemente dependentes do petróleo), que instrumentos financeiros ponderariam para o efeito?

[RPedroG]

Ao que parece a iminência (como quem diz nos próximos 2 anos) da saída do euro da Alemanha é cada vez mais verosimil.

http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/mercados ... tivos.html

sinceramente nao acredito numa saida do euro da Alemanha.
o que pode acontecer é o euro nao durar até lá, mas nesse caso saiem todos.

mas sinceramente até percebo q olhando para os juros alemaes, portugueses e gregos, se prefira os alemaes. Eu nao investiria nada na divida grega pois a possibilidade de perda é enorme.
E em Portugal a situacao parece estavel, mas isso pode mudar rapidamente e com juros a 5 anos a 1,2%, nao merece o risco.
Mas sim, também nao ia comprar divida alema. Prefiro neste momento investir em outras areas.

[BearManBull]

Penso que essa oportunidade não compensa no caso da Alemanha em que as exportações não acompanham a desvalorização do euro.

As importações por outro lado estão muito mais caras >20% por alguma razão o QE só vai começar agora com o preço do petróleo tão em baixo.

Repara que o Ulisses defendia a possibilidade de salvaguardar os investimentos, mas há outros investimentos tão ou mais seguros pode-se também considerar que o regresso de um Marco mais forte do que o Euro seria isso sim uma salvaguarda dos investimentos e com o extra de se poder tirar mais valias no processo.

[Jorge Fr.]

Eu acho que acima de tudo, esta é uma otima oportunidade para os governos usarem este dinheiro e criarem investimento, seja através de infra-estruturas ou de programas de apoio e outros incentivos como redução de carga fiscal.

E assim recomeça o ciclo de crescimento na Europa. Com melhores condições de investimento, haverá maior procura a empréstimos, taxas de juro vão voltar a aumentar.
Mais empresas, mais emprego = crescimento

[BearManBull]

Ao que parece a iminência (como quem diz nos próximos 2 anos) da saída do euro da Alemanha é cada vez mais verosimil.

http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/mercados ... tivos.html

[assunoadr]

A questão é simples... Para quem tem milhões e milhões de euros, qualquer depósito bancário é, para eles, um risco de falência. A Alemanhã não falirá e por isso estão dispostos a entregar-lhes esse dinheiro. Isto dito da forma mais simples possível.

Um abraço,
Ulisses

E os bancos Alemães não têm algo mais atractivo, ou estes montantes não cabem em depositos a prazo?

trisquel, os Bancos alemães atravessam os mesmos problemas dos seus pares Europeus. Os activos tóxicos (alguém se lembra deles) continuam nos seus Balanços e a isso junta-se a exposição às dívidas dos países em dificuldades, pelo que qualquer Banco na Europa corre o risco de se tornar insolvente.

Quanto a esta emissão é apenas consequência dos disparates que se têm feito no centro da Europa, em que estando a periferia amarrada ao Euro, a principal beneficiada é a Alemanha, que nada faz para corrigir os desiquilibrios europeus.

Entretanto vai amealhando com o "Investimento" que fez nos últimos anos em ganho de competitividade relativamente aos vizinhos de continente, e aproveita para enviar recados moralistas aos pobres gastadores do sul da Europa.

Subscrevo inteiramente! De facto é isso mesmo que se está a passar. Enquanto se mantiver este nível de irracionalidade, os alemães vão continuar a beneficiar de taxas baixas ou até negativas (ridiculo) à custa da fuga de capitais dos paises que eles próprios estão a ajudar a afundar.

[Pata-Hari]

Existe dívida norueguesa e existem emissões de outros países (alemanha, p.e.) em coroas norueguesas.

[Trisquel]

Não sei se existe dívida Norueguesa, mas também deve ser algo considerado bastante seguro pelos mercados, embora tenha a desvantagem do risco cambial.

AutoMech,

Na página anterior fala sobre a Noruega.

Edit - Oopsss era a Dinamarca!

