Enviado: 18/9/2003 16:53Isso só pode ser piada! Não acredito minimamente nisso!
Um abraço,
Ulisses
Um abraço,
Ulisses
È um dos potênciais sucessores de Grasso.
fonte Bloomberg
até xá
cochim
CALDEIRÃO DE BOLSA
Fórum dedicado à discussão sobre os Mercados Financeiros - Bolsas de Valores
http://caldeiraodebolsa.jornaldenegocios.pt/
GRASSO demite-se
http://caldeiraodebolsa.jornaldenegocios.pt/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=16221
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Enviado: 18/9/2003 16:53Warren Buffet
Enviado: 18/9/2003 16:46Richard Grasso segundo a Forbes
Enviado: 18/9/2003 16:12Aqui vai um artigozito do Dan Ackman (Forbes) acerca de Richard Grasso. (Acho interessante a escrita deste Sr. 
).
Aqui fica:
"NEW YORK - At the end of the day, the New York Stock Exchange paid Richard Grasso so much that they had no choice but to fire him. That sounds perverse since, normally, high pay is a sign of affection and respect. But one of the oddities of Grasso's pay package, even today, is its mystery.
Grasso's pay started with his salary: $1.4 million per year. One might think that $1.4 million would be enough of an incentive for an executive to show up and do his best work, but that's naïve. Starting in the early 1990s, just before Grasso was hired as chairman and chief executive, the NYSE board decided that it would need a new compensation "program" in order to "attract and retain superior 'world-class' executives."
The hiring of Richard Grasso would seem to be exhibit A in the case against this theory. First, there was no need to attract him, and the NYSE had never had any problem retaining him. He was a lifer.
The NYSE board's compensation committee didn't simply determine how much was needed to attract or keep the best, it determined a formula--though its details remain hazy. The exchange has said that in addition to the salary, it determined that there should be a "target bonus of at least $1 million per year." Grasso's bonus substantially exceeded that target every year since 1996, his first full year as CEO, topping out at $16.1 million in 2001. There were other payments on top of that--long-term incentive compensation plan awards and capital accumulation plan awards. In 2000 and 2001, the board awarded Grasso a "special payment" of $5 million, which was apparently none of the above.
Though Grasso's compensation is the subject of a 12-page letter from compensation committee Chairman H. Carl McCall to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, it's still not clear what the formula was for determining this pay package. Nor is it clear what the difference was between annual incentives, long-term incentives and capital accumulation. Why were all three needed?
In the letter, McCall lists Grasso's compensation as CEO year by year. The total comes to $80 million, or $90 million when you add the special payments. Since Grasso was paid a total of $139.5 million, according to the exchange, that leaves $49 million unaccounted for. It would seem impossible for Grasso to have accumulated such a sum even in nearly 30 years as an exchange employee, especially since he so famously began his career as an $82.50-a-week clerk. It's clear that Grasso was liked, but is anyone that well-liked?
It is a truly bizarre situation. So-called compensation consultants hired by the board are apparently in the middle of it. But before the NYSE can "move on" or "look forward," it should explain more clearly than it has where the $139.5 million came from and how it was that Grasso was still owed $48 million, as he says he was.
Many have asked: Who cares? After all, the exchange isn't even a public company. It's a fair question. The answer is not just pure envy or fascination, though that's part of it. First, the exchange does hold a public trust as a quasi-regulator of the public companies it lists. Even more, the answer has to do with how the top executives in America, representing firms like AOL Time Warner, Viacom, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase and Home Depot, could have done business in such a cryptic fashion leading to such weird and excessive results. Questions remain about why the board did what it did, how it did what it did and whether it even knew what it was doing.
Grasso has done what's in the "best interest of both the exchange and [himself]," he said. But his resignation should not permit a cover-up. Before the NYSE moves on, it must look back and act on its public trust by putting plainly how the deal was done."
).
Aqui fica:
"NEW YORK - At the end of the day, the New York Stock Exchange paid Richard Grasso so much that they had no choice but to fire him. That sounds perverse since, normally, high pay is a sign of affection and respect. But one of the oddities of Grasso's pay package, even today, is its mystery.
Grasso's pay started with his salary: $1.4 million per year. One might think that $1.4 million would be enough of an incentive for an executive to show up and do his best work, but that's naïve. Starting in the early 1990s, just before Grasso was hired as chairman and chief executive, the NYSE board decided that it would need a new compensation "program" in order to "attract and retain superior 'world-class' executives."
The hiring of Richard Grasso would seem to be exhibit A in the case against this theory. First, there was no need to attract him, and the NYSE had never had any problem retaining him. He was a lifer.
The NYSE board's compensation committee didn't simply determine how much was needed to attract or keep the best, it determined a formula--though its details remain hazy. The exchange has said that in addition to the salary, it determined that there should be a "target bonus of at least $1 million per year." Grasso's bonus substantially exceeded that target every year since 1996, his first full year as CEO, topping out at $16.1 million in 2001. There were other payments on top of that--long-term incentive compensation plan awards and capital accumulation plan awards. In 2000 and 2001, the board awarded Grasso a "special payment" of $5 million, which was apparently none of the above.
Though Grasso's compensation is the subject of a 12-page letter from compensation committee Chairman H. Carl McCall to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, it's still not clear what the formula was for determining this pay package. Nor is it clear what the difference was between annual incentives, long-term incentives and capital accumulation. Why were all three needed?
In the letter, McCall lists Grasso's compensation as CEO year by year. The total comes to $80 million, or $90 million when you add the special payments. Since Grasso was paid a total of $139.5 million, according to the exchange, that leaves $49 million unaccounted for. It would seem impossible for Grasso to have accumulated such a sum even in nearly 30 years as an exchange employee, especially since he so famously began his career as an $82.50-a-week clerk. It's clear that Grasso was liked, but is anyone that well-liked?
It is a truly bizarre situation. So-called compensation consultants hired by the board are apparently in the middle of it. But before the NYSE can "move on" or "look forward," it should explain more clearly than it has where the $139.5 million came from and how it was that Grasso was still owed $48 million, as he says he was.
Many have asked: Who cares? After all, the exchange isn't even a public company. It's a fair question. The answer is not just pure envy or fascination, though that's part of it. First, the exchange does hold a public trust as a quasi-regulator of the public companies it lists. Even more, the answer has to do with how the top executives in America, representing firms like AOL Time Warner, Viacom, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase and Home Depot, could have done business in such a cryptic fashion leading to such weird and excessive results. Questions remain about why the board did what it did, how it did what it did and whether it even knew what it was doing.
Grasso has done what's in the "best interest of both the exchange and [himself]," he said. But his resignation should not permit a cover-up. Before the NYSE moves on, it must look back and act on its public trust by putting plainly how the deal was done."
Enviado: 18/9/2003 13:32O problema aqui não se põe no volume do salário + prémios, mas no facto de ter sido "segredo" o dito salário + prémios. Isto não fica bem para quem tem como uma das funções principais, ser regulador.
É lógico que existem interesses escondidos, e provavelmente sempre existiram e sempre irão existir, aonde houver somas avultadas em jogo normalmente é assim. Mas de vez em quando os sistemas necessitam de levar um abanão para sacudir os interesses instalados criando assim um novo shift que possobilibite uma revitalização do mesmos.
Como curiosidade os tais 140 milhões davam para pagar ao Sr Greenspan e ao Presidente do Banco de Inglaterra durante 415 (quatrocentos e quinze) anos.
Um abraço
É lógico que existem interesses escondidos, e provavelmente sempre existiram e sempre irão existir, aonde houver somas avultadas em jogo normalmente é assim. Mas de vez em quando os sistemas necessitam de levar um abanão para sacudir os interesses instalados criando assim um novo shift que possobilibite uma revitalização do mesmos.
Como curiosidade os tais 140 milhões davam para pagar ao Sr Greenspan e ao Presidente do Banco de Inglaterra durante 415 (quatrocentos e quinze) anos.
Um abraço
Enviado: 18/9/2003 13:31Ao fazer uma pesquisa, encontrei este artigo do Cramer sobre o Grasso, do qual gostei bastante.
Ulisses
"Paying the Price for Transparency"
By James J. Cramer
09/15/2003 02:16 PM EDT
"Transparency's ugly on Wall Street. It's ugly because we are paid so much more than everyone else for virtually everything we do.
I didn't come from Wall Street. I came from journalism. I was always amazed at how much we were paid -- or overpaid -- for selling and trading and issuing stocks and bonds. I made more money in my first week of work at Goldman Sachs than I did in all of my five years of work before that. And then, a month later, I made more money in a day than I did in my entire work life.
Until I made more money in an hour than I did in my entire work life.
And so on.
The whole time I was at Goldman I was in disbelief that there existed such opportunities as the one I "lucked" into, although it took me four years to get the job, and I think I got it after working my butt off trying to get in the door.
But think about it: Why should I have known how much was being made? There's no transparency here. It is private enterprise. It is nobody's business. The press was always sniffing around trying to figure out how much brokers made. The funniest thing is, of course, we were in the poorest paid division -- save research -- of the firm! Others made tons more. I don't think I was ever in the top 1,000 in pay at Goldman Sachs. That's amazing.
It was nobody's business at the New York Stock Exchange, too, when the Dick Grasso package was put together. Nobody even thought it would see the light of day. But the people who put the package together were guys like the people who worked with me at Goldman Sachs. They regarded the NYSE as a private business, not a regulator, or even a quasi-regulator. Grasso was, and is, a pitchman in a competitive situation. He is a spokesperson, not a cop. He is a value-enhancer, not a principal.
Now that transparency is here, people are in jaw-dropping disbelief about Grasso's pay. There are three groups of people who are in disbelief, though.
The first group is those who had no idea how much money we make on Wall Street. They are flabbergasted, and I believe, they would be flabbergasted even if Dick were a pure CEO and not a quasi-regulator.
The second group is made up of people who are angry at Grasso. These include the folks at LaBranche who didn't like the investigation Grasso has conducted.
The third group is made up of people who lost a lot of money in the market and believe that Grasso is part and parcel of the decline in equities and standards that led to that decline. I can't help you on that, but I can tell you that there are lots of other villains worse than Grasso.
These three groups have seized on a number that they wouldn't have had without transparency and have used that number to make Grasso the fall guy, a rich fall guy, but a fall guy nonetheless.
Oddly, I have to tell you, the discussion is a good one. I favor massive transparency. I want people to know what world we are from. That Grasso's caught in the maw of the transparency is the price you have to pay when you make tons of money and people find out about it.
It's funny, but I truly believe that this discussion will make it so that we stop overpaying people simply because some consultants and some board members believe that because others received big packages so should their buddies. That's the bigger issue that comes about with transparency.
In the meantime, though, the three constituencies are having the time of their lives with this one. Enjoy it, after Grasso's gone, many of you, particularly the third group, will be just as mad and just as angry as before. "
(in www.realmoney.com)
Ulisses
"Paying the Price for Transparency"
By James J. Cramer
09/15/2003 02:16 PM EDT
"Transparency's ugly on Wall Street. It's ugly because we are paid so much more than everyone else for virtually everything we do.
I didn't come from Wall Street. I came from journalism. I was always amazed at how much we were paid -- or overpaid -- for selling and trading and issuing stocks and bonds. I made more money in my first week of work at Goldman Sachs than I did in all of my five years of work before that. And then, a month later, I made more money in a day than I did in my entire work life.
Until I made more money in an hour than I did in my entire work life.
And so on.
The whole time I was at Goldman I was in disbelief that there existed such opportunities as the one I "lucked" into, although it took me four years to get the job, and I think I got it after working my butt off trying to get in the door.
But think about it: Why should I have known how much was being made? There's no transparency here. It is private enterprise. It is nobody's business. The press was always sniffing around trying to figure out how much brokers made. The funniest thing is, of course, we were in the poorest paid division -- save research -- of the firm! Others made tons more. I don't think I was ever in the top 1,000 in pay at Goldman Sachs. That's amazing.
It was nobody's business at the New York Stock Exchange, too, when the Dick Grasso package was put together. Nobody even thought it would see the light of day. But the people who put the package together were guys like the people who worked with me at Goldman Sachs. They regarded the NYSE as a private business, not a regulator, or even a quasi-regulator. Grasso was, and is, a pitchman in a competitive situation. He is a spokesperson, not a cop. He is a value-enhancer, not a principal.
Now that transparency is here, people are in jaw-dropping disbelief about Grasso's pay. There are three groups of people who are in disbelief, though.
The first group is those who had no idea how much money we make on Wall Street. They are flabbergasted, and I believe, they would be flabbergasted even if Dick were a pure CEO and not a quasi-regulator.
The second group is made up of people who are angry at Grasso. These include the folks at LaBranche who didn't like the investigation Grasso has conducted.
