Vamos lá ver se nos entendemos.
Sempre que existe um devedor existe um credor.
Os terráqueos ainda não devem nada aos marcianos.
Os fluxos financeiros mundiais constituem uma espécie de sistema circular.
...assim, o $ tem que ir sempre para algum lado, ou seja existirá sempre PELO MENOS UM
país no mundo que em princípio não terá problemas de financiamento. O meu palpite é que esse país seja os EUA ( o que é mais ou menos confirmado pelos recentes fluxos em momentos de pânico )
bom, e se o $ deixar de fluir, se as pessoas começarem a guarda-lo debaixo do colchão (literalmente) ??
Talvez nesse caso seja promulgada legislação que o proiba, ou que $$ parado possa ser $$ confiscado (ao estilo Ouro nos anos 30).
Em último caso existe sempre a possibilidade de recorrer a mais
quantitative easing.
Relativamente ao UK o Krugman escreveu algumas linhas há alguns dias atrás :
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/why-isnt-britain-in-more-trouble/
Why Isn’t Britain In More Trouble?
There have been various versions of the “Britain is the next Greece!” story out there; a good rundown at FT Alphaville. As they note there, however, the CDS and bond markets don’t seem to agree:
So is Britain different, and why?
Some of the raw budget numbers are daunting: according to Eurostat, Britain ran a primary deficit — that is, a deficit not counting interest payments — of 9.5 percent of GDP last year. That’s larger than Greece’s 8.5 percent.
Against that, Britain had debt of “only” 68 percent of GDP, compared with Greece’s 115 percent.
But the really big difference is in economic prospects. Britain’s recovery hasn’t been as strong as one would like — but the economy is growing, and since deflation looks unlikely thanks to the floating exchange rate, Britain can expect to see growth of several percent a year in nominal GDP. Greece, on the other hand, is in the euro straitjacket, and is probably condemned to years of depressed activity and deflation; S&P says it won’t regain 2008 nominal GDP until 2017, and that sounds optimistic to me.
To see the implications, imagine for a moment that both Greece and Britain were paying 5 percent on their debt, but that Britain was expecting 3 percent nominal GDP growth, Greece zero. Then Britain would need to run a primary surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio; Greece would have to run a surplus of 5.75.
Wait: there’s more. Britain can expect some “automatic” decline in its primary deficit as the economy recovers; Greece can’t.
And one more thing: Britain can offset the depressing effects of fiscal austerity with loose monetary policy; Greece can’t.
What all this suggests is that while Britain faces a nasty adjustment, it’s within the realm of possibility; Greece, even if it had retained market confidence, would face an adjustment at least two or three times as severe. Naturally, then, Greece has lost market confidence, turning the situation into a death spiral.
So Britain isn’t Greece – largely because it still has its own currency.
Really, that should be Gordon Brown’s slogan: “He kept us out of the euro.” And that’s the saving grace of the situation.