[Supermann]

Não sei se existe dívida Norueguesa, mas também deve ser algo considerado bastante seguro pelos mercados, embora tenha a desvantagem do risco cambial.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=GNOR10Y:IND

[Supermann]

Não sei se existe dívida Norueguesa, mas também deve ser algo considerado bastante seguro pelos mercados, embora tenha a desvantagem do risco cambial.

[Automech]

Não sei se existe dívida Norueguesa, mas também deve ser algo considerado bastante seguro pelos mercados, embora tenha a desvantagem do risco cambial.

[Blue Epsilon]

Tanta confusão que para aqui vai.



Coisa tão simples.

Simplesmente têm tanto medo e desconfiança da maioria das instituições que estão dispostos a perder 0.01% durante 6 meses para ter o dinheiro seguro.

Nada mais que isso.

Supermann,

Agora disseste tudo. Realmente tudo se resume a isso!

A reforçar essa ideia, os depósitos dos bancos no BCE (os tais overnight) têm batido records diariamente. Isto mostra bem que ainda não existe confiança em emprestimos interbancários!

Apenas se confia no BCE e em dívida alemã.

[Supermann]

Tanta confusão que para aqui vai.



Coisa tão simples.

Simplesmente têm tanto medo e desconfiança da maioria das instituições que estão dispostos a perder 0.01% durante 6 meses para ter o dinheiro seguro.

Nada mais que isso.

[Trisquel]

Meu Deus,

Porquê tanta complicação !!??

Como já disse acima, são os investidores do mercado obrigacionista (sobretudo os Fundos) que se refugiam num título que consideram que não vai perder qualquer valor, ao contrário de outros papéis que certamente perderão valor caso as "yields" subam.

Isto sinaliza desconfiança no mercado de títulos da zona Euro. Não foram só estes papéis da Alemanha, os Bilhetes do Tesouro Holandês a 3 meses também foram vendidos há dias para render 0% aos que neles investiram.

Abraço

dj

Já agora há mais casos, a situação não é virgem, anda tudo em pânico. Até pode ser um bom sinal!!!!

" ...Nesta quinta-feira (29/12), o Banco Central dinamarquês emitiu títulos com vencimentos de três, seis e nove meses, no valor total de 2,32 bilhões de coroas dinamarquesas (cerca de 750 milhões de reais). Em dois casos, os juros ficaram abaixo de zero, ou seja, na prática os investidores estão pagando ao Estado dinamarquês para poder investir nos seus papéis.

"Esse foi o primeiro leilão com juros negativos que já tivemos", afirmou Ove Jensen, responsável pela administração da dívida no Banco Central de Copenhague. Segundo ele, os investidores estão procurando qualidade, os juros já não são tão importantes. "Importante é receber o dinheiro de volta", completou.

Os rendimentos negativos dos papéis dinamarqueses são, contudo, baixos. Os títulos de três meses estão "pagando" -0,21% e no caso das emissões de seis meses, a taxa de juros ficou em -0,07%. Quem investiu em papéis de nove meses embolsará um ganho mínimo de 0,03%. Também no chamado mercado secundário os títulos dinamarqueses são bem procurados, com juros em torno de zero..."

[djovarius]

Meu Deus,

Porquê tanta complicação !!??

Como já disse acima, são os investidores do mercado obrigacionista (sobretudo os Fundos) que se refugiam num título que consideram que não vai perder qualquer valor, ao contrário de outros papéis que certamente perderão valor caso as "yields" subam.

Isto sinaliza desconfiança no mercado de títulos da zona Euro. Não foram só estes papéis da Alemanha, os Bilhetes do Tesouro Holandês a 3 meses também foram vendidos há dias para render 0% aos que neles investiram.

Abraço

dj

[escada1]

honestamente, é mais barato nesse caso:

-Ter comprado dolares há uns tempos e vende-los

No forex abrir posições longas, não utilizando alavancagem.O resultado é o mesmo e as percas são as mesmas, ou até nenhumas.

Isto tem história.Este movimento é pura manipulação.