The third group is made up of people who lost a lot of money in the market and believe that Grasso is part and parcel of the decline in equities and standards that led to that decline. I can't help you on that, but I can tell you that there are lots of other villains worse than Grasso.
These three groups have seized on a number that they wouldn't have had without transparency and have used that number to make Grasso the fall guy, a rich fall guy, but a fall guy nonetheless.
Oddly, I have to tell you, the discussion is a good one. I favor massive transparency. I want people to know what world we are from. That Grasso's caught in the maw of the transparency is the price you have to pay when you make tons of money and people find out about it.
It's funny, but I truly believe that this discussion will make it so that we stop overpaying people simply because some consultants and some board members believe that because others received big packages so should their buddies. That's the bigger issue that comes about with transparency.
In the meantime, though, the three constituencies are having the time of their lives with this one. Enjoy it, after Grasso's gone, many of you, particularly the third group, will be just as mad and just as angry as before. "
(in www.realmoney.com)
Enviado: 18/9/2003 13:30Bem,alguem vai-lhe pagar os 150 milhoes de dolars,se e merecido ou nao,cada um tem a sua opiniao,mas para quem lhos ira pagar com certeza sera de bom grado.Isso parece é inveja à Portuguesa.Enfim lá estao aqueles maluquinhos a irem ao extremo outra vez,daqui a pouco ninguem pode ganhar $$$ la.
Enviado: 18/9/2003 12:45Inclusive, Dick Grasso foi o "best man" que o NYSE podia ter tido nos últimos tempos.
O problema é que nos anos noventa havia até um certo glamour em torno dos CEO milionários e agora isso é um pecado, quase um "crime".
É a América dos extremos e dos absurdos. Agora é quase a caça às bruxas nos salários elevados.
Manias...
até mais
dj
O problema é que nos anos noventa havia até um certo glamour em torno dos CEO milionários e agora isso é um pecado, quase um "crime".
É a América dos extremos e dos absurdos. Agora é quase a caça às bruxas nos salários elevados.
Manias...
até mais
dj
Enviado: 18/9/2003 12:31No meio desta discussão, vi dizer-se (e, sobretudo, escrever-se) tantas barbaridades que quase só faltou chamarem criminoso ao Grasso.
Apesar de tudo, Grasso é uma pessoa tida em boa conta por muita gente. Duvido que ele se evapore da cena assim. Não me espantaria nada que a CNBC tivesse lá um lugarzinho para ele: Homem inteligente, popular nos Estados Unidos e com ideias interessantes sobre o mercado.
Just a feeling...
Beijos,
Ulisses
Apesar de tudo, Grasso é uma pessoa tida em boa conta por muita gente. Duvido que ele se evapore da cena assim. Não me espantaria nada que a CNBC tivesse lá um lugarzinho para ele: Homem inteligente, popular nos Estados Unidos e com ideias interessantes sobre o mercado.
Just a feeling...
Beijos,
Ulisses
Enviado: 18/9/2003 12:30Ja tenho andado a ver este assunto no cnbc a mais de uma semana...
Eu nem concordo com a demissão, se o problema é o paycheck, entao reduzam-lhe o salário!
Penso que o Sr. Grasso estava a fazer um bom trabalho de qualquer maneira
Eu nem concordo com a demissão, se o problema é o paycheck, entao reduzam-lhe o salário!
Penso que o Sr. Grasso estava a fazer um bom trabalho de qualquer maneira
GRASSO demite-se
Enviado: 18/9/2003 12:16Diz que foi com a maior relutancia, lol....
Pediu voto de confiança e, olha que chatice, não passou.
Na CNBC fala-se na responsabilidade do conselho de administração que foi quem aceitou aqueles montantes, mas isto é giro, porque afinal de contas eles estavam a votar o salário de quem os contrata e os mantêm no board, nunca poderiam negar o que lhes era pedido, não se pode morder na mão do dono, né?!??!?!? enfim... greedy feeding the greedy.
Pediu voto de confiança e, olha que chatice, não passou.
Na CNBC fala-se na responsabilidade do conselho de administração que foi quem aceitou aqueles montantes, mas isto é giro, porque afinal de contas eles estavam a votar o salário de quem os contrata e os mantêm no board, nunca poderiam negar o que lhes era pedido, não se pode morder na mão do dono, né?!??!?!? enfim... greedy feeding the greedy.