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While most hedge funds probably don't operate in such a nakedly self-serving way, the underlying logic of Oz's strategy is quite common: take a position that yields high returns with high probability and extremely poor returns with low probability, and keep your fingers crossed. Credit default swaps are one example, so are bets on interest rate spreads. Such strategies are risky but not fraudulent; the manager can always argue that his opinion about the odds differed from the market odds (he was simply engaging in arbitrage).
Eliminating such scams through regulation is not going to be easy due to the unusual nature of the product. Yet, some steps toward protecting investors can -- and should -- be taken.
All hedge funds should be required to register as soon as they are established and to report their returns on a regular basis. Such tracking would allow potential investors to study the records. New rules could also require managers to keep investors apprised of the fund's downside exposure. Alternatively managers could guarantee that losses not exceed a certain level, similar to a car manufacturer offering a warranty.
Although individual hedge fund managers may drag their feet, it is actually in the industry's best interest to encourage greater regulation and transparency. Otherwise, a rising tide of failed funds could cause a collapse in investor confidence, putting both the good and the bad wizards out of business.
Dean P. Foster is Professor of Statistics at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. H. Peyton Young is James Meade Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 01642.